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1 Executive summary 
Following seminal contributions from two of the giants of 20th century economics, 
Schumpeter and Arrow, the relationship between competition and innovation has long 
been hotly debated, but the general consensus is that competition, whether for the 
market or in the market, is an important stimulus to innovation. This provides an 
important additional justification for competition policy, beyond the static purely price-
based perspective. Remarkably however, we know relatively little about how specific 
competition policy interventions have impacted on firms’ innovation activities. So 
whilst the impact evaluation literature has made important strides in recent decades in 
assessing the static gains which have been driven by anti-trust and merger control, 
there have only been very few studies evaluating the impacts of individual policy 
decisions in this area. The main objective of this study is to explore whether, and how 
far, such impact evaluation exercises are feasible for competition and innovation.  
For this reason DG COMP commissioned a team of academics led by Peter Ormosi at 
the Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, to review the existing 
literature, and to propose a rigorous analytical and methodological framework which 
can be used to evaluate cases. As an illustration of this framework in action, the study 
provides a pilot evaluation of the Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/Hitachi 
mergers. The findings of this case study prove to be interesting in their own right – 
shedding some new light on these important mergers. But far more important for 
present purposes, it establishes that the methodology is viable, albeit with important 
lessons to be learnt. 
The objective of this study was to offer a detailed literature review, develop a 
methodological framework, collect data on three different areas (R&D spending, 
patents, and product characteristics), and analyse it. Our task was to identify what is 
feasible, what we can learn in terms of the applied methodology, and also to provide 
preliminary results on how innovation was affected by the 2012 consolidation of the 
HDD market. 
1.1 Review of existing literature 
The study reviewed the economic and legal literature as well as competition policy 
practice in order to identify recurrent issues that affect competition in innovative 
markets. The review focused specifically on the existing empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of the European Commission’s merger, antitrust and cartel decisions on 
innovation.  
Schumpeter’s early classification of the three stages of technical progress remains 
very helpful for genuinely understanding what is loosely referred to as ‘innovation’. In 
a nutshell, the first stage is the investment, the second stage, the innovation of 
something new, and the third stage is diffusion, in which the innovation is adopted 
and introduced more widely by other firms. The pilot study follows this trichotomy.  
Competition and innovation 
The relationship between market structure and innovation has been one of the most 
widely researched areas of industrial organisation. While a unified consensus is difficult 
to draw based on theoretical works, these are invaluable for identifying the different 
conditions that influence the relationship between market structure and innovation. 
Empirically the picture is equally rich and diverse, arguments and evidence exist that 
depending on the circumstances and the industry, the relationship between 
competition and innovation might be characterised by an increasing, decreasing, or an 
Final report 
7 
inverse U-shaped function. The sensitivity of findings to specific conditions support the 
argument for more case-specific studies, such as the pilot study in this report.  
Competition policy and innovation 
It has been acknowledged that some practices are difficult to assess by competition 
authorities because they create both consumer benefits and harms. In innovative 
industries, the potential trade-off is even more difficult given that consumer harms 
might be identifiable in a static setting, whereas consumer benefits only appear in the 
future in a dynamic process. This is often the case in various manifestations of 
monopoly abuse. 
Innovative markets might be characterised by features, which could conceivably 
justify the need for a more nuanced stance to assessing competition problems. Such 
features are: (1) high fixed costs, but low marginal costs; (2) innovation-intensive 
industries entail far more uncertainty than more traditional industries; (3) there are 
also inevitable doubts about appropriability; (4) because innovative markets are often 
conducive to the creation of market dominance, due to network effects for example, 
they are probably more prone in principle to potential competition problems. 
Reflection on these essential features provokes difficult questions for anti-trust to 
address.  
For abuse of dominance cases the picture is ambiguous. First of all, refusal to supply 
or licence may be a natural strategy for any innovator anxious to fully internalise the 
fruits of innovation. For this reason, limiting their ability to foreclose might have a 
negative effect on willingness to innovate. On the other hand, there is a key concern, 
that exclusionary practices may hinder the innovation activities of rivals, for example 
by deterring innovative entrants. Which of these two effects dominate will depend on 
the particulars of a given case, but the ambiguity of the problem highlights the 
importance of studies looking at the ex-post innovation effect of abuse of dominance 
interventions. 
The literature evaluating the effect of merger control on innovation is relatively small 
but growing. A small number of studies assess the causal effects of mergers on 
innovation ex-post. While not studying the role of the competition authority explicitly, 
the fact that the mergers did occur allows for an indirect assessment of those mergers 
on innovation that were deemed not to produce anticompetitive effects.  
In some of these studies, the negative effect of market power on innovation appears 
to dominate potential positive effects arising from cost savings. Other studies find the 
opposite effect. The contradiction can be explained by the fact that these studies look 
at the average effect of a sample of different mergers, rather than pointing out in 
which cases the negative effects were particularly pronounced. Whilst these aggregate 
studies have important academic value, they mask the fact that some mergers 
increase, and some others decrease innovation and as such cannot inform us about 
the effect of specific cases or interventions. This further underlines the importance of 
conducting individual studies such as this one. 
The idea that cooperation among rivals could promote innovation has always been 
seen with suspicion by the economics literature, because it could hide anticompetitive 
behaviour. Nevertheless, the traditional description of the innovation process should in 
principle highlight the advantages of industries characterised by intensive economies 
of scale. However, this model of analysis ignores the cumulative innovation which 
includes a set of incremental steps typical of the modern IT industries. When the 
innovative process shows these characteristics, coordination among firms at the 
different stages might be justified, which is the reasoning behind the block exemption 
of certain R&D related horizontal agreements. Because of the ambiguity of the 
available evidence, it appears reasonable that competition authorities carefully 
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scrutinise horizontal and vertical research joint ventures for possible collusive 
behaviour. 
1.2 Findings of the pilot study 
The study team agreed with DG COMP that the pilot study would look at the feasibility 
of estimating the innovation impact of two mergers in the HDD market, Seagate’s 
acquisition of Samsung’s HDD division, and Western Digital’s acquisition of Hitachi 
Global Storage Technologies, and the innovation impact of Toshiba’s acquisition of 
HGST’s 3.5-inch HDD operations.  
DG COMP unconditionally approved the Seagate/Samsung merger, and approved the 
WD/HGST merger subject to the divestiture of HGST’s 3.5’ HDD operations to Toshiba. 
The Chinese competition authority, MOFCOM also approved both mergers but subject 
to a number of restrictions. Because of these restrictions, the two mergers (especially 
the WD/HGST acquisition) could not be fully consummated in 2012. However, there is 
evidence that at least for Seagate property rights (including IP, such as patents) were 
transferred with the conditional approval of the merger. For this reason, Seagate and 
WD were free to choose at least between increasing or not changing innovation 
activities – the remedies only required them to hold R&D activities separate and do 
not reduce R&D spending. Moreover, because the mergers were approved (although 
conditionally), each party and the competitors could perfectly anticipate that it would 
be fully consummated within foreseeable time. This pilot study looks at whether the 
combination of the 2012 events, and the partial consummation of the mergers had an 
effect on Seagate’s, Western Digital’s, and Toshiba’s innovation activities. 
For Seagate, we found evidence of an increase in all three stages of innovation (R&D 
intensity, patent activity, and product characteristics) after 2012. For WD we found 
very little, or no robust effect in terms of R&D spending and product characteristics, 
and mixed evidence on patent activity. Finally, for Toshiba the evidence we found 
typically showed a drop in innovation at all three stages. We could not pin down 
causality in terms of which merger decision had exactly what effect, only how the 
cocktail of all events at the turn of 2011/12 affected innovation.  
1.3 Methodological lessons 
One of the most important methodological lessons is that identification is difficult and 
therefore one should be careful in selecting a case where the number of potential 
confounding effects is small. In our study this was not the case, as we had three 
mergers at the same time, and different decisions by various competition authorities. 
Disentangling the effect of at least some of these might be possible (for example one 
could try to estimate a structural model and simulate a factual or counterfactual 
without some of these events) but it was beyond the remits of this feasibility study. 
However, even in our complex case, it was possible to estimate how the collection of 
all relevant events affected innovation, and this information alone can be extremely 
valuable for future merger control. 
Our headline conclusion is that although such exercise is inevitably complex, it is 
feasible and useful, and hopefully this study sets out a sound example for future work. 
We believe that ex post studies of this kind are extremely valuable, especially in policy 
areas where the Commission’s decisions are made ex ante (such as merger control), 
these studies can confirm how dynamic factors, such as innovation evolved after the 
Commission’s decision, and whether the Commission’s predictions on these factors 
had been correct.  
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1.3.1 R&D expenditure 
When analysing R&D data in ex-post merger evaluations, the post merger 
data represents the sum of the merging parties’ R&D intensity. To eliminate 
biased impact estimates, one should (1) remove the period of the merger 
from the analysis, and (2) look at growth in R&D intensity rather than 
absolute figures. 
When evaluating how R&D intensity (R&D expenditure to revenue ratio) changes after 
a merger, one must not ignore an important artefact of this type of data, that is, 
following a merger, elements of the financial statement of the acquired company are 
added to the corresponding elements of the financial statement of the acquiring 
company. This means that for simple arithmetic reasons R&D expenditure and Total 
Revenue will be higher in the post-merger period even if the merger does not increase 
the R&D intensity of the relevant businesses. This calls for some methodological 
adjustments. In this study we ignore the period of the treatment (the merger approval 
period) when estimating the impact of treatment, to take out the hikes caused by 
merging the two financial statements. Second, instead of using the level of R&D 
intensity we compare the ‘growth’ in R&D intensity. This eliminates the potential issue 
that a change in the level of R&D will inevitably include the effect of adding up two 
figures in the firms’ financial statements. 
Because R&D expenditure data is recorded for the whole firm, it is more 
fitting in cases where the relevant firms are less diversified so that the R&D 
data can be attributed to the relevant product. 
When using R&D data from firms’ financial statements, it is very difficult (if possible at 
all) to acquire data specifically for the relevant segments or products of the analysed 
firms. Therefore the use of R&D expenditure data is more fitting in cases where the 
relevant firms are less diverse, where R&D expenditure figures in financial statements 
can be attributed to the relevant product. 
Similarly to price-impact studies, finding an adequate Control is likely to be 
easier in some markets (e.g. differentiated products). Because innovation 
happens at the global level, impact studies on innovation are not likely to be 
able to rely on geographical market variation to find an adequate Control. 
One of the main challenges in our pilot study was finding the right Control group. One 
is more likely to find an adequate Control in markets with differentiated products. In 
the present case the product is somewhat differentiated (HDD, SSD, USB Flash), 
which is what we tried to explore to find a Control. Geographically, innovation tends to 
happen at a global level, therefore it is unlikely that local market variation can be used 
for finding a good Control group.  
1.3.2 Patents 
Changes in patent stock around a merger can provide useful first information 
on firms’ potential for post-merger innovation synergies. 
Patent data is very complex but there are some measures which can provide useful 
guidance in motivating a detailed empirical work. One such measure is the number of 
patents transferred. We found that Seagate acquired a large number of patents from 
Samsung with the merger. This consolidation of ownership in relevant patents can 
provide important synergies for future innovation. 
For evaluating the impact of specific cases on patent activity, one has to be 
able to identify all patents that are relevant and filter out the irrelevant ones. 
Where the relevant firms are only active in the relevant product market, such 
identification might be possible by simply looking at the owner of the patent. 
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More sophisticated machine learning techniques could be called on in other 
cases to filter out irrelevant patents. 
In the pilot study, the main players (Seagate and Western Digital) were mainly active 
in the relevant market (HDD), therefore one could use the assumption that all of their 
patents were HDD related. Where such simplification is not possible one could draw on 
machine learning techniques to further improve sampling. This would require an 
algorithm to filter out non-relevant patents, and would involve an analyst ‘training’ the 
algorithm by creating a learning set (a set of patents that the analyst identifies as 
relevant). The algorithm would then compare the other patents to the learning set and 
assign it to relevant or irrelevant classes based on their similarity to the documents 
that have already been assigned to the category. As the set of identified ‘relevant’ 
patents grows, the better tuned the algorithm becomes in identifying relevant patents. 
When rivals’ patenting activity cannot be used as control one potential option 
is to us patenting activities in complementary product markets as Control, 
although these markets may not be fully independent of the Treatment. 
The mergers we evaluated in the pilot study involved all firms in the HDD market. For 
this reason we could not use a direct rival as Control. With patent data it is very 
difficult to find a Control that is sufficiently similar to the Treatment, except for the 
effect of the merger. Our solution is to use firms that produce complementary goods 
as Control. It is important to emphasise that this Control group is not complementary 
patents but patents on complementary products. We can test the similarity of this 
Control to the Treatment and we identify the cases when they are. But this Control 
might also have been affected by the merger, violating the independence assumption.  
Using a different product as Control when analysing patenting activity might 
violate the parallel trend assumption of difference-in-differences estimates if 
the product is at a different level of technological maturity. 
The study investigated the use of a different, but similar product as Control when 
estimating the impact of the mergers on patenting activity. The study team had access 
to patents in SSD and Flash drives. These are all alternative storage technologies. 
Because HDD is more mature technology than SSD or Flash, patenting follows a 
different pattern. Because of the time-lag between the lifecycle of the two 
technologies it seems doubtful whether either of these technologies would perform as 
a good control. This is a problem that one will inevitably face if the Treatment and 
Control are not at the same level in terms of technological maturity. In our specific 
case, because innovation is still expanding in HDD, we explore using Flash as Control 
group. 
Patent data is rich and multidimensional. Simple measures such as patent 
count or citation-weighted patent count might be used but composite indices 
created through factor analysis can capture more information on patents. 
One pivotal question when evaluating patenting performance is what measure of 
patents to use. Patent count is an obvious choice, although this does not eliminate the 
issue that many of the patents do not reflect real technological innovation. To address 
this, the literature overwhelmingly relies on citation-weighted patent counts, which is 
patent count weighted by the number of subsequent citations that the patents receive, 
which is great to account for great dispersion in the value distribution of patents. 
Finally the study also employs a composite measure, which combines multi-
dimensional information on patents into one factor, using factor analysis. 
There is a multitude of possible measures of patent activity, which implies a 
large number of potential models and Control groups. Our recommendation is 
to look at all possible Controls, filter out the ones where there is a violation 
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of the assumptions required for unbiased estimates, and examine the 
robustness of the estimates across the remaining models and Control groups. 
The pilot study offered three main measures of patenting activity (patent count, 
citations, and a common factor) and experiments with various expressions of these 
measures, such as levels, logs, growth, intensity (normalised by firm size). For each of 
these variables we test the parallel trend and serial correlation, and only use models 
and Control groups where these assumptions are not violated.  
Firm level patent data is highly volatile over time, which makes it difficult to 
find a suitable Control that satisfies the parallel trend assumption needed in 
difference-in-differences studies. 
The feasibility study highlighted an important issue with using patent data to evaluate 
how an event affected the patenting performance of an individual firm. Firm-level 
patenting activity is highly volatile. Even more so when one looks at quarterly periods. 
The typical pattern for any firm is to have some patents in one quarter and possibly 
none in the next, and so on. The Control group on the other hand consists of many 
firms, therefore the time series is smoothened out over time. When contrasting a 
volatile time series against a smooth time series, the parallel assumption is likely to be 
violated. To find a suitable Control one should look at time-trends instead. This study 
suggests imposing a linear trend on patenting activity and assessing whether the 
Control group patent data displays a parallel linear trend. We also offer a detailed 
discussion of which measure of patent activity is the best in terms of the assumptions 
required for unbiased estimates. 
1.3.3 Product characteristics 
When estimating impact on technology development, completely different 
products might not be the best counterfactual. In general, one will have a 
better chance finding a well-behaved Control in differentiated product 
markets. However, the chance of a spill-over effect might be higher in these 
markets.  
It is not a trivial exercise to find a product for which technological changes follow the 
same (or sufficiently similar) pattern except for the effect of the merger. For example, 
for estimating the impact on new products, one would need to use a Control product, 
for which new models are marketed at a similar pace. This requirement is likely to rule 
out using a product from a different market as Control. In our study we explore the 
differentiation between two storage technologies, HDD and SSD. 
In the absence of a reliable Control group, one might have to rely on different 
estimation techniques to analyse product characteristics data. 
For product characteristics data it might be advisable to start with a different 
estimation method, such as establishing structural breaks or divergence from long-
term technology trends. However, these methods are not as strong in terms of 
identifying causes and effects. Another way to proceed would be to estimate a full 
structural model, in which we could simulate a well behaved Control group, but this 
was beyond the remits of our study.  
The diversity of product characteristics data can be helpful for finding an 
outcome variable, for which the assumptions of a difference in differences 
study are not violated, even if the Treatment and Control are on a different 
overall technological cycle. 
Product characteristics data is potentially diverse, which can be helpful for finding an 
outcome variable, for which the assumptions of a difference in differences study are 
not violated. This is true even if in general the two products are on a different 
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technology cycle. Looking at our cases as example, it is undeniably true that HDDs are 
on a different technology cycle than SSDs. However, some product features seem to 
follow more similar trends than others. For example the number of new products, or 
the areal density or capacity of drives offer much more meaningful comparisons than 
features such as power consumption, or failure rate. A good evaluation study can 
make use of this feature of the data. 
Data on the number of new products is likely to be the most easily available 
information that could be used to measure how innovation is diffused into the 
market.  
1.3.4 General 
Because of the potential time-lag between R&D expenditure, patent 
applications, and the diffusion of a new technology, ex-post evaluations of 
impact on innovation should allow sufficient time (our recommendation is at 
least 5-6 years). 
In terms of general methodological lessons, the feasibility study offered useful 
guidance on which cases are recommended for such evaluations. Data availability is of 
course a key concern, although R&D expenditure and patent data tends to be available 
for a large number of cases. Another important lesson is about the timing of the 
study. If one accounts for the lags between the three stages of innovation (R&D-
patent-diffusion), then it is safe to conclude that ex-post studies that want to look at 
all three stages should be conducted at least 5-6 years following the merger. This will 
vary by industry. High technology markets tend to be characterised by shorter lags 
and mature industries by longer lags. 
Conducting a full-fledged study of the effect of individual competition 
enforcement decisions on innovation is a resource-intensive task as it 
requires a separate investigation of how various facets of innovation (R&D, 
patenting, diffusion) are affected. 
This feasibility study offered a useful benchmark to assess the time and resource 
demands of a similar evaluation. Such a full-fledged evaluation of innovation is not a 
trivial task. Data for each of the three stages is different in nature. An evaluation of 
R&D effects requires firm level balance-sheet data. Patent analysis relies on the 
collection of adequate patent data, which involves not only the arduous task of 
filtering out as much noise as possible but also a thorough understanding of the 
industry. Finally, product diffusion, or product characteristics data is often costly and 
requires engineering knowledge. Each stage is a separate ex-post evaluation exercise 
on its own. We had 7 months to conduct a feasibility study on the HDD market, in 
which we admittedly were able to explore many issues but did not come to a definitive 
conclusion on some parts. We would say that a full study of how innovation was 
affected by a competition decision would require 12-18 months. 
Finally, quantitative studies, like the one presented in this report, are useful but may 
not offer full explanation of the effects estimated in quantitative studies. For this 
reason it might be justified to follow-up these quantitative studies with qualitative 
case studies, especially if the additional information acquired can help improve 
identification of causes and effects. 
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2 Introduction 
Following seminal contributions from two of the giants of 20th century Economics, 
Schumpeter and Arrow, the relationship between competition and innovation has long 
been hotly debated, and the general consensus is that competition, whether for the 
market or in the market, is an important stimulus to innovation. This provides an 
important additional justification for competition policy, beyond the static purely price-
based perspective.  
There is considerable amount of literature on measuring the relationship between 
competition and innovation. Remarkably however, we know relatively little about how 
specific competition policy interventions have impacted on firms’ innovation activities. 
So whilst the impact evaluation literature has made important strides in recent 
decades in assessing the static gains which have been driven by anti-trust and merger 
control, there have only been very few studies evaluating the impacts of individual 
policy decisions on innovation.  
Moreover, most of the studies that have been undertaken have only provided 
aggregate and sometimes rough evidence summarising the average effect in large 
samples of interventions, and this masks important information on the effect of 
individual interventions. Thus, just as an aggregate study on the average price effect 
of mergers tells us very little - if the mean estimated price change is zero, this does 
not mean that no merger ever increases price - an aggregate study might show that 
innovation on average is hindered/encouraged/unaffected by interventions, but give 
no information on which cases hinder and which ones spur innovation. In short, 
aggregate studies, may not only suffer from the very fact that they are aggregate, 
almost inevitably involving approximations, but also they provide little or no guidance 
on how an in depth analysis of a specific intervention in a specific case should, or 
could, be conducted.  
The main objective of this study is to explore the feasibility of a detailed ex-post 
impact evaluation for an individual intervention on the subsequent innovative 
performance of the firms and market concerned. For this reason DG COMP 
commissioned a team of academics led by Peter Ormosi at the Centre for Competition 
Policy, University of East Anglia, to review the existing literature, and to propose a 
rigorous statistical methodology which can be used to evaluate cases. As an 
illustration of the proposed methodology, the study provides a pilot evaluation of the 
Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/Hitachi mergers. The findings of this case 
study prove to be interesting in their own right – shedding some new light on these 
important mergers. But far more important for present purposes, it establishes that 
the methodology is viable, while underlining some of the conceptual and 
methodological problems which it confronts. This yields important lessons to be 
applied in future evaluations of competition enforcement on innovation. 
The study first reviews the economic and legal literature as well as competition policy 
practice in order to identify recurrent issues that affect competition in innovative 
markets. The review focuses specifically on the existing empirical evidence regarding 
the impact of the European Commission’s merger, antitrust and cartel decisions on 
innovation.  
This survey of previous literature goes beyond just providing a simple descriptive 
review, it is intended to set the scene in various ways for the rest of the project. It 
identifies the main lessons to be drawn from existing ex-post evaluations of the 
impact of EU competition decisions on innovation in innovative and R&D intensive 
markets. It collects the main hypotheses that can be tested empirically. It assesses 
the main methodologies and empirical and theoretical approaches used in existing 
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literature to analyse the effects of competition policy enforcement on innovation. It 
also reviews the data sources used for the empirical work, and the strengths and 
limitations of previous approaches. And finally, it looks at what the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature tells us about the causality between competition policy 
enforcement and innovation, where the causality is strong, and what other factors 
influence this relationship. 
As its second main part, the study offers a pilot case study to demonstrate how impact 
on innovation might be best evaluated. In this respect we look at the feasibility of 
using various datasets, methods, and study designs. This feasibility study allows us to 
consider three stages of innovation through three different datasets: investment (R&D 
spending), invention (patents), and innovation (product characteristics). Two of these 
datasets, R&D expenditure and patents are widely used in the literature. We examine 
whether these are suitable for measuring effects caused by specific enforcement 
decisions. The third type of data is on product characteristics, which we employed to 
more directly measure innovation. 
As another important goal, the study looks at whether the method most typically used 
for policy evaluation – difference in differences – is an appropriate tool for estimating 
impact on innovation. By focusing on a specific case we can answer questions such as: 
Is the identification of the effect of an enforcement action (merger) possible? Is there 
sufficiently granular data for this type of analysis? Is there data on adequate 
counterfactuals? 
Finally, another objective of this study is to examine how different study designs 
perform in this context. Does choosing a different product or technology as 
counterfactual result in biased estimates? Can we use methods like propensity score 
matching or synthetic control to construct a counterfactual? How to find a Control 
group for analysing patent activity that satisfies all assumptions required for unbiased 
estimates. 
DG COMP and the Project Team agreed that the pilot study would be on two 2011 
mergers in the HDD market, Seagate/Samsung, and Western Digital/Hitachi. Given 
the high-tech nature of the market, data on innovation was more likely to be 
available. Another specific feature of these mergers was that they were 
(unconditionally or conditionally) approved by the European Commission, but 
approved subject to strict conditions by MOFCOM. This allowed us a test of how the 
partial consummation of the mergers (following the Commission’s approval) affected 
innovation, whilst the MOFCOM restrictions were still pending. Moreover, the 
restrictions were stricter on WD than on Seagate, which also allowed us to test the 
difference in how the two firms reacted. 
An important contribution of this feasibility study is the number of methodological 
lessons that we offer for future works of similar nature. For example we give guidance 
on how to define the dependent variables, how to measure R&D investments, what 
measure of patents to apply. These lessons also offer information on the 
characteristics of cases that are more likely to be suitable for future studies. We also 
provide pointers on how other key issues, such as the definition of the Control groups 
or the type of data required. 
Section 3 of this report offers a review of the relevant literature. Section 4 introduces 
the HDD market, and Section 5 discusses the merger decisions to set up the pilot 
study. Section 6 delivers the evaluation of the effect of the mergers on R&D 
investments, and Section 7 looks at the impact on patenting activity, and finally 
Section 8 offers a tentative look at impact on product features. 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
We begin in this section with a discussion of what is innovation, followed in Section 
3.2 by how it may be measured and briefly, in Section 3.3, how innovative industries 
can be identified. Although these sections are introductory, they are not trivial since 
clear terminology, and a fairly wide perspective are key to understanding the subject 
of this project. Section 3.4 is a brief conventional survey of the literature examining 
the relationship between competition and innovation. This is well-trodden territory and 
it is not in our brief to assess in detail whether competition affects innovation and in 
what direction. Section 3.5 reviews previous literature on the relationship between 
competition enforcement and innovation. This covers both theoretical and multi-
industry empirical studies case studies of specific industries.  
Schumpeter’s early contributions to our understanding of innovation continue to have 
a major impact. While some of his views are contested (see below), his classification 
of the three stages of technical progress remains very helpful for genuinely 
understanding what is loosely referred to as ‘innovation’. In a nutshell, the first stage 
is investment. In the second stage, referred to as innovation in general parlance, this 
leads to an invention. The third stage is diffusion, in which the innovation is adopted 
and introduced more widely by other firms – this latter is sometimes called imitation. 
Very loosely, invention and innovation can sometimes be observed in the form of 
patents and R&D expenditures. Diffusion, on the other hand, need not necessarily 
involve any patenting or R&D. In some cases it will be pure imitation of another firm’s 
innovation, in other cases (process innovation, see below), it will be buying capital 
products from a supplier, where it is the supplier who is the innovator. 
This investment-innovation-diffusion trilogy is not just a matter of semantics. As 
argued below, it helps us understand different measures, how to define innovative 
industries, and how to evaluate the full impact of an enforcement intervention. For 
example, exclusivity may help encourage the incentive to invent, but also harm the 
speed of subsequent diffusion, leaving the CA with a dilemma on how to intervene, if 
at all. In the pilot study we offer at least a conceptual discussion of how to evaluate 
the impact of competition enforcement on all three stages. We employ a broad 
definition of innovation although, in the particular case study here (HDD mergers), 
diffusion is less of an issue, given that the market involves only a handful of firms 
each of which is active in its own innovation, rather than imitating others.  
A second, related distinction, again well-established in the academic literature is 
between process and product innovation. Product innovation occurs with the 
introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly improved. This includes 
significant improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, 
software in the product, user friendliness or other functional characteristics. Process 
innovation occurs with a new or significantly improved production or delivery method. 
This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or software. Many 
years ago, Blaug (1963), rather wittingly captured the distinction by describing a 
process innovation as a new way of making old things, while product innovation is an 
old way of making new things. 
Increasingly however, a simple process/product dichotomy seems insufficient. For 
example, with a capital good innovation (e.g. 3D printing) for the supplier, this is a 
product innovation, but for the customer business, using the machines, it is a process 
innovation. Beyond this, there is a recognition that there is more to innovation than 
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just process and product innovations. The OECD Oslo Manual (2005) for measuring 
innovation1 identifies four main categories of innovation: 
1. Product innovation 
2. Process innovation  
3. Marketing innovation: A new marketing method involving significant 
changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product 
promotion or pricing. 
4. Organisational innovation: A new organisational method in business 
practices, workplace organisation or external relations. 
The addition of categories 3 and 4 are important and include many significant 
instances over the last 20-30 years cases such as Uber, cut-price airlines, internet 
book retailing. 
3.2 Measuring Innovation 
In previous literature, innovation has been identified using different measures; some 
of these are related to inputs, others to outputs (Mohnen and Hall, 2013). For 
example, one could consider firms’ investments for the realization of new products or 
production processes, or could contemplate the speed of adoption of new products and 
processes. Since this is fairly familiar territory, here we focus on the two most 
common indicators, patents and R&D, but we also discuss case-specific technological 
measures. 
3.2.1 R&D expenditure 
R&D expenditure is frequently used as a proxy for innovation. However, similarly to 
patents, this has received a wide range of criticism. This is mainly because not all R&D 
spending leads to innovation. In fact, whether it does lead to innovation varies from 
industry to industry. For example in some cases, R&D is devoted to defensive 
innovation, i.e. strategies to reinforce/defend the appropriability of past innovation. 
On the other hand, in markets with nonexclusive intellectual property rights there may 
be substantial amounts of duplicative R&D expenditures that increase industry costs 
with little or no additional benefits for innovative output (Gilbert 2006). On the other 
hand, there are also innovations that are not a result of R&D spending. Moreover, 
some innovation is achieved through investment in own R&D, and some are purchased 
from other innovators.  
R&D expenditure appears to have a characteristic that – if proven true in our data – 
make it a very good candidate for measuring the effect of exogenous shocks such as 
the decision of the Commission. This characteristic is that in the absence of changes in 
firm size, employment or exogenous factors, firm-level R&D expenditure follows a 
random walk with a small error variance – i.e. R&D expenditure in the short run (5-10 
years) is roughly constant or increasing slightly (Hall et al. 1986). Other sources also 
find that firms behave ‘as if’ they aim for a roughly constant ratio of R&D to 
employment (or sales) (Coad and Rao 2009). This could make it possible to identify 
the effect of an external shock (the Commission’s intervention). 
Another issue is that as innovation becomes complex and costly, it reaches 
diminishing returns. Higher and higher expenditures produce fewer and fewer 
innovations per unit of investment. For this reason there is likely to be a time-trend in 
R&D spending, which does not imply increasing innovation but reflects diminishing 
returns (e.g. Strumsky et al 2010). 
                                          
1 www.oecd.org/sti/oslomanual 
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Gilbert (2006) in his review of studies on competition and innovation notes another 
reason why R&D expenditure is a weak measure of innovation: that it can be too 
aggregate, relate to spending that does not lead to innovation, also includes 
purchases of other firms’ innovations. 
3.2.2 Patent counts 
Broadly speaking, the invention stage culminates with the issue of a patent or patents. 
A patent is a document which awards inventors the exclusive right to use the disclosed 
invention for a specific period of time. To be granted, an invention must fulfil specific 
criteria: it has to be novel, non-obvious and useful, that is have potential commercial 
value. Because of their close link to innovation, patents are used by firms to measure 
the output of their R&D division, and hence adopted to identify compensation and 
incentive schemes. It might be costly to defend them, but their registration is 
relatively inexpensive. Patents are rich in information on the developed technology. 
They are documents, which contain highly detailed information on the innovation per 
se, on the technological area to which the invention belongs to, names and full details 
of the inventors, of the assignees, countries where they are registered, etc. Although 
patents require a series of administrative procedures, firms tend to rely on them to 
protect their innovations (Geroski and Walters, 1995). The drastic increase in the 
number of patent applications and grants in the last decades confirms the important 
role of patent in protecting innovation (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Section 3.1). 
Another advantage of patents is their ability to cover a broad range of technologies, 
allowing to block rivals from possible advancements before the innovation is disclosed 
(i.e. raise to patent, Ginarte and Park, 1997). They also represent a valuable asset for 
venture capitalists, and are used as a trading device, especially in those industries 
engaged in advancement in cumulative technologies.2 Due to the detailed information 
contained in patent documents, patent data are broadly adopted in quantitative 
analysis as a measure of the value of the innovation (Trajtenberg, 1990). Another 
reason for their popularity in academic research is that they are readily available from 
patent offices. 
Nevertheless, patent documents also present some disadvantages. It is widely known 
that firms seek patents for many reasons, not just when they wish to protect a newly 
developed technology or product or process. A wide range of papers refer to the 
weakness of patent numbers in measuring the level of innovation,3 which rightly poses 
the question: are patent applications (which is the most widely used proxy) a good 
measure of innovation and are they good for the purposes of this project?  
                                          
2 This latter aspect is particularly important in those industries which require access to a 
“thicket” of different patents in order to progress the innovation (i.e. semiconductor, telecoms, 
electronics and software, IT). Patents are more valuable when aggregated, that is the reason 
whey firms tend to have a portfolio of different patents, especially in industries which rely 
mainly on cumulative innovations. 
3 For a review see Gilbert (2006). 
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Figure 1 – Growth in patent activity and total factor productivity (1963 – 2013) 
 
Potential problems with patents: 
 Not all inventions are patented, for various reasons including the fact that they do 
not meet the patentability criteria, or because the inventor prefers an alternative 
strategy to protect its right.  
 A standard method of calculating indicators from patent data is missing, mainly 
because patent offices in different countries apply different procedure to assess 
patent applications.4 Such discrepancies explain why patent counts across countries 
and industries often present great variance. It is mainly due to different economic 
costs and the extent of the IP law enforcement that firms in some countries are 
more willing to use patents to protect their IP, while in others they prefer secrecy 
avoiding to disclose valuable information included in patent documents. 
 Patent values are highly skewed, with most providing little or no commercial benefit. 
Figure 1 shows that since 1963 patenting activity has increased several folds, whilst 
the rate of growth in productivity has hardly changed, suggesting perhaps that most 
patents do not contribute to productivity at all. 
 Patent applications might have a substantial lag after the innovation so it might be a 
bad measure in applications where we are trying to measure the impact of specific 
interventions. 
 Patents are not the same as innovation. While many innovations lead to a patent, at 
least equally many others do not; while many patents are associated with an actual 
innovation, at least equally many others are obtained for legal or rent-seeking 
purposes that have little or nothing to do with actual innovations. 
 Patents can be invalidated, these patents no longer signify innovation.  
                                          
4 To sort such a type of problem, the OECD has started a process which aims to introduce 
common standards across all patent offices. 
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 High-tech products often include many patents (patent thicket), which makes it 
more difficult to determine the contribution to innovation of a single patent perhaps 
licensed to third companies. 
 There is endogeneity. Patents might follow innovation but literature is not clear on 
whether the market power resulting from patents stimulates or mitigates 
innovation. Put differently, we are looking at whether competition increases patent 
applications but patents themselves might limit competition (reverse causality). 
Some of these problems can be ameliorated by using measures of citation weighted 
patent counts. Below we pursue this approach, as does a number of researchers in the 
previous literature (see Section 6.2), and with these qualifications we believe that  
patents provide important, if imperfect, information on both the output of the 
invention stage and inputs into the innovation stage of Schumpeter’s trilogy. For this 
reason, patent data, coupled with citations, will be included below in the case study. 
3.2.3 Product quality/performance 
An alternative way to measure innovation is to look directly at the quality of a 
product/service. For example Goettler and Gordon (2011) use microprocessor (CPU) 
performance as the main measure of innovation. Focusing on product quality might 
also help us distinguish between product and process innovation (e.g. innovation 
efforts that do not increase product quality are less likely to be product innovation and 
more likely process, marketing or organisational innovation). 
In comparison to patents and R&D, this is a much less tested route. Below, in our pilot 
case study we will look at the possibility of using this type of data to measure 
innovation. 
To conclude, innovation is often in effect a latent variable that we do not directly 
observe, and consequently researchers have tried to measure it through various 
observable but imperfect means. From the perspective of research, we observe inputs 
and outputs from three different stages of the innovation process: 
 The resources used for research (R&D expenditure) 
 The product of the research (patents, or measures of quality) 
 The effect of the research (changes in product attributes) 
The problem is that our devices for measuring each of these are imperfect. In the pilot 
case study to follow we will acquire data on three different measures of innovation and 
will be able to verify the relative performance and aptness of these measures.  
3.3 Identifying innovative industries 
In the appendix we consider the possibility of applying statistical screens to identify 
innovative industries in an objective way, and these are included in Section 12.1 on 
page 102.5 In general we are cautious in advocating any single statistical measure. For 
example, both R&D and patent data have important limitations. But even if they were 
perfect measures of process and product innovation, they might be less capable of 
capturing either marketing or organisational innovation. Moreover, speed of diffusion 
may not be reflected by either measure. Indeed, for new processes supplied by an 
upstream innovate supplier, diffusion amongst downstream users may require no 
patenting and probably only little R&D by the users. 
                                          
5 Initially this was part of the terms of contract. 
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Nevertheless, both patents and R&D are potentially useful indicators of some aspects 
of how innovative some industries are, and in Section 12.1 in the Appendix, we 
explore how statistical screens might work out, based on patent and R&D data. 
3.4 Competition and innovation 
The relationship between market structure and innovation has been one of the most 
widely researched areas of industrial organisation. It was not the brief of the present 
project to provide an exhaustive new literature survey – there are many other 
excellent existing surveys – and here we merely highlight some of the key features in 
the literature. 
On the theoretical side, growing out of Joseph Schumpeter’s two works (1934, 1942) 
is the assertion that large firms are better placed to invest in innovation and 
competition might not be the best platform to boost innovation. Since then a wide 
range of papers tried to challenge or find support for Schumpeter’s proposition. While 
a unified consensus is difficult to draw, these works are invaluable for identifying the 
different conditions that influence the relationship between market structure and 
innovation. Crucial is the level of intellectual property protection – whether the 
innovator enjoys exclusivity on its innovation (see for example Levin et al. 1985, Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001), the role of technical uncertainty (Reinganum, 1989), the level of 
competition in innovation, i.e. for the market (Gilbert and Newbery 1982), information 
asymmetries between owners and managers (e.g. Schmidt 1997, and Aghion et al. 
1999), or firm characteristics (Boone 2000, Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein 2005). 
Many studies provide exhaustive reviews, such as Gilbert (2006). 
Empirically the picture is equally rich.6 The earliest works looked at the relationship 
between firm size and R&D intensity (see Gilbert 2006 for a retrospective overview). 
However these ignored the reverse causality between market structure and innovation 
and were likely to have provided biased findings. For instance, Geroski (1990)7 finds 
evidence against the hypothesis that increases in competitive rivalry decrease 
innovativeness. Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1995)8 reveal a complex 
relationship between competition and innovation: at the firm level, dominant firms 
tend to innovate more, while at the industry level, concentration dampens innovation; 
to the extent that growing dominance increases concentration, the level of aggregate 
innovation will tend to fall. Griffith, Harrison and Simpson (2006)9 show that the effect 
of increasing competition on innovation is, within an industry, larger the closer to the 
global technological frontier. 
A theme running through some of the literature is that the relationship between 
competition and innovation may be characterised by an inverse U-shape. Especially in 
the early days of Structure-Conduct-Performance, this was seen as the way to 
reconcile Arrow and Schumpeter – following Arrow, increases in competition increase 
the pressure to innovate, but after some point, increasing competition may begin to 
reduce the incentive, unless property rights are protected. In more recent years, this 
                                          
6 A recent empirical survey has been provided by the CMA (2015); although this addresses the 
relationship between competition and productivity, much of the literature discussed is also 
relevant to innovation.  
7 Geroski, P. (1990), 'Innovation, Technological Opportunity and Market Structure', 'Oxford 
Economic Papers, 42,, pp. 586 - 602 
8 Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Van Reenen, J. (1995), 'Dynamic count data models of 
technological innovation', 'The Economic Journal', 105 (March), pp. 333 – 344 
9 Griffith, R, Harrison, R. and Simpson, H 'The link between product market reform, innovation 
and EU macroeconomic performance', European Economy Economic Papers 243 
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was formalised by Aghion et al (1997)10 and Aghion et al. (2005). Then, in a 
subsequent study of the effects of Reforms introduced by the UK government 
throughout the 1990s, aimed at reducing entry barriers, they found that market 
liberalisation and interventions by competition authorities, had a positive impact on 
innovation in the UK. Entry or the threat of entry increased the incentive on existing 
firms to innovate or adopt new techniques in order to avoid the loss of market share. 
It also caused those firms that were less inefficient to exit.11  
Our own reading of this literature is slightly differently nuanced, and is heavily 
influenced by one of the most impressive of the existing surveys,: Shapiro (2010, 
p.401) argues that “a firm with a vested interest in the status quo has a smaller 
incentive than a new entrant to develop or introduce new technology that disrupts the 
status quo”. This is in line with standard Arrowian arguments. However, Shapiro gives 
on to add: “Schumpeter was also quite correct: the prospect of obtaining market 
power is a necessary reward to innovation”. He concludes that “There is no conflict 
whatsoever between these two fundamental insights”. This conclusion is perhaps the 
best balanced summary of the literature surveyed.  
3.5 Competition policy and innovation 
The role to be played by competition policy in innovative industries is also potentially 
controversial. Some would argue that the CA should be more tolerant than usual of 
market power, at least in the static sense. Others would argue against any special 
status for innovative industries.  
The stated policy of one competition authority (OFT, 2011, p.25)12 clearly recognises 
this. It suggests that its portfolio of interventions on innovation-intensive sectors has 
focused on those markets characterised by barriers to entry and high levels of 
concentration and/or discrete innovation developments (where the 'escape the 
competition effect' can potentially be stronger). For instance, a number of its 
enforcement cases tackled the abuse of dominance against new entrants (NAPP, 
Genzyme, Gaviscon). It also claims that its work on mergers in innovative markets, 
such as pharmaceuticals, bioscience and advanced manufacturing, is conducted to 
ensure, as usual, that mergers do not lessen static competition. But also, it focuses on 
whether any loss in static competition may sometimes be balanced by benefits from 
the merger can sometimes which lead to innovation and growth.  
Our review of the previous literature is in three sub-sections. First we identify what 
are the key characteristics of innovative industries which might justify special 
treatment from competition authorities. We then discuss, some of the implications for 
each of the different areas of policy - abuse of dominance, mergers and horizontal 
agreements – before briefly discussing some specific case studies in these areas.  
3.5.1 Features which may justify special treatment from CAs 
We start with one of the conventional wisdoms, which is relevant to all types of 
intervention, and all types of market. Starting from Williamson (1968), it has been 
                                          
10 Aghion, P, Harris, C, and Vickers, J. (1997) “Competition and Growth with Step-by-Step 
Innovation: An Example’ in 'European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings' XLI (1997), 
771–782. 
11 Aghion, P. Blundell, P., Griffith, R., Howitt, P and Prantl, S. (2009), 'The Effect of Entry on 
Incumbent Innovation and Productivity', 'Review of Economics and Statistics', MIT Press, 
vol.91(1), pages 20-32, October 
12 OFT Competition and growth, November 2011, report no. OFT1390 
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acknowledged that some practices are difficult to assess because they create both 
consumer benefits and harms. In innovative industries, the potential trade-off is even 
more difficult given that consumer harms might be identifiable in a static setting, 
whereas consumer benefits only appear in the future in a dynamic process. This is 
often the case in various manifestations of monopoly abuse. 
Against that backcloth, it is instructive to first take a step back, and ask the question 
“what are the quintessential features of an innovative market, which might 
conceivably tip the balance towards a more liberal stance to short-run competition 
problems?” For present purposes, we confine ourselves to the following headline 
points. 
1. High fixed costs, but low marginal costs: innovation often entails large, sometimes 
enormous, initial sunk costs due to R&D. Pharmaceuticals is a classic example. But 
the other side of the coin is that marginal costs are often very low – again 
pharmaceuticals provides a good example. The same will be true in many 
information industries, e.g. software, in which marginal costs are virtually zero. 
2. Innovation-intensive industries entail far more uncertainty than more traditional 
industries. There is uncertainty in the initial research stage – will research lead to an 
invention? Then in the innovation stage – will the invention be translated into a 
marketable product? And then there is rival uncertainty – will the firm be beaten to 
innovation? 
3. There are also inevitable doubts about appropriability: once the innovation has been 
made, how can the innovator ensure that it can appropriate its ‘justified’ reward? 
Insofar as the innovation derives essentially from new information, and given that 
information can often be a public good, it may be difficult for the innovator to guard 
against imitation. 
On the other hand 
4. Because innovative markets are often conducive to the creation of market 
dominance, due to network effects for example, they are probably more prone in 
principle to potential competition problems. 
Reflection on these essential features also provokes awkward questions for anti-trust. 
For example, feature (1), with potentially very low marginal costs, raises obvious 
problems for how we should think of excessive pricing on the one hand, or predatory 
pricing on the other hand. The uncertainty described in (2) means that there may be 
extreme fluctuations in the profits and market shares of innovative (or failed-
innovative) firms. In these circumstances, both structural and performance indicators 
(concentration and profitability respectively) may provide very misleading signals on 
which to base an intervention. Appropriability under (3) of courses raises the obvious 
conflict between IPR and short-run competition. 
Perhaps there are other common features of innovative industries (or sub-categories 
of the above three) which might merit future discussion. One possibility, which we 
raise for discussion without necessarily having a definite opinion at this stage is that 
there is a qualitative difference between what we might call ‘mature’ innovative 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals, certain other chemicals, aerospace, other vehicles 
and newer industries evolving out of the ‘digital economy’, such as certain types of 
software (video console games), internet platforms, network-based new business 
practices (Amazon, Uber). 
While traditional innovation and digital economy industries clearly share some 
features, there are important differences. For example, in the latter: 
 Protection is achieved through copyright, rather than traditional patents (Peitz and 
Belleflame, 2010, Table 19.1); arguably copyright is typically more difficult to 
protect than are patents. 
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 Fixed costs may not be so high, and it is more possible for the small inventor to re-
emerge. Indeed, in some cases, the new inventor may be a consumer with a new 
idea. 
 With the growth of platforms involving internet selling, personalised price 
discrimination may become more feasible, with all its ambiguities for what is the 
appropriate competition policy stance. 
We next group together some thoughts provoked by the above under their 
implications for the different areas of competition policy. 
3.5.2 Areas of Competition Policy 
3.5.2.1 Abuse of dominance and innovation 
Because it is impossible to have a one-size-fits-all test, there is a general consensus 
among economists that an economic based approach to abuse of dominance cases is 
advisable. 
A key concern about exclusionary practices is that they may hinder the innovation 
activities of rivals - by foreclosing competitors. Previous literature on the relationship 
between abuse of dominance and innovation is scarce, but there are some papers 
which focus on the interplay between patents and abuse of dominance.13 Others, such 
as Rey and Salant (2012) look at the effect of different policies of licensing intellectual 
property. They model licensing policies of upstream owners of essential intellectual 
property, and find that multiple owners of essential intellectual property tend to limit 
downstream variety. Shapiro (2010, p. 401) also discusses how exclusionary conduct 
can affect innovation. He argues that: “exclusionary practices […], if not checked by 
antitrust law, can make current monopoly power more durable by deterring innovative 
entrants.”  
One of the central points of discussion regarding abuse of dominant cases has been 
firms’ refusal to supply. Refusal to supply can relate of course to any product, but 
the innovation aspects are more pronounced in high-tech products, where innovators 
are keen to fully appropriate a return to their R&D outlays. Prominent EU cases include 
Commercial Solvents, IBM, Magill14, and Microsoft15. Cases involving rebates may be 
similar in this respect; recent landmark cases include Tomra16 and Intel.17 Refusal 
to supply or licence may be a natural strategy for any innovator anxious to fully 
internalise the fruits of innovation. 
Our reading of the relatively limited literature in this area is that intervention against 
exclusionary practices designed to foreclose can be justified if the removal of barriers 
to diffusion of best practice fosters the rate of technical progress. However, such 
interventions might have deleterious effects on the incentives for future invention if 
they are viewed as limiting the ability of businesses to internalise the benefits from 
their R&D investment. 
                                          
13 See Straus (2010) 
14 Commission decision of 21 December 1988 Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE ([1989] OJ 
L78/43) 
15 Commission decision of 24 March 2004 in case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. 
16 Commission Decision of 29 March 2006, Prokent/Tomra, Case COMP/38.113. 
17 Commission Decision 13 May 2009 COMP 37/990 Intel (2009) 3726. 
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3.5.2.2 Mergers and innovation 
The literature evaluating enforcement effects with respect to mergers and innovation 
is relatively small but growing. A small number of studies assesses the causal effects 
of mergers on innovation ex-post. While not studying the role of the competition 
authority explicitly, the fact that the mergers did occur allows for an indirect 
assessment of those mergers on innovation that were deemed not to produce 
anticompetitive effects. Danzon et al (2007), Ornaghi (2009), and Haucap & Stiebale 
(2013) all provide estimates for the pharmaceutical industry. While the former two 
studies draw on American data, the latter is based on decision by the EC. All three 
studies find a negative effect of the merger on innovation. Their findings are robust to 
different measures of innovation (such as R&D expenditure, patents, or citations-
weighted patents). As such, the negative effect of market power on innovation 
appears to dominate potential positive effects arising from cost savings.  
Haucap & Stiebale (2013) further estimate the effects of innovation activity on rival 
firms active in the same markets. While being smaller in magnitude than the 
reductions in the merging parties’ R&D activity, they find a significant negative effect 
on rival firms as well. To capture dynamic feedback of innovative activities to future 
decisions on possible M&As, their empirical strategy relies on the use of a linear 
feedback model as proposed by Blundell, Griffth, and van Reenen (1995) and Blundell, 
Griffth, and Windmeijer (2002). They estimate the impact of mergers on patent 
application count using a DiD model (Poisson) combined with propensity score 
matching. 
Unfortunately, all the above three studies only provide estimates of average effects 
rather than pointing out in which cases the negative effects were particularly 
pronounced. Another issue that plagues these studies is the crude selection of 
competitors, which is almost inevitable given the fact that multi-market contact of 
many of the multi-product merging firms. This renders difficult an appropriate 
selection of controls. 
Judging from these results, one might conclude that merger control was insufficiently 
strict to block or remedy mergers which had negative effects of innovation. Further 
insight is provided by Park & Sonenshine’s (2012) study of the ex-post merger effects 
on innovation for a U.S. sample. They distinguish between mergers that were 
challenged by the antitrust authorities because of potential anticompetitive concerns 
and those which were not. They find that the post-merger innovation outcomes of the 
challenged merging firms were lower than they would have been had the firms not 
merged. But for non-challenged mergers, or mergers that do not raise concerns about 
market concentration, post-merger innovation outcomes were not significantly 
different from what they would have been without a merger. 
On the other hand, there are studies that find increases in R&D activity after mergers, 
including Bertrand (2009) and Stiebale (2013). Using a sample of 123 French 
acquisition targets in cross-border mergers and a combination of PSM and DiD 
methods, Bertrand (2009) finds that R&D budgets increased significantly three years 
after acquisition. Stiebale (2013) focuses on acquirers (324 firms) and finds that their 
R&D intensity significantly increases after mergers.  
This empirical literature is summarised in Szucs (2013)18. In his own work, Szücs 
examines the R&D intensity of 265 acquiring firms and 133 merger targets between 
1990 and 2009. He uses various matching methods to construct control groups for 
                                          
18 “M&A and R&D: Asymmetric Effects on Acquirers and Targets?”, Deutsches Institut fur 
Wirtschaftsforschung, October 2013eutsches 
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acquirers and targets and then applies difference-in-differences to identify the causal 
effect of mergers on R&D growth and intensity. He finds that target firms substantially 
decrease their R&D post merger, while the R&D intensity of acquirers drops due to a 
sharp increase in sales. 
One common feature of the above works is that they offer estimates of the average 
effect of a sample of mergers on innovation in a pool of markets. Such averages offer 
valuable contributions to academic and policy work. However, they are less 
informative about the quality of enforcement activities as they do not identify the very 
cases where merger decisions positively or negatively affected innovation. This 
feasibility study is an important step towards a new breed of future studies that look 
at the impact of individual cases. 
3.5.2.3 Horizontal agreements and innovation 
An argument in support of an active antitrust policy comes from Agrawal et al (2014), 
who underline the importance of the co-existence in the market of both small and 
large firms for innovation advancement, in particular in the presence of large regional 
labs. The idea that cooperation among rivals could promote innovation has always 
been seen with suspicion by the economics literature, because it could hide 
anticompetitive behaviour. Nevertheless, the traditional description of the innovation 
process should in principle highlight the advantages of industries characterised by 
intensive economies of scale. However, this model of analysis ignores the cumulative 
innovation which includes a set of incremental steps typical of the modern IT 
industries. When the innovative process shows these characteristics, coordination 
among firms at the different stages might be justified.  
By promoting some changes to US antitrust law, in their paper on innovation and 
cooperation, Jorde and Teece (1990) explore alternative forms of deals, which operate 
also in concentrated markets, underlining how they can spur pace of innovation. By 
relaxing antitrust policy, this type of collaborative agreement is favoured by 
governments, in the belief that it yields positive effects in term of social welfare.  
Studies based on cooperative research agreements that occur at the upstream level 
show that collusive behaviour is possible if R&D cooperative partners are allowed to 
extend the same conduct in the market for products (Levy, 2012). In a work based on 
joint R&D activities, Duso, Roller and Seldeslachts (2014) test whether upstream 
research joint ventures could lead firms to coordinate in the downstream market for 
products. By observing changes in the market shares of firms’ R&D cooperation 
activities, it emerges at least that some of these types of joint ventures are adopted 
mainly for innovative purposes.  
On the other hand, there is evidence that firms enter non-vertical joint research 
efforts with the aim to collude subsequently on the downstream market. Miyagiwa 
(2000) demonstrates that sharing innovative discoveries via cooperative contracts 
makes collusion among parties smoother since it eliminates all possible sources of 
instability, such as inter-firm cost asymmetry. In a study based on the semiconductor 
industry, Song (2011) shows that although a cooperative R&D agreement benefits the 
parties by removing duplicative research efforts, it also reduces research expenditure 
by 25-50% compared to what firms may have invested in a competitive research 
environment. Henry and Ponce (2011) show that the possibility to trade knowledge 
allows the innovator to enjoy a monopolistic position for a limited period of time, 
without the requirement of a legal patent. Because of the ambiguity of these findings 
it appears reasonable that competition authorities carefully scrutinise horizontal and 
vertical research joint ventures for possible collusive behaviour. 
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3.5.3 Competition Policy and Innovation: Specific Cases 
We carried out a fairly exhaustive survey of the previous literature on anti-trust or 
merger cases. For the cases that appear below, the criteria for inclusion were that the 
case should have:19 
 been discussed in a paper which has appeared in an academic journal or was a 
briefing by an organisation independent of competition authorities; 
 be drawn from an innovative industry (see Section 12.1 in the Appendix); 
 contained a significant discussion of innovation20. 
 The purpose was to identify any common themes which might be pursued in our 
own case study. We identified ten specific cases which illustrate issues which can be 
found frequently in many other competition cases both within and outside the EU. 
This is not a random sample, but we believe it is representative.  Six of these 
illustrate issues arising in abuse of dominance cases, two were a cartel and a JV, 
and two were mergers.  
3.5.3.1 Abuse of Dominance 
Napp (2001)21 was the first abuse of dominance case brought under the UK’s 
Competition Act 1998 (OFT, 2011). This concerned alleged predatory pricing in which 
the innovation was a new drug. The bigger issue is how innovation will often bestow a 
first mover advantage on the innovator, and that this may facilitate abuse. In most 
cases in the literature, this is exclusionary abuse, but in this case it was excessive 
pricing on sales in the community.  
In the IMS case22 (Intercontinental Marketing Services Health Inc), the 
innovation was a copyrighted method for collecting and collating large volumes of 
data. IMS is the world's number one supplier of information to the pharmaceutical and 
in 2000, it filed a lawsuit against two new competitors, alleging that they had infringed 
IMS' copyright. This was subsequently taken to the European Commission (Ezrachi 
and Maggiolino 2012). The general issue is whether and how far protection of IPR can 
effectively foreclose the market to potential entrants, and if so, how the competition 
Authority should rule. 
In Lundbeck (2009), the alleged abuse involved reverse settlements in 
pharmaceuticals, (Gurkaynak, Guner and Filson, 2014,23) Here, a market leader paid 
generic rivals of its product Citalopram to stay out of the relevant market. In 2008, 
the EC signalled its interest in pharmaceutical patent settlements by initiating an 18-
month sector inquiry, with a final report issued in July 2009 (Final Report). The EC 
analysed the competition between patent-holding drug firms and generic drug firms 
and investigated the sector to see by which means (“tool kits” as used in the report) 
the patent-holder could delay or block the entry of the generic in the market. 
The Third Monitoring Report of the Final Report notes that ‘‘settlements are…a 
generally accepted, legitimate way of ending private disagreements’’ and, by saving 
administrative bodies time and money, have a positive societal impact. However, the 
                                          
19 Other cases are discussed in the Appendix. 
20 The interim report for this project includes a large number of other cases. 
21Decision of the Director General of Fair Trading No CA98/2/2001 30 March 2001 Napp 
Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited and Subsidiaries (Napp); OFT 2011. 
22 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, 2000; E.C.R. I-
5039, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28.; Commission case number 38044.  
23 Commission case number 39226. 
Final report 
27 
reports caution that some patent settlements cause harm that outweighs these 
benefits. Specifically, ‘‘settlement agreements that limit generic entry and include a 
value transfer from an originator company to one or more generic companies are an 
example of … potentially anticompetitive agreements, in particular where the motive 
of the agreement is the sharing of profits via payments from originator to generic 
companies[.]’’ The recent Lundbeck announcement and other ongoing investigations 
indicate that reverse payments remain a high priority for the EC.  
In Samsung v Apple, the alleged abuse was a refusal to licence (Buheler et al, 
2014). Samsung was found guilty by making use of the Standard Essential Patents 
(SEPs) tool. Standards are considered crucial in many sectors, with a particular 
emphasis where Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are applied (Lerner and Tirole, 
2015), because their use allow firms to regulate the collection of royalty revenues. 
Hence, the way by which they are introduced might represent a barrier to their own 
use, raising the classical hold-up problem. SEPs are patents which give access to the 
manufacturing process, and gives to the patent holder a significant market power in 
deciding how the those patents are licensed. For that reason, Standard Setting 
Organizations (SSOs) impose on SEPs holders a regulation function in which they 
require to grant licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, better 
defined as FRAND. Such a type of price commitment aims to prevent a hold-up 
problem by a SEP holder. In the Samsung vs Apple case, the former owns SEPs that 
are pivotal for the mobile telecommunications industry, and has committed to licence 
them under the FRAND terms. In April 2011, Samsung started a litigation against 
Apple accusing this latter to have violated a Samsung patent. For what concerns the 
dispute occurred in Europe, and following its preliminary analysis based on Samsung 
request of intervention against Apple, the Commission expressed its view claiming 
that the use of such injunctions may represent a potential anti-competitive behaviour, 
leading to an abuse of dominant position  
This case overlaps between competition policy and licencing agreement, and to 
discipline it the EU Commission approach relies on the policies applied to vertical 
agreements for other types of property.24 According to how the abuse is perpetrated, 
the infringement may fall also under the vertical foreclosure. The Commission 
evaluated that the terms of the licence on UMTS SEPs would have generated a 
disadvantage for Apple, and hence an abuse of dominant position from Samsung, the 
patent owner. It followed that for a period of five years Samsung made the 
commitment of not seeking any injunctions in the European market of smartphones 
and tablets against companies that agreed on a particular SEP. However, in 2013 
Samsung obtained a limited ban on sale on specific Apple products following its 
violation of Samsung patents.25  
In AstraZeneca (AZ), (2015)26, the abuse was foreclosure (Roeller and Stehmann, 
2006). It was argued that AZ misused the patent system and the procedures for 
marketing pharmaceuticals to block or delay market entry for generic competitors to 
its ulcer drug Losec. In June 2005, AZ was found guilty of excluding generics and 
parallel traders from competing in two ways: (i) giving misleading information to 
national patent offices and (ii) misusing rules and procedures by selectively 
deregistering the market authorisations for Losec capsules in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden with the intent of blocking or delaying entry by generic firms and parallel 
                                          
24 See Commission Regulation No 2790/1999 of December 22, 1999, on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. 
25 Details on "U.S. ITC says Apple infringes Samsung patent, bans some products". Reuters. 
2013-06-04 
26 Commission case number 37507;Roeller and Stehmann 2006 
Feasibility study on the microeconomic impact of enforcement of competition policies on innovation 
 
28 
traders. The scope for such misconduct is clearly more pronounced in markets with 
asymmetric information, as will be so in many innovative markets. 
3.5.3.2 Cartels 
In the LCD-TV screen case, one of the leading actors, Samsung, was both the 
promoter of a major RJV at the upstream level of the industry (with Sony), and a 
member of a cartel at the downstream level. This was a successful joint venture. 
Despite the fact that it generated a high concentration in the market, it also promoted 
competition among the other players. But during the same time of the cooperation 
with Sony, in December 2010 most of the producers of LCD displays were also found 
guilty of cartelized price fixing.  
The general lesson to be learned is not on the effect of cartels per se, but rather that 
JV, formed to foster research, may sometimes occur alongside otherwise anti-
competitive behaviour 
The Canon-Olivetti Joint Venture (1987) is interesting because of the way that the 
Commission responded. While recognising the possible innovative consequences of the 
JV, the Commission was aware of potential deleterious impacts on market 
competition. It therefore set the length of the agreement to a specified period of 12 
years, while the manufacture of new products would have required substantial long-
term investments (Fine, 1992). 
3.5.3.3 Mergers 
GLAXO/Wellcome and SmithKline Mergers 
Pharmaceuticals is an obvious sector in which to examine the role of mergers on the 
innovation process. Driven mainly by large investments in R&D, the sector has been 
witness of different waves of mergers and acquisitions (Grabowski and Kyle, 2008). 
In January 1995, two of the biggest UK pharmaceutical firms, Glaxo and Wellcome, 
merged. This represented one of the most important mergers at the time, and both 
the European Commission and the Federal trade Commission had active roles in the 
pre-assessment of the merger on market competition (Morgan, 2001).  
To prevent any possible detrimental effects, in term of foreclosure or abuse, Glaxo 
agreed to grant an exclusive licence to a third party to develop a product of Wellcome 
which was about to be launched (i.e. 311C). The FTC was more critical but gave its 
consent to the merger, even though some sceptism was voiced on the possibility to 
increase further R&D investments. The predictions seem to be consistent with the 
study developed in this industry, where evidence shows that small firms with few 
ongoing projects can gain the most from mergers with bigger firms in developing and 
launching new drugs (Grabowski and Kyle, 2008). After this initial horizontal merger, 
in 2000 the new company proposed to the Commission to undertake SmithKline 
Beecham. The merger was approved, and again to remove serious doubts on the 
proposed transaction the parties offered a series of out licenses in the European 
market. 
Nokia/Navteq and TomTom/Tele Atlas Merger (Drauz et al, 2010) 
In recent years there has been an increasing number of mergers in high-tech markets, 
requiring extensive market investigations. In 2008, TomTom’s acquisition of Tele Atlas 
and Navteq by Nokia were approved by the Commission. Both cases presented the 
feature of a vertical integration of one of the two main suppliers of navigable digital 
maps (Tele Atlas and Navteq) with a downstream producer of Portable Navigation 
Devices (TomTom) and/or navigation software (TomTom and Nokia). Both cases 
raised analogous concerns over possible foreclosure, increased prices, along with 
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reduction in the product quality. The Commission agreed to both mergers, and in the 
case of TomTom/Tele Atlas the economic evaluation came to the conclusion that the 
incentive to create barriers were not profitable. Instead, thanks to the presence of 
another supplier of digital map databases, the merger between Nokia/Navteq, and 
hence the threat of possible vertical constraints was considered not enough to prevent 
the process.  
3.6 Summary 
Innovation is multi-faceted, and for the purpose of this project we are interested in all 
facets. It can be measured in various ways, and only rarely is any single measure 
sufficient for an encompassing evaluation and all measures have limitations. It is 
advisable to employ more than one measure in most cases, and in this case we will 
use R&D, Patents and technical product characteristics. 
The majority of previous literature suggests that competition (especially for the 
market) will generally increase the pace of innovation. Nevertheless, within the 
Schumpeterian tradition, some writers have argued that this is not always necessarily 
the case. It follows that where competition policy successfully protects/promotes 
competition, one might expect that this will also be innovation enhancing, but this 
needs to be shown, not merely assumed. 
We have argued that innovative markets tend to have ‘special features’, which will 
often render competition decisions more complex than normal, however, this should 
not necessarily affect the stance of the CA, e.g. by employing a more lenient standard 
of proof in innovative markets.  
A review of previous academic case studies reveals that the area of policy which has 
attracted most attention is the general area of abuse of dominance, especially 
exclusionary behaviour, designed to protect IPR. Very few studies to date have 
examined the impact of merger control and innovation. The current study will 
therefore help fill a relative gap in the literature. 
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4 The Hard Disk Drive and Solid State Drive markets  
As agreed between Commission Services and the project team, the pilot study focuses 
on two mergers (Seagate/Samsung, and Western Digital/Hitachi) in the Hard Disk 
Drive market. We believe that this is a fitting choice for a feasibility study as Hard 
Drive manufacturing is a highly innovative market.27 Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels 
(2010) highlight that the computer manufacturing industry accounts for around a 
quarter of US productivity growth in the last five decades, therefore the study can 
have a potentially important policy message as well. Moreover, given the 
characteristics of the relevant product, data is more likely to be available not only on 
R&D expenditure and patents, but also on product characteristics. 
First we briefly introduce the characteristics of the storage market, including Hard Disk 
Drives. Then we give account of the two relevant European Commission decisions. 
Inevitably we also need to discuss regulatory approval in other jurisdictions, notably 
by MOFCOM, which resulted in holding the relevant operations of Western Digital and 
Hitachi separate until 2015, effectively delaying the full integration of the merging 
parties.  
4.1.1 The storage market 
Hard Disk Drives (HDD), Solid State Drives (SSD), and other Flash drives, such as 
USB Flash Drives, or memory cards are the main categories of storage technologies. 
HDDs are devices that use one or more rotating disks with magnetic surfaces to store 
and allow access to data. An SSD is a storage device that uses integrated circuit 
assemblies to store data. It is based on non-volatile media such as NAND Flash 
Memory, rather than magnetic media and magnetic heads. SSDs record, store and 
retrieve digital data without any moving parts. Finally, other Flash drives include USB 
Flash Drives, which is a Flash Memory based data storage device with integrated USB 
interface.  
Our report is mapped around a simple breakdown of the storage market: HDDs, SSD 
and Flash drives. These categories are much broader than the Commission’s market 
definition, which distinguishes between storage used in different end-user 
applications.28 Nevertheless, the purpose of this report is to study innovation. 
Innovation is likely to happen across these end-user applications. It would be 
impossible to distinguish the effect of a particular innovation of HDD on enterprise or 
consumer electronics applications for example. Looking at data on product 
characteristics could reveal more detailed information on how innovation was 
disseminated through improved and better performing products, although for the 
purposes of this pilot study we only have data on the desktop and mobile applications. 
According to rough estimates, the amount of data generated roughly doubles every 
two years. This requires an enormous and ever growing supply of storage devices. 
                                          
27 The HDD market is covered extensively in Christensen’s (2003) incredibly insightful book, The 
Innovator’s Dilemma. 
28 The Commission’s investigation broke down the HDD market into the following main 
applications: enterprise, client compute, and client non-compute. Enterprise includes disk drives 
for mission critical and business critical applications. Client compute includes disk drives for 
mobile and desktop computers. Client non-compute consists of disk drives specifically 
configured for consumer electronics (CE) applications. Pre-merger, Seagate, Western Digital and 
Hitachi had been active in all applications, Samsung had only been present in client compute 
and client non-compute, and Toshiba had only been active in enterprise, mobile, and CE. 
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HDDs are still the dominant way to store data, especially when measured in the 
amount of capacity shipped. This is mainly due to the large storage demand from 
cloud storage providers.  
Regarding the number of units shipped, SSD is gaining pace and HDD sales have been 
dropping since 2011. Part of the reason for HDD’s loss is the decline in the sales of 
PCs – traditionally the main users of HDDs. But even if one only looks at drives 
shipped for PCs, the decline of HDDs and the emergence of SSDs is unquestionable.29  
The following discussion introduces the technical characteristics, the innovation 
process, and the market structure of three storage types, HDD, SSD, and Flash drives.  
4.1.2 Hard Disk Drives vs Solid State Drives 
A hard disk drive is a device that uses one or more rotating disks with magnetic 
surfaces (media) to store and allow access to data. HDDs provide non-volatile data 
storage, which means that the data remains present when power is no longer applied 
to the device. 
SSDs use semiconductor storage technologies to guarantee high performance in terms 
of storing and executing code. Originally developed to meet the need of Solid State 
Drives (SSDs), due to their fast page based read/program operations, their diffusion 
have grown enormously.  
SSDs are digital storage devices that incorporate solid-state memory emulating hard 
disk drives. Different from HDDs, SSDs do not have any moving parts, and are 
completely built on semiconductor memory arranged as a disk which uses integrated 
circuits instead of magnetic or optical storage support. Because no mechanical 
components are involved, SSDs are fast in comparison to rotating media (HDD), 
providing access to data in microseconds, instead of the several milliseconds 
requested by HHDs. This latter aspect has made the SSD technology a viable 
alternative to the magnetic disk, marking a real revolution in the computer storage 
system. 
SSDs made their first appearance in the late 1970s, its diffusion was initially 
obstructed because the production cost per megabyte was much larger than that for 
HDDs,30 and the installation of SSD required skilled IT administrators. After the initial 
impasse, due to their large reduction in price jointly with their excellent performance, 
SSDs have been broadly adopted. 
Despite the technological achievements, and the commercial success, HDDs always 
had mechanical limitations that meant that their growth would come to an end and the 
technology would be replaced by a different one. By their nature, mechanical devices 
cannot improve as quickly as solid state technologies can. In 20 years (1988-2008) 
CPU performance increased 16,800 times. In the same period HDD’s performance 
increased 11 times. As Seagate put it in 2008: “While impressive advances in density 
have yielded exponential growth in disc drive capacity, disc drive speed has achieved 
only modest gains over the years”. 
The main benefits of SSDs compared to HDDs include increased speed, lower power 
consumption, increased resistance to shock, and reduced noise and heat generation. 
SSD drives are also smaller and easier to fit into small devices. A major disadvantage 
                                          
29 https://technology.ihs.com/433958/ssds-to-account-for-one-third-of-worldwide-pc-storage-
shipments-by-2017  
30 In 2006 Samsung introduced the first SSDs at the price of $45 per GB, which price was still 
60 to 70 times higher than standard hard-disk drives (http://spectrum.ieee.org). 
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of SSDs is their price. HDDs have been primarily used for archiving, and SSDs are 
mainly used in portable devices (laptops, smartphones, tablets).  
In the 2000’s, with the increasing popularity of laptops and notebooks, SSDs were 
increasingly used as primary drives. SSD capacity size continuously increased and 
price was coming down fast. In August 2015, Samsung announced a 16 TB SSD. In 
2016 1Gb of SSD cost $0.24. 
4.1.3 Market structure in HDD 
The HDD market has witnessed continuous consolidation since the late 1980’s.  
Figure 2: Consolidation in the HDD market 
 
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=16149377  
Before the two mergers there had been five players in the market: Seagate, Western 
Digital, Toshiba, Hitachi GST, and Samsung).  
 
Figure 3 shows the total HDD market shares just before (Q3/Q4 2011) and just after 
(2012) the two mergers. The change between Q3 and Q4 2011 is due to the 2011 
floods in Thailand, where a lot of HDD (mainly WD) manufacturing lines were located. 
As a result, WD’s market shares dropped by 10 percentage points, which was picked 
up almost entirely by Seagate. 
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Figure 3: HDD market shares before and after the mergers 
  
 
 
Following the two mergers, the market consolidated to three players, Seagate, 
Western Digital, and Toshiba, and the market shares are close to a 40-40-20 divide 
(Seagate, WD and Toshiba respectively). No entry took place following the merger, as 
was predicted by the Commission in their assessment of the likely impact of the 
merger, and the market shares remained steady, following a rough 40-40-20 
breakdown for Seagate, WD, Toshiba respectively.31 
4.1.4 Market structure in SSD 
In the last two decades the semiconductor industry has experienced a dramatic 
change, driven by demand for electronic products (for example mobile phones, 
cameras, notebooks, etc.) able to store data and information. The use of NAND flash 
memory has allowed manufacturers to re-launch already existing products, improving 
in their characteristics (i.e .personal digital assistants, digital cameras, MP3, etc.).  
The major players in SSD are Samsung, Toshiba, SandDisk, Micron, SKHynix, and 
Intel. Although they are listed as independent firms, Micron and Intel partnered in 
2006 to produce NAND Flash Memory. In 2012, their joint venture expanded further 
agreeing for Micron to supply NAND products to Intel. Today Intel Micron Flash 
                                          
31 https://www.anandtech.com/show/10098/market-views-2015-hard-drive-shipments  
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Technology is working on the entry in the 3D NAND market which should give them a 
further burst in term of new innovation and advantage compare to the other firms 
already into the market. Allowing for a larger density of memory cells, 3D NAND 
technology increases both performance and reliability of the storage devices. Having a 
denser chip, a 3D NAND memory grants twice the write performance, and ten times 
the reliability of standard (2D) NAND cell. Micron jointly with Intel have announced the 
launch of the first generation of 3D NAND flash memory shortly, supplying the market 
with a 1.5mm thick drive able to store to 1TB of data. 
Due to high demand for efficient storage devices, the SSD industry has been 
characterised by fast innovation, which has yielded total sales of 30,777 million SSDs 
in the first quarter of 2016, generating 32% growth compared to 2015. At the same 
time, a shift in consumer preferences, competition from smartphones, jointly with a 
slowdown of economic growth in China, along with a series of exogenous shocks (e.g. 
Thailand flooding) negatively affected the demand for PC, and consequently the hard 
drive market. During the same period of time shipments of PCs and HHDs dropped by 
10% and 20% respectively.32 The market for SSD is characterized by the presence of 
a large number of manufacturers, some of which also operate in the HHD market.33  
4.1.5 Cloud storage 
Technically speaking cloud storage is downstream to storage manufacturing (cloud 
storage operators use a combination of HDD and SSD drives). However, it is a 
product/service that strongly affects the number of HDD/SSD sales because it 
eliminates the need for other HDD/SSD buyers to invest in large capacity storage, and 
instead offers to them the use of cloud storage. For this reason we argue that cloud 
storage exerts competitive pressure on HDD/SSD manufacturers, but HDD and SSD 
manufacturers also compete for selling to cloud storage providers.  
There has been a growing trend among users in moving data to cloud storage. Users 
used to buy several HDDs to back up their data. These drives are often only utilised to 
about a third of their capacity. Storing data in the cloud is more efficient because it 
allows mobile access but also, cloud providers operate at around 80% of storage 
capacity, generating much less waste than individual users. This efficiency means 
reduced costs for users, which means cloud storage typically offers cheaper storage 
than the end-user owning HDDs or SSDs.  
                                          
32 http://www.anandtech.com/show/10098/market-views-2015-hard-drive-shipments, also see 
www.trendfocus.com for full details. 
33 http://www.trendfocus.com/ssd-shipments-continued-growth-despite-shrinking-pc-market-
trendfocus-2nd-calendar-quarter-analysis/  
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5 Regulatory approval of the mergers 
5.1 European Commission decision in the Seagate/Samsung 
merger34 
On 19 April 2011 Seagate announced their intention to buy Samsung’s HDD business. 
Seagate notified the European Commission on the day of the announcement of the 
acquisition.  
Although the Seagate/Samsung(HDD) acquisition was announced after WD announced 
the acquisition of Hitachi, Seagate beat WD to the European Commission notification. 
This turned out to be an important detail because of the Commission’s priority 
principle – i.e. Seagate/Samsung transaction was assessed in the light of the 
competitive situation that prevailed at the time of its notification – i.e. without 
considering the pending WD/Hitachi acquisition. 
In determining the relevant market the Commission found that:  
 HDDs employed in different end-use applications (desktop, mobile, enterprise, CE) 
are not each other’s substitutes.  
 In the Desktop market as well as in the CE market 3.5" HDDs are not currently 
significantly substitutable for 2.5" HDDs. 
 There is a lack of immediate and effective supply side substitution between HDDs 
intended for different end-uses and within the same end-use application across form 
factors (3.5" and 2.5"). 
 SSDs and HDDs are not currently substitutable due to the significant price 
differential between the two technologies and the limited storage capacity of SSDs 
compared to HDDs. 
Therefore the Commission’s conclusion was that there were insufficient grounds to 
conclude that the HDD markets should be defined in a broader manner than on the 
basis of a combination of form factor and end-use categories for HDDs.  
In the assessment of the competitive effect of the merger the Commission found that 
in general, entry by new competitors on any of the HDD markets was unlikely. Based 
on the above, the Commission defined the following relevant product markets: 3.5" 
Business Critical HDDs, 3.5" Desktop HDDs, 3.5" CE HDDs, 2.5" Mobile HDDs, and 
External HDDs (XHDDs), and concluded that the proposed transaction would not give 
rise to significant impediment of effective competition stemming from non-coordinated 
effects in any of these markets. The Commission also looked at coordinated and 
vertical effects and found no concerns. For these reasons the merger was 
unconditionally approved on 19 October 2011. 
The Commission's investigation also indicated that the proposed transaction would not 
negatively impact on innovation in the 3.5" Desktop market as Samsung was not a 
strong innovator. According to one Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), Samsung 
was more a trend follower. Hitachi and Western Digital were also important 
innovators, and given the pressure asserted by them the parties claimed (and the 
Commission agreed with this argument) that the merger would not reduce incentives 
to innovate. 
The finding is consistent with the parties' analysis on innovation. Innovation had been 
defined in the parties' analysis as the introduction of a new product, when a company 
                                          
34 European Commission, Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung COMP/M.6214, Decision October 
19, 2011 
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starts selling a product that no other company has sold before. Products were defined 
by the merging parties on the basis of the combination of the key product features 
from a buyer perspective (form factor, capacity, speed). The parties suggested that 
Samsung was never the first to introduce a 3.5" HDD product in the preceding eleven 
years. In sum, it was concluded that Samsung did not constitute a particularly 
important competitive force before the proposed transaction.  
5.2 Other decisions in the Seagate/Samsung merger 
The merger was unconditionally approved in every jurisdiction, with the exception of 
China (MOFCOM). The main arguments for the unconditional approval were that 
Samsung had not exerted effective competitive constraint in the HDD market, and 
therefore its elimination from the HDD market would not affect the level of 
competition.35 
The MOFCOM decision took a harder stance against the proposed merger, and 
approved it, but subject to a set of conditions.36  
Regarding innovation, MOFCOM anticipated that competition was driving innovation in 
the HDD market and expressed concerns that the merger would reduce incentives to 
innovate. 
In its decision, MOFCOM required Seagate to maintain Samsung HDD brand as an 
independent competitor in the market, through a newly incorporated independent 
subsidiary. Although Seagate would receive the revenues from the Samsung line, its 
prices would have to be set independently of Seagate. Similarly, the production lines 
and sales operations of Samsung HDDs would have to remain independent, and any 
communication between Seagate and Samsung would have to be reported to a 
monitoring trustee. Seagate had to maintain and expand the production capacity of 
Samsung HDDs within 6 months of the MOFCOM decision and capacity had to be 
determined by market demands thereafter. Seagate also had to undertake that it 
would not reduce the amount of magnetic heads bought from TDK (China) Co. Ltd. 
Finally, Seagate had to set up an independent R&D unit for Samsung. Moreover, 
Seagate undertakes to invest at least $800 million in R&D, each year for 3 years after 
the MOFCOM decision. 
On 20 October 2015 MOFCOM acknowledged that Seagate had fully complied with the 
above conditions, and lifted them, allowing the full integration of Seagate and 
Samsung HDD.37 
                                          
35 See for example: 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/05/120305westerndigitalstmt.pdf  
36 No. 90 Circular of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2011) 
Announcement of the Decision after Anti-Monopoly Review to Give Conditional Approval to the 
Acquisition of the Hard Disk Drive Business of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. By Seagate 
Technology LLC.  
37 MOFCOM Announcement No. 43 of 2015 on Changing Restrictive Conditions for the 
Concentration between Undertakings concerning the Acquisition of Hard Disk Drive Business of 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. by Seagate Technology Co., Ltd. 
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5.3 European Commission decision in the Western Digital/Hitachi 
merger38 
On 7 March 2011, WD and Hitachi, Ltd announced and executed a share purchase 
agreement for the sale of all issued and outstanding capital stock of Hitachi Global 
Storage Technologies (HGST), a wholly owned subsidiary of Hitachi Ltd. Western 
Digital’s notified the Commission a day after the Seagate/Samsung notification, on 20 
April 2011. Following the priority principle, the Commission held that a party that is 
the first to notify a concentration which (i.e. the Seagate/Samsung merger), assessed 
on its own merits, would not significantly impede effective competition in the internal 
market or in a substantial part thereof, is entitled to have its operation declared 
compatible with the internal market within the applicable time limits. For this reason 
the Commission considered the WD/Hitachi merger with a market structure that 
reflected conditions after the Seagate/Samsung merger, with the following HDD 
suppliers: WD, HGST, Seagate/Samsung. 
The relevant market (product and geographical) was defined the same way as in the 
Seagate/Samsung mergers. The Commission defined the following relevant product 
markets: Mission Critical Enterprise, 3.5" Business Critical HDDs, 3.5" Desktop HDDs, 
3.5" CE HDDs, 2.5" Mobile HDDs, 2.5” CE, and External HDDs (XHDDs). 
For the 3.5” HDD market (where Toshiba had not been active) the Commission found 
that the reduction in the number of HDD suppliers from three to two would 
significantly impede effective competition on that market, and because entry was 
found unlikely to be timely and sufficient, the merger could have led to significantly 
increased post-merger prices. The Commission also found that the merger would give 
rise to significant impediments to competition in the XHDD (external HDD) market but 
the commitments offered for the 3.5” Desktop, CE, and Business Critical HDD 
applications were sufficient to eliminate concerns in the XHDD market as well. 
To remedy these issues, the Commission accepted the commitments of the merging 
parties to divest the entire 3.5” HDD production to a suitable buyer. This buyer later 
emerged to be Toshiba. 
Regarding innovation, both WD and Hitachi had been very active, and in fact Hitachi 
had a large IP portfolio and was believed to have surpassed WD in innovation. The 
merging parties repeatedly claimed that the Commission failed to take account of the 
disruptive nature of new innovation in the storage market, which should have 
dismissed the concerns about the 3.5” market. It was also claimed that innovation had 
constantly exerted downward price pressure regardless of the level of concentration of 
the market. The Commission considered that the fact that the proposed concentration 
would not reduce the rate of innovation did not exclude a price effect if the number of 
suppliers had been reduced from three to two. The Commission also added that 
evidence on past effects of innovation on price levels cannot be taken as excluding 
any price effect that would result from the merger. Innovation was also mentioned 
under discussions of the coordinated effects of the merger. The parties claimed that 
because of the highly innovative nature of the product, coordinated effects were 
unlikely.  
5.4 Other decisions in the Western Digital / Hitachi merger 
The US FTC also approved the merger subject to the condition that Western Digital 
divests assets used to manufacture and sell 3.5” desktop hard disk drives to 
                                          
38 European Commission, Case No COMP/M.6203 - Western Digital Irland/Viviti Technologies, 
Decision October 19, 2011 
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Toshiba.39 However, similarly to the Seagate/Samsung merger, MOFCOM took a more 
stringent position, and it approved the merger but with a list of restrictions.40 
Regarding innovation, MOFCOM anticipated that competition was driving innovation in 
the HDD market and expressed concerns that the merger would reduce incentives to 
innovate. 
MOFCOM required Western Digital to maintain HGST as an independent competitor in 
the relevant market. Western Digital had to ensure that HGST continues to use the 
existing production line and the relevant production team to manufacture HDD 
products. The marketing of these HDD products had to be independently carried out 
by the original sales team in the name of HGST. Following the merger, Western Digital 
had to ensure it would not jeopardise the independence between Western Digital and 
HGST by exercising its rights and performing its obligations as a shareholder of HGST 
and would not eliminate or restrict competition between these two companies. 
Western Digital and HGST had to maintain their respective R&D operations 
independent from each other.41 Any exchange of information or personnel (in R&D and 
in other operations) had to be reported to the monitoring trustee in advance and be 
subject to supervision under this decision. Moreover, Western Digital and HGST had to 
maintain the momentum of the preceding years’ R&D investment levels. 
The MOFCOM decision also required the divestiture of the main 3.5-inch HDD assets of 
HGST to a third party within 6 months from the decision. 
On 20 October 2015, MOFCOM lifted most of the original restrictions.42 This allowed 
WD and HGST to finalise the consummation of their merger. However, Western Digital 
had to continue the independence between the brand and the sales. 
5.5 Testable hypotheses 
The two MOFCOM decisions delayed the full consummation of the two mergers until 
October 2015. But it does not mean that the consummation of the mergers did not 
start in 2012, especially in the case of Seagate/Samsung, where the MOFCOM 
conditions were less restrictive. For this reason we consider that there were two 
clusters of events in the market. 
1. First, in 2012, there was a combination of three main events: the conditional 
approval of Seagate’s acquisition of Samsung HDD, the conditional approval of WD’s 
acquisition of HGST, and Toshiba’s acquisition of the 3.5-in HDD operations of 
HGST. Our identification is unable to disentangle the individual effect of these 
events. Neither can we unravel the individual effect of each authority’s decision. 
Rather we can only estimate if this cocktail of events changed the innovation 
                                          
39 https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1110122/western-digital-matter  
40 No. 9 Announcement of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2012) 
Announcement of Decision after Anti-Monopoly Review to Impose Restrictive Conditions on the 
Approval of the Concentration of Undertakings for the Acquisition of Hitachi Storage by Western 
Digital. 
41 When Western Digital shut down the R&D department of HGST in March 2012, and 
transferred these assets to WD, MOFCOM imposed a RMB 300,000 fine and required WD to 
correct the breach of MOFCOM’s restrictions by proper measures. See: Ministry of Commerce 
Announcement (2015) No. 41 Announcement on Changing the Concentration of Undertakings 
Restrictions over Western Digital’s Acquisition of Hitachi. 
42 Ministry of Commerce Announcement [2015] No. 41 Announcement on Changing the 
Concentration of Undertakings Restrictions over Western Digital’s Acquisition of Hitachi. 
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activities of the three firms that remained in the HDD market, Seagate, WD, and 
Toshiba.  
2. Second, in Q3 2015, the full consummation of the two mergers, triggered by 
MOFCOM lifting most of the restrictions on the Seagate/Samsung and the WD/HGST 
mergers.  
For the purposes of this study we focus on the effects of the first treatment.43 Our 
primary objective is not to deliver watertight results on the impact of these events on 
innovation – simply because our limited resources and time did not allow for a full 
empirical analysis. Rather the study is intended to demonstrate that such impact 
evaluation is feasible and offer a framework for doing it.  
A pivotal question before starting our analysis is how the MOFCOM decisions affected 
the mergers. With these MOFCOM restrictions is it possible to pick up any impact on 
innovation of the 2012 events? We argue that although the MOFCOM conditions were 
restrictive, they did not nullify the effect of the 2012 events, for the following reasons.  
Firstly, although there were remedies in place to ensure that the brands were kept 
separately and that the acquired brand does not suffer as a result of the merger, 
property rights (including intellectual property) were transferred with the conditional 
approval of the merger (which is evidenced by the fact that revenues were received by 
the acquiring firms post-merger). Put differently, if there had not been a transfer of 
property rights, then there would not have been any need for MOFCOM’s hold separate 
requirements. As there is no evidence that suggests that restrictions were placed on 
the transfer of intellectual property rights (restrictions were only placed on the 
R&D activities), Seagate and WD were each able to access the acquired businesses’ 
stock of intellectual property (patents). This is important, because before the merger 
Seagate and WD would have needed a license to use Samsung and HGST patents. 
With the transfer of the already existing stock of intellectual property, this is no longer 
required. Indeed, Samsung and Seagate had already had mutual cross-licensing 
agreements in place before the merger,44 which allowed them to access each other’s 
patents, and the merger corroborated this.  
To demonstrate, the top row of Table 1 below shows the HDD-related patent stock for 
the merging firms just before the merger. The bottom rows of Table 1 show the 
number of patents for which ownership was transferred with the mergers in 2011/12. 
Although we do not have evidence that these are the same patents as the ones for 
which cross-licensing agreements had existed. Our intuition is that they are not, 
otherwise why would Seagate need to transfer the patents that they’re already free to 
use? We can see that Seagate became the owner of around 20% of Samsung’s HDD-
related patents with the mergers. Many of the patents that Samsung kept were not 
strictly on HDDs, but on complementary products that use HDDs. It is therefore safe 
to expect that the Samsung/Seagate merger, as it happened in 2011/12, had the 
                                          
43 We only have 1 year post 2015 data, which might be enough to look at effects that can 
imminently take place (such as changes in prices) but doesn’t seem long enough for merger 
related innovation effects to fully unfold. For this reason this pilot study does not focus on this 
second treatment. It might be something to address in a follow-up study.  
44 “The companies have also extended and enhanced their existing patent cross-licence 
agreement and have expanded co-operation to co-develop enterprise storage solutions.” 
http://www.seagate.com/gb/en/about-seagate/news/seagate-completes-aquisition-samsungs-
hdd-business-pr/. See also: 
http://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/news/newsIrRead.do?news_seq=19841&news_ctg
ry=irnewsrelease&page=1&rdoPeriod=ALL&from_dt=&to_dt=?ref=binfind.com/web&search_key
word=  
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potential to affect Seagate’s innovation activities, if not least, through the synergies 
resulting from shared access to some key HDD patents. 
Regarding WD, we did not find any ownership transfer from HGST to WD at the time 
of the 2011/12 conditional approval of the merger. This does not mean that WD did 
not have access to HGST patents. Cross-licensing agreements are not rare in the 
industry and could have contributed to some innovation synergies – however, we do 
not have any evidence to support this argument. Another explanation might be that 
MOFCOM’s restrictions were more crippling on WD than on Seagate, therefore patent 
transfers did not happen. 
Neither did we find any patent transfers from HGST to Toshiba at the time of the 
merger. This is despite the requirement that relevant HGST IP rights should be 
transferred to Toshiba upon their purchase of the divested 3.5-in HDD operations. We 
did not find any HDD patent that changed ownership from HGST to Toshiba, but HGST 
as a brand existed until Q4 2015, and the cut-off point of patent data is 2 years (data 
that is less than 2 years old may not have been included in the relevant patent 
registers. It is therefore possible that licensing rights were given to Toshiba, but HGST 
remained the assignee. 
Table 1: HDD patent stock before the merger and patents transferred with the 
mergers 
 
Samsung Seagate HGST WD Toshiba 
HDD patent stock before the merger 951 194 1260 74 486 
Number of patents transferred with mergers 
  to Seagate 173 
 
0 
   to WD 0 
 
0 
   to Toshiba 0 
 
0 
   
The numbers in Table 1 offer evidence that the consummation of the 
Samsung/Seagate merger started in 2011/12, and that innovation synergies could 
have started to manifest therewith. 
Methodological remark 1: Changes in patent stock around a merger can provide 
useful first information on firms’ potential for post-merger innovation synergies. 
To continue our list of reasons why the impact of the 2011/12 events is worth 
estimating, we note that Seagate and WD were free to choose between increasing or 
not changing R&D activities – the remedies only required them to hold these activities 
separate and do not reduce them under a specified level. More specifically: 
 Seagate was required to spend at least $800 million annually on R&D. However, 
Seagate’s R&D expenditure never dropped under $875 million in any of the 5 years 
preceding the merger (the average annual R&D spending pre-merger was above 
$900 million, see Figure 4). Therefore Seagate even had a leeway to somewhat drop 
their R&D spending and still comply with the MOFCOM requirements. This is 
important because it tells us that Seagate was free to increase, hold constant, or 
even reduce (to some extent) their R&D expenditure post-merger, which makes our 
exercise of testing the sign of the change in R&D a meaningful one.45 
                                          
45 Even with the most conservative reading, assuming that Seagate was not able to drop their 
R&D spending one could still test if there was an increase in R&D. 
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Figure 4: Seagate's R&D expenditure pre-merger 
 
 Western Digital was required to maintain the pre-merger level of R&D expenditure. 
This still allowed WD to decide between increasing or not increasing R&D 
expenditure, which makes it relevant to test whether there was indeed an increase. 
Finally, expectations could also play a role here. The mergers had been approved 
(although subject to conditions), therefore each party and their rivals could have 
anticipated that it would be fully consummated within foreseeable time. Any rational 
firm would be unlikely to idly stand by until all restrictions are raised. The expectation 
of future cost synergies might be conducive to higher innovation. Nevertheless, these 
are all rather speculative. We do not know how much these expectations affect firms’ 
innovation activities post-merger but we can turn to the data to answer this question. 
From the MOFCOM case announcement it is clear that restrictions were less stringent 
on Seagate than on WD. WD was practically forced to operate inefficiently maintaining 
duplicated production, marketing and sales operations for WD and HGST. This 
circumvented any possibility of increased efficiency. Figure 5 shows that the hold 
separate conditions only really affected WD and not Seagate. WD and HGST combined, 
had 80,767 employees, compared to Seagate's 53,602. At the same time there was 
only 8 per cent difference in capacity shipped between the two firms.46 Moreover, the 
hold separate conditions were imposed for 2 years on WD and 1 year on Seagate.47 
                                          
46 https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/12/10/3-things-western-digital-corp-
management-wants-you.aspx  
47 https://www.law360.com/articles/318280/china-places-strict-rules-on-western-digital-
hitachi-merger  
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Figure 5: Number of full time employees for WD and Seagate 
 
Therefore one could also test if there was a differential response from Seagate and 
WD to the 2012 mergers. Moreover, the industry also had a fully consummated 
merger in the form of the acquisition of HGST’s 3.5’ HDD operations by Toshiba, which 
would justify our quest of testing the effect of the mergers on Toshiba. 
Even if one rejects all our points above, we could still take a pragmatic approach and 
let the data speak. We do not have information on how the merging firms were 
affected by the events of 2011/12, but we can take this question to the data to see if 
these events had an effect that we can observe.  
For these reasons the pilot study will test the following: 
 Whether the combination of events in 2012 had an impact on Western Digital’s 
innovation activities. 
 Whether the combination of events in 2012 had an impact on Seagate’s innovation 
activities. 
 Whether there was a differential innovation effect on Seagate in comparison to 
Western Digital. 
 Whether the divestiture acquisition of the 3.5-in business of HGST affected the 
innovation activities of Toshiba. 
The main objective of this study is to assess the feasibility of measuring the impact of 
competition enforcement decisions on innovation. Based on what is used in the wider 
literature, we propose three different ways to measure innovation and examine the 
suitability of these measures to estimating the impact of specific interventions on 
innovation. First we look at the investment part of innovation, R&D expenditure. This 
is followed by a study on how the mergers affected the invention stage of innovation, 
as measured by the number of patents. Finally, we take some tentative steps to 
understand how the 2012 events affected product and technology diffusion, through 
an analysis of the impact of the merger on simple product characteristics. 
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6 The impact of the mergers on R&D intensity 
R&D spending is often used in aggregate studies on innovation as a measure of firms’ 
innovative activities. It is a convenient measure because it is denominated in 
comparable units (amount of money spent). However, as noted earlier, R&D is not the 
same as innovation, and some of these expenditures may not convert into a marketed 
product or improved production process. Nevertheless, it is a good first step to test 
whether the mergers had an impact on the three firms’ (Western Digital, Seagate, and 
Toshiba) willingness to invest in innovation. Most studies use R&D intensity (ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total revenue) as a measure of R&D spending, and we follow the 
same convention. 
6.1 Data and main variables 
Our data spans between Q1 1995 and Q2 2016 but the actual availability of data for 
each firm varies significantly in the early years. Nevertheless, we have complete 
quarterly coverage of data for the relevant firms for the period of observation Q1 2007 
to Q2 2016. We chose these cut-off points for simple reasons of data availability. The 
merger approval started in Q1 2011 and finished with the divestiture of the 3.5in 
business of HGST in Q1 2012. We had data available for 16 quarters post-merger (last 
available quarter was Q2 2016 at the time of the study), therefore we chose a 16 
quarter cut-off point on the other end as well (i.e. 4 years before the merger approval 
procedure started). All the data used for the R&D analysis is from firm’s balance 
sheets, as downloaded from S&P’s Capital IQ database. Below, we provide a brief 
introduction of the main variables used for our analysis. 
R&D intensity 
We measure innovation through R&D intensity, which is the ratio of R&D expenditure 
to total revenue. Figure 6 below plots the total revenue and the R&D expenditures for 
Western Digital. We can see a hike in both R&D expenditure and total revenue in Q1-
Q2 2012, implying that the acquisition of HGST took place in 2012 in accounting 
terms, i.e. WD’s books included HGST after Q2 2012. (The other big leap is WD’s 
acquisition of Sandisk in 2016).  
Figure 6: R&D expenditure and total revenue (Western Digital) 
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For Seagate (Figure 7), the jump was smaller at the time of the merger. This might be 
explained by the argument that Samsung’s HDD business was smaller than Hitachi’s, 
and it was not a significant competitive threat in the HDD industry (the FTC and the 
Commission both acknowledge this in their decisions). If this is so, it would be 
plausible that Samsung spent relatively little on HDD related R&D, which would 
explain why the merger does not show a large spike around the time of the merger on 
Figure 7. 
Post-merger Seagate’s R&D expenditure continuously increases whilst total revenue 
slowly decreases. This would suggest that the intensity of R&D spending for Seagate 
increased post-merger. 
One of the MOFCOM conditions was for Seagate to sustain an annual $800 million R&D 
expenditure level. Figure 7 also shows that Seagate has always spent above $800 
million per year on R&D, therefore it is unlikely that the post 2012 increase in R&D 
expenditure was simply a compliance with the MOFCOM conditions. Because Seagate 
was already above this level, they had a choice between not changing and increasing 
R&D expenditures. Figure 7 suggests that Seagate opted for an increase. 
Another MOFCOM condition was that Seagate increases Samsung’s production 
capacity. MOFCOM was satisfied that Seagate complied with this condition. Figure 7 
suggests that the increased spending on expanding capacity did not negatively affect 
spending on R&D. 
Figure 7: R&D expenditure and total revenue (Seagate) 
 
Of course Figure 6 and Figure 7 are not very useful for the purposes of comparison as 
they express absolute numbers therefore an increase in R&D might only be a sign of a 
growing company rather than growing attention to innovate. For this reason we look 
at R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditure to total revenue).  
Figure 8 plots R&D intensity for Seagate, Western Digital and Toshiba between 2007 
and 2016. The two vertical lines show the start and the closure of the merger approval 
process (mergers notified in Q1 2011, and divestiture implemented in Q2 2012). 
Figure 8 reveals a few interesting patterns. First of all, Western Digital (solid line) 
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(Q4 2009) the two mergers were proposed. Interestingly, WD and Seagate go parallel 
until Q4 2009, then WD starts its ascending trail. This seems to correspond to industry 
news of WD’s dedication to increasing innovation. As part of this story, in February 
2011 WD opened a new HDD R&D centre in Singapore,48 and in December 2011 it set 
up its first overseas SSD R&D centre in Taiwan (focusing on R&D enterprise 
applications).49 To us it appears WD is on a path of increased innovation, and the 
acquisition of HGST was not the cause but a part of this trend, especially as HGST is 
one of the largest patent owners in the industry (HGST has over 4,200 worldwide 
patents, with more than 300 patents added each year).50 
Seagate is a slightly different story. Its R&D intensity moved together with WD until 
Q4 2009 and then levelled out until the time of the merger. In Q1-Q2 2012 it suffered 
a slump. Figure 7 showed that this was due to the larger increase in Total Revenue 
rather than R&D expenditure as a result of adding Samsung HDD to Seagate’s books. 
Post-merger Seagate’s R&D intensity started to increase and has been increasing up 
to the end of our observation period. 
Toshiba, who acquired the 3.5’ HDD operations of HGST displays a different pattern. It 
had a leap in 2009, much sharper than Seagate and WD. This peak was probably the 
result of Toshiba’s acquisition of Fujitsu. This is followed a fairly constant level of R&D 
intensity both before and after 2012. But Toshiba has to be treated with more caution 
than Seagate or WD. For the latter two storage manufacturing is the only relevant 
business segment, whereas Toshiba is active in many different areas, and storage only 
constitutes around a quarter of its total operating revenue and R&D expenditure.51 
Figure 8: R&D intensity for Seagate, Western Digital, and Toshiba 
 
                                          
48 http://hothardware.com/news/western-digital-opens-up-singaporebased-hard-drive-rd-center  
49 
http://www.storagereview.com/western_digital_to_set_up_its_first_overseas_ssd_rd_center_in
_taiwan  
50 https://www.hgst.com/company/innovation-center  
51 26.2% according to Capital IQ. 
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Before moving on to the estimates, we need to highlight a couple of important 
methodological issues when using R&D data impact evaluation.  
First of all, when evaluating how R&D intensity changes after a merger, one must not 
ignore an important artifact of this type of data, that is, following a merger, elements 
of the financial statement of the acquired company are added to the corresponding 
elements of the financial statement of the acquiring company. This means that for 
simple arithmetic reasons R&D expenditure and Total Revenue will be higher in the 
post-merger period even if the merger does not increase the R&D intensity of the 
relevant businesses (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). This calls for some methodological 
adjustment. Firstly, we ignore the period of the treatment (the merger approval 
period) when estimating the impact of treatment, to take out the hikes caused by 
merging the two financial statements. Second, instead of using the level of R&D 
intensity we compare the ‘growth’ in R&D intensity. This eliminates the potential issue 
that a post-merger change in the level of R&D intensity inevitably includes the effect 
of adding up two figures in the firms’ financial statements. 
Methodological remark 2: When analysing R&D data in ex-post merger evaluations 
the post-merger data represents the sum of the merging parties’ R&D intensity. To 
eliminate biased impact estimates, one should (1) remove the period of the merger 
from the analysis, and (2) look at growth in R&D intensity rather than absolute 
figures. 
Secondly, when using R&D data from firms’ financial statements, it is very difficult (if 
possible at all) to acquire data specifically for the relevant segments or products of the 
analysed firms. Therefore the use of R&D expenditure data might be more fitting in 
cases where the relevant firms are less diverse, where R&D expenditure figures in 
financial statements can be safely attributed to the relevant product. In our case, 
Seagate and Western Digital fit this bill and so do many of our Control firms (e.g. 
Sandisk, Kingston, Micron, Hynix). 
Methodological remark 3: Because R&D expenditure data is recorded for the whole 
firm, it is more fitting in cases where the relevant firms are less diversified so that the 
R&D data can be attributed to the relevant product. 
Firm size 
There are numerous studies linking various firm characteristics, such as firm size, to 
innovation (e.g. Shefer, 2005). This large body of studies found that R&D expenditure 
increases with size. On the other hand, when looking at patent counts, the opposite 
effect has been shown – larger firms are associated with smaller number of patents. 
Some narratives concluded that larger firms are linked with less productive R&D 
spending. We will provide an extra piece of evidence to this debate but the main 
purpose is to use firm size to select a comparable control group. We measure firm size 
by total revenue, total assets, gross profit, number of employees, and net income. 
Pre-sample innovation activity 
Blundell, Griffith, and van Reenen (1995) and Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer 
(2002), both use this variable as an exogenous control. In our case this will mean pre-
sample average of annual patent applications and pre-sample average annual R&D 
spending. We aggregate and take firm-level means of the R&D expenditure data 
preceding Q1 2007, and use it as additional firm specific control. This could help 
control for some of the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Looking at the data we found 
that Micron, Verbatim, Sandisk are most similar to Seagate, and Hynix, Sony, and 
Hitachi were most similar to WD in their R&D expenditure before the sample period 
(1999-2006). We use this variable in the matching process. 
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Relevance of storage production within a firm 
In our data R&D expenditure is reported for the entire company that may have 
numerous diversified portfolios. For example R&D expenditure for Samsung 
incorporates all R&D spending by Samsung, which includes Samsung’s products other 
than storage. In specific cases this might not be a problem. For example, some firms 
might only be focusing on a small number of products or services. Seagate or WD 
specialise almost entirely on storage technologies. For them, R&D expenditure is likely 
to reflect expenditure on storage related research. This could allow us to make use of 
these aggregate R&D spending figures and estimate how specific interventions change 
them. 
To be able to gauge how much of the given company’s total production is related to 
storage technologies, we used S&P’s Capital IQ database for the number of segments 
the given business is active in. This is a time-constant figure, which means we only 
include it in finding a matching control and not in the DiD estimations (which control 
for firm-fixed effects). 
Time variant firm characteristics 
We controlled for other firm-level time-variant characteristics. Cost of goods sold 
represents cost of revenue incurred on all raw materials, work in process, 
manufacturing expenses and other costs directly attributable to production of finished 
goods and operating revenues. Gross profit is the difference between total revenue 
and the cost of revenue. In our regressions we include total revenue and gross profit, 
which together determine the cost of revenue. Net income includes various earnings 
on the firms’ operations. Total debt refers to various interest bearing obligations. Total 
operating expenses reflects expenses not directly associated with the production of 
goods or services. These firm characteristics are closely correlated with each other 
(larger businesses will have high values, etc.). To handle this we normalise these 
variables by using their ratio to total revenue rather than their absolute values.  
6.2 Finding adequate Control groups 
To evaluate whether the changes suggested by Figure 8 can be attributed to the start 
of consummating the two mergers in 2012 we compare the merging firms’ R&D 
intensity with various Control groups in the next section. Selecting the Control is not a 
trivial exercise. The HDD market is worldwide, which means that local markets cannot 
be used as Control. Moreover, innovation is likely to happen at worldwide level in 
other industries as well, meaning that local market variation is unlikely to be explored 
in similar studies in other industries. However there is some level of product 
differentiation (HDD, SSD, Flash drives), which is what we are going to explore to find 
an adequate Control group. 
6.2.1 Using rival firms as control 
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that using rival firms in studies on the price 
effect of mergers can lead to biased price effect estimates (spill-over effect). The 
intuition behind this is simple. If the merging firms increase prices, it is likely that the 
non-merging rivals will also increase their prices. In this case the difference between 
the merging firms’ and the non-merging firms’ prices is not going to reflect the full 
price effect of the merger. 
Analogously, in other areas such as innovation this would imply that if the merger 
increases innovation, the rivals might react by also increasing their innovation. We 
cannot test this intuition on our data because the only rival in the HDD market Toshiba 
was very directly affected by the merger (having acquired parts of HGST), making it 
an inadequate candidate to stand as Control. Moreover, we are also testing the impact 
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of Toshiba’s acquisition of part of HGST, i.e. there are no direct rivals that do not 
appear in the Treatment group.  
6.2.2 Selected storage firms as Control  
Our first Control group consists of a sample of SSD, and Flash drive firms. As 
introduced above, SSD and Flash drives are alternative technologies to storing data. 
In the merger decisions, the Commission concluded that at the time of the merger 
these technologies were not directly competing with HDD. Since then the 
substitutability between the two technologies have increased, although for certain 
applications one or the other technology still has clear advantages. For example HDD 
is considered better for archiving data, SSDs (flash memory based storage) are 
preferred in laptops where frequent and quick access is needed to data, and Flash 
drives are better suited in mobile devices such as mobile phones, tablets, memory 
cards, USB sticks. In some areas, such as desktops, there is more of a competition. 
However, with their prices now converging to HDDs, SSD and Flash drives are more 
and more considered as substitutes for HDD by users. 
The Control group includes the following firms: Transcend Information Inc., Intel 
Corporation, Sandisk Corporation, Kingston Technology, Micron Technology Inc., 
Imation Corp., Verbatim (Mitsubishi Kagaku Media), SK Hynix Inc., Sony Corporation, 
Lite-On Technology Corp., Powerchip, Kingston Technology, Barun Electronics, I-O 
Data Device Inc., Quanta Storage Inc., Ritek Corp., Panram Int., Power Quotient Int., 
Silicon Power Computer & Communications, Trek 2000 Int. Ltd. This is not an 
exhaustive list of all storage producers, but these are the typically largest firms in 
these markets (making them most similar to the Treatment firms), and the ones 
where R&D expenditure data was available. 
By using SSD/Flash manufacturers as Control we would assume that these 
technologies were exposed to the same demand and supply side shocks, except for 
the effect of the merger. We control for the cost of revenue (revenue minus profit) 
which should pick up some of the supply side shocks. On the demand side we can only 
assume that the main determinants of demand, income and substitutability change in 
parallel for buyers of HDDs, SSDs, and other Flash drives. 
The main issue we think is that these other storage firms might have been affected by 
the merger. If the different storage technologies are on the same product market, 
then innovation decisions in one product might trigger a response in the other. This 
would make these a biased counterfactual – i.e. the estimated impact on HDD R&D 
intensity would be smaller than the real impact. Doing a market definition was out of 
the remits of this report therefore we relied on the Commission’s market definition, 
which concluded that SSDs and Flash drives are not on the same market as HDD.52 
Post merger, the two products have converged, which might mean that a spill-over 
effect post-merger is more likely, i.e. our estimates would be downward biased. 
Knowing the sign of the bias can help us give meaningful interpretation to our results, 
at least regarding the sign of the effect of the 2012 events (e.g. if we estimate a 
positive impact on Seagate but we know the estimate is downward biased, we can be 
certain that the effect was positive). Nevertheless, we also employ other Control 
groups. 
                                          
52 Paragraph 236, European Commission, Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung COMP/M.6214, 
Decision October 19, 2011; and paragraph 342 European Commission, Western Digital 
Ireland/Viviti Technologies COMP/M.6203, Decision November 23, 2011. 
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6.2.3 Large sample IT firms as control 
As an alternative Control group, we looked at a more extended sample of firms. We 
selected all firms classified under ‘Information technology’ on S&P’s Capital IQ 
database. Being on different product markets we expected these to be more likely to 
be independent and thus unaffected by the 2012 events.  
We expected firms in this sample to be exposed to similar demand shocks because the 
demand for high-tech products is likely to be driven by the same underlying economic 
conditions (e.g. the 2007 economic downturn left computer manufacturing and other 
consumer electronics unaffected). On the supply side, we have less intuition, although 
we control for costs. To confirm this intuition, we turn to the data and offer various 
Control groups and test how each performs as Control. 
The sample size of these firms was over 200,000. We eliminated very small 
businesses (<$1 million total revenue) and businesses where balanced data was not 
available. This left us with a sample of 1701 firms, plus the 5 Treatment firms 
(Western Digital, Hitachi, Seagate, Samsung, and Toshiba).  
We distinguished between 4 potential Control groups here. First of all, we only 
included firms that were most similar to the Treatment firms in their primary industry 
(SIC codes53 357x). Second, using a larger group, we included firms with SIC codes 
35xx. Our third Control includes firms with SIC codes 3xxx, and finally our fourth 
Control includes all 1701 IT firms. As we show in Section 13.1.2 on page 130 in the 
Appendix, this latter sample performs best as Control, therefore in the analysis below 
we only use that Control. 
6.2.4 A weighted sample of IT firms 
Finally, we employ a matching method to acquire a weighted sample of all IT firms. To 
acquire the weights, we match (Propensity Score Matching with replacement54) Control 
with Treatment based on total revenue, pre-sample R&D expenditure, revenue 
growth, total assets, gross profit, net income, and number of segments. The 
characteristics of the data do not make it perfect for matching. We are matching 
based on pre-merger characteristics, whereby we take the pre-merger mean of each 
characteristic for the Treatment and the Control firms and estimate how well they 
predict the treatment (the merger). What makes matching difficult is that the 
Treatment group is always only composed of 1 firm, therefore we would need to find a 
sample of firms in the Control group that are most similar to this firm. This would not 
be difficult if we were only matching based on 1-2 characteristics but we face some 
restricting dimensionality problems with our current data. Despite these difficulties, 
nearest neighbour matching has produced well behaving Control groups as will be 
shown later.  
Figure 19 in the Appendix shows the firms included in the weighted Control group, 
when matched against WD, Seagate, and Toshiba. We used equal weights for the 
firms with the nearest 30 propensity scores. We tried different matching and weighting 
methods but they provided worse fits. Later we will show that our results are not 
sensitive to these matching assumptions. 
Table 21 in the Appendix displays the pre-merger means and standard deviations of 
the above variables for four groups: the Treatment firms, the sample of storage firms, 
the sample of IT firms, and the weighted sample of IT firms (matched with each 
                                          
53 https://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm 
54 We need to apply replacement because we are matching a large pool of Control firms to a 
single Treatment firm. 
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Treatment firm). The purpose of Table 21 is to demonstrate how well each potential 
Control groups perform as control. A Control is most similar if its pre-merger observed 
characteristics are most similar to the Treatment. In this regard, Table 21 suggests 
that the weighted IT firms perform best, with the unweighted IT firms a close second. 
6.2.5 Synthetic control 
As mentioned above, our matching method was not ideal because we were matching 
all potential Control firms to a single Treatment firm. A more suitable solution for 
finding the right Control in such cases is through the synthetic control method 
described in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), and Abadie et al. (2010). The idea 
behind this method is to generate a weighted sample of firms that are most similar to 
the Treatment firm based on a set of observable characteristics.55 
We use all IT firms (as above) as a pool for potential Controls, and calculate the 
weights based on total revenue, gross profit, total assets, net income, total debt, 
expenses, pre-sample R&D expenditure, and the proportion of relevant segments to 
find the synthetic control. For each Treatment firm, the corresponding weighted 
Controls are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Composition of synthetic control groups 
Firm Weight 
WD 
 
Alphabet Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOGL) 0.042 
Compal Electronics, Inc. (TSEC:2324) 0.128 
Intuit Inc. (NasdaqGS:INTU) 0.124 
Inventec Corporation (TSEC:2356) 0.339 
NVIDIA Corporation (NasdaqGS:NVDA) 0.368 
Seagate 
 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (NasdaqCM: 0.419 
Alphabet Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOGL) 0.038 
Compal Electronics, Inc. (TSEC:2324) 0.37 
Intuit Inc. (NasdaqGS:INTU) 0.165 
NVIDIA Corporation (NasdaqGS:NVDA) 0.008 
Toshiba 
 
Avaya Inc. 0.093 
NetApp, Inc. (NasdaqGS:NTAP) 0.046 
Symantec Corporation (NasdaqGS:SYMC) 0.106 
TCL Multimedia Technology Holdings Limi 0.293 
Unisys Corporation (NYSE:UIS) 0.414 
salesforce.com, inc. (NYSE:CRM) 0.048 
                                          
55 The synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie et al., 2010) is a data-
driven approach to construct a control group based on a set of possible controls. Different from 
the DiD method this methodology gives different weights to the untreated units and calculates a 
weighted average of the controls that closely matches the treatment during the pre-treatment 
period. We use the package synth_runner in Stata and compute the synthetic control using as 
covariates firm quarterly data on log of total debt, log of total assets, log of total revenue, and 
R&D intensity. Then we create a dependent variable, which is the difference between the 
treatment and synthetic control outcome variable. In the estimations we regress this derived 
variable against a time trend, quarter dummies and the dummy variable for merger (key 
variables for the DiD effect). 
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The above exercise presents us with valuable lessons on the feasibility of finding an 
adequate Control group. These lessons are not confined to innovation-impact studies 
but price-impact studies as well. Markets with differentiated products are more likely 
to offer a counterfactual. In the present case the product is somewhat differentiated 
(HDD, SSD, Flash drives), which is what we tried to explore to find a Control. 
Geographically, the market is world-wide, therefore it was impossible to find a product 
in the different geographical market. More generally, because innovation happens 
globally, geographical variation is unlikely to play a role, meaning that product 
differentiation is likely to be the only source that one could exploit for finding an 
adequate Control group.  
Methodological remark 4: Similarly to price-impact studies, finding an adequate 
Control is likely to be easier in some markets (e.g. differentiated products). Because 
innovation happens at the global level, impact studies on innovation are not likely to 
be able to rely on geographical market variation to find an adequate Control. 
6.3 Estimating the impact of the mergers  
In presenting the results we focus separately on the impact of the acquisition of HGST 
(2.5 inch) by WD, the acquisition of Samsung by Seagate, and the impact of the 
acquisition of HGST (3.5 inch) by Toshiba on the R&D intensity of the acquiring 
companies. 
6.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 3: R&D intensity before and after the merger (main storage firms) 
name of firm 
4 year average 
r&d intensity pre-
mergers 
4 year average 
r&d intensity 
post-mergers 
change in 4-
year average 
r&d intensity 
3D Systems Corporation (NYSE:DDD) 0.087 0.108 0.021 
Barun Electronics Co. Ltd. (KOSDAQ:A064520) 0.018 0.021 0.003 
Hitachi, Ltd. (TSE:6501) 0.169 N/A N/A 
I-O Data Device, Inc. (TSE:6916) 0.027 0.091 0.064 
Imation Corp. (NYSE:IMN) 0.013 0.073 0.061 
Intel Corporation (NasdaqGS:INTC) 0.153 0.209 0.056 
Lite-On Technology Corp. (TSEC:2301) 0.021 0.028 0.007 
Micron Technology, Inc. (NasdaqGS:MU) 0.105 0.101 -0.003 
Panram International Corp. (GTSM:8088) 0.004 0.007 0.003 
Power Quotient International Co., Ltd.  0.003 0.002 -0.001 
Powerchip Technology Corp. 0.070 0.056 -0.014 
Quanta Storage Inc. (GTSM:6188) 0.031 0.039 0.008 
RITEK Corporation (TSEC:2349) 0.024 0.036 0.013 
SK Hynix Inc. (KOSE:A000660) 0.071 0.115 0.044 
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (KOSE:A0059) 0.056 0.066 0.010 
SanDisk Corp. 0.106 0.136 0.030 
Seagate Technology plc (NasdaqGS:STX) 0.081 0.098 0.015 
Silicon Power Computer & Communications 0.007 0.013 0.006 
Transcend Information, Inc. (TSEC:2451) 0.004 0.006 0.002 
Trek 2000 International Ltd (SGX:5AB) 0.036 0.040 0.005 
Western Digital Corporation (NasdaqGS:WD) 0.067 0.111 0.044 
Sony Corporation (TSE:6758) 0.063 0.060 -0.003 
Toshiba Corporation (TSE:6502) 0.054 0.054 0.001 
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Before we move on to estimating the effect of the 2012 events on R&D spending, we 
provide some descriptive statistics. Table 3 shows the 4-year average R&D 
expenditure to revenue ratio before and after the mergers. It appears that that the 
ratio of research spending increased from around 7% to 11% for WD, increased from 
around 8% to 10% for Seagate and remained almost the same for Toshiba. For the 
other firms the increase was around 1.5 percentage points on average. 
These simple averages do not always reveal a large change. For further information 
we plot R&D intensity growth against the Control groups discussed above.56 Figure 9 
compares WD with the four Control groups. The two vertical lines mark the start and 
end of the merger procedure – this period was excluded from the analysis as 
explained above. These suggest that in terms of the similarity assumption, the 
synthetic group performs better than the others. Table 21 and Table 22 in the 
Appendix compare the mean values of the key variables for WD and the Control 
groups and it confirms this visual finding.57 Moreover, using a synthetic control is also 
the best method for eliminating potential endogeneity issues. Storage firms are also 
the least likely to be independent of the treatment – for this Control group there is a 
viable possibility that it was also affected by the merger. Looking at the plotted R&D 
intensity growth values for WD and the Synthetic control, our visual conclusion of the 
evolution of R&D is that WD’s R&D intensity grows at around the same rate as the 
Control’s. 
Figure 9: R&D intensity growth plot for WD and three different Control groups 
 
For Seagate, Figure 10 shows that the Synthetic Control group performs best in terms 
of displaying parallel pre-merger trend in R&D intensity. Looking at the figures in 
Section 13.1.3 on page 132, and Table 21 and Table 22 in the Appendix also suggest 
that in terms of similarity, the synthetic control group performs best, and the 
                                          
56 Section 13.1.3 on page 135 in the Appendix also provides plots for R&D intensity. 
57 We looked at the sum of differences from the observed pre-merger mean value for each 
Control group. Say the observed pre-merger mean total revenue for WD was X, then we 
compared the mean pre-merger total revenue for each Control group with this X. We then 
summed up the distances from this mean for each Control group. This was by far the lowest for 
the synthetic control. 
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unweighted and weighted samples of IT firms are somewhat better than the Control 
group of storage firms. The best performing Controls are also more likely to satisfy the 
independence assumption than storage firms that are more likely to have been 
affected by the merger. 
What Figure 10 reveals is that Seagate’s R&D intensity growth moved around the 
same level as the Treatment group pre-merger. Post-merger there is a higher level of 
growth for Seagate than for the Control groups. We will test this formally, but in any 
case, this would suggest that the events between Q3 2011 and Q2 2012 lead to an 
increase in Seagate’s R&D intensity. 
Figure 10: R&D intensity growth plot for Seagate 
 
Finally, we look at Toshiba on Figure 11. The Treatment line shows a jump in 2009 
when Toshiba acquired Fujitsu’s HDD operations. We only had annual R&D data for 
Toshiba. We evenly split the annual data across the four quarters for each year to get 
the quarterly data. This eliminates seasonality from the data but should not affect the 
simple DiD estimates provided later.58 The figures show that the matching process was 
not as effective as for WD or for Seagate. We will formally test this later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                          
58 One could model seasonality for example based on seasonal moves in other firms but our 
simple DiD estimates rely on pre-, and post-merger means, which is not affected by how we 
model seasonality.  
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Figure 11: R&D intensity growth plot for Toshiba 
 
6.3.2 Difference-in-differences estimates 
As explained above, in estimating the effect of the 2012 events, we look at how the 
growth in R&D intensity changes after the merger.59 More specifically we look at how 
the mergers in 2012 affected the magnitude of quarterly and annual change in R&D 
intensity. This is to eliminate the problems arising from adding up revenue and R&D 
expenditure figures for the merging companies. Looking at the change in R&D 
intensity also eliminates serial correlation in the data (as explained below). The 
descriptive figures above suggest that for WD and for Toshiba 2012 had no effect on 
the growth of R&D intensity, whereas for Seagate R&D intensity growth increased 
after 2012. 
In our regression we control for firm fixed effects, time trend, seasonal trend, and 
various firm characteristics, such as total revenue, gross profit, total assets, net 
income, total debt, operating expenses, and gross profit. As explained above, we 
normalise these variables by using their ratio to total revenue. In the model reported 
in Table 4 we lag the regressors by 5 quarters (because ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−4, and 
we do not believe that any of these variables would have contemporaneous effects).60  
Table 4 shows the estimated effect of the mergers on the annual R&D intensity growth 
of WD, Seagate, and Toshiba. Annual change equals the difference between R&D 
intensity at time t and R&D intensity 4 quarters earlier. ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−4. We 
report the magnitude of annual growth as quarterly changes are typically too small to 
give meaningful results.61  
                                          
59 Section 13.1.3 on p.146 in the Appendix shows the plots for R&D intensity growth. 
60 In the model reported in Table 25 in the Appendix, where ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑡−1, we lag 
the dependent variables by 2 quarters for the same consideration. 
61 In Table 21 in the Appendix we show the main results where we look at R&D change over 2 
quarters. We get qualitatively the same results (longer periods allow for larger increase). 
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Table 4 only shows the estimated ‘treatment effects’.62 Our interest is not in the effect 
of the regressors, therefore we did not want to distract the reader by going into a 
lengthy discussion on these effects.63 We have run a large number of different models, 
under varying model specifications, different lags, etc. A number of these is reported 
in the Appendix (Section 13.1.1 on p.125), others are available from the authors on 
request. 
The coefficients in Table 4 offer no evidence on whether WD’s R&D intensity changed 
post-2012. On the other hand, there seems to be evidence, that following the 
combination of 2012 events, Seagate’s annual growth of R&D expenditure was around 
0.6–1.6 percentage point higher than it would have been without the 2012 events. For 
the Seagate the effect seems consistent across the different models, which supports 
that this finding is robust to a choice in the exact specification of the Control group. 
Similar effect is estimated without regressors, and under different model 
specifications. This would suggest that, if one accepts our identification strategy, the 
2012 events increased Seagate’s R&D spending. Interestingly, the effect was lowest 
where other storage firms were used as Control. This might be an indication that these 
firms were also affected by the 2012 events and they responded with a small increase 
in their on R&D.  
Finally, for Toshiba, there is some evidence of a small (around 0.5 percentage points 
per year) drop in R&D growth. This seems to be the case irrespective of the estimated 
model. However, we are less confident in these results for two reasons: (1) as 
explained above, the matching for Toshiba did not work as well as for the other two 
firms); and (2) storage production is only a small segment of Toshiba, whereas our 
R&D data is firm-level, therefore these effects could be picking up changes in other 
segments (i.e. a general, not HDD specific drop in Toshiba’s R&D spending). 
Table 4: Effect of the mergers on R&D intensity growth of WD, Seagate, and Toshiba 
Control 
Other storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted IT 
firms 
Synthetic 
control 
Western Digital 
   
DiD  -0.00534 0.00164 -0.0103 0.00749 
(std. err) (-0.00638) (-0.0015) (-0.00746) (-0.00531) 
N 479 28449 840 78 
Seagate 
    
DiD 0.00569 0.00656*** 0.0101** 0.0159*** 
(std. err) (-0.00563) (-0.000846) (-0.00427) (-0.00589) 
N 593 28571 793 78 
Toshiba 
    
DiD -0.0098 -0.00451*** -0.00065 -0.00414 
(std. err) (-0.00751) (-0.00071) (-0.00158) (-0.00531) 
n 593 28571 1320 78 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
                                          
62 In the technical appendix we explain the estimated model in detail. 
63 Section 13.1.1 on p.138 in the Appendix provides more details on the effect of covariates. 
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6.3.3 Assumptions required for unbiased results 
No serial correlation 
We talk about serial correlation (or autocorrelation) if in the estimated model the error 
terms across time periods are correlated. In this case this would mean correlation 
between R&D intensity at different time periods due to an unobserved factor. DiD 
models often rely on panel data that spans over many time-periods and cross-
sections. Not all panel data necessarily suffers from autocorrelation. If the number of 
time series is small (e.g. two periods, pre- and post-merger) and/or there is a very 
large number of cross sections, then autocorrelation may not be so much of an issue. 
However, when the data is dominated by its time-series dimension, then all issues of a 
time series analysis (including autocorrelation) have to be accounted for.  
If there is positive serial correlation in the R&D intensity data, then the standard 
errors of the OLS coefficient estimates will be lower than the unbiased standard errors. 
This would imply that the effect of the merger might be found significant even when, 
in an unbiased model, it would not be. Similarly, negative serial correlation in the price 
data may overestimate the standard error of the merger effect. 
We used Wooldridge’s (2002) autocorrelation test for panel data. The tests returned 
evidence of serial correlation when using the R&D intensity data. However, one of the 
benefits of using R&D intensity growth instead of R&D intensity as the dependent 
variable, is that by taking differences we are likely to eliminate serial correlation. 
Indeed, using R&D intensity growth, we only find some serial correlation in the model 
with the unweighted IT firms in the sample, but it disappears when the other two 
Control groups are used.  
Independence (no spill-over effects) 
A spill-over effect occurs where the effect of the treatment spills into the Control 
group, reducing the difference between Control and Treatment, hence underestimating 
the effect of the merger. This may be problematic in markets with strategic 
interaction, as typically are those studied in most of the merger literature. A violation 
of this assumption would mean that the estimated post-merger R&D intensity change 
is downward biased in its absolute value (it would be the same sign but smaller 
absolute value).  
It is possible that there was a spill-over effect into other parts of the storage market 
(SSD and/or other Flash), which is our first Control group. However, we offer two 
other Control groups (unweighted and weighted IT firms) based on the assumption 
that it is very unlikely that the Treatment affected non-storage product markets. This 
is why we chose a sample of IT firms, as the independence assumption is much less 
likely to be violated for this Control group. The similarity assumption might be more of 
an issue for this case, which we test by testing parallel trends.  
Similarity (parallel trends) 
For DiD to provide unbiased estimates one would need Treatment and Control to 
follow parallel trends in the absence of the merger. Obviously, we do not observe the 
Treatment group without the merger after 2012. For this reason we can only test 
whether the parallel trend exists before the merger. Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11  
above provide a first visual test. In general, the models where other storage firms 
(SSD and other Flash drives) and where IT firms are used as control provide a parallel 
trend. Matching improves this a little. 
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There are various ways to test whether the parallel trend assumption is violated, and 
we present two of these, one for the R&D analysis below, and another one later for the 
patent analysis. There is no particular reason why we should have preference for 
either of these tests in looking at R&D, patents, or product characteristics.  
The first test is the more restrictive one. It looks at annual deviations from the parallel 
trend in the pre-merger data. The intuition is that if the changes in R&D intensity 
(growth) are not statistically the same for the Treatment and Control (i.e. the trend-
lines deviate) in any pre-merger year, it would be a violation of the parallel trend 
assumption. The test therefore looks at whether changes in R&D intensity growth are 
significantly different in any pre-merger year.64 For the simple difference-in-
differences model that we are estimating one would not need to be so restrictive. Our 
DiD model assumes linearity in both pre-, and post-merger trends. Therefore it would 
be enough to test whether the two linear trends (Treatment and Control) remain 
parallel. We demonstrate this – less restrictive – test in the patent analysis. 
To run a formal test we look at pre-merger R&D intensity growth data, and estimate a 
fixed effects model, with the same covariates as in the headlined model, but with 
yearly dummies, and interactions between the yearly dummies and the treatment. If 
the pre-merger trends are parallel, then the interaction coefficients (te2008-te2011) 
should be non-significant. On the other hand, if there is difference in how the Control 
and the Treatment change, then the estimated coefficients would be significantly 
different from zero. As a matter of fact, what we should be looking at is the joint 
significance of the annual differences between Control and Treatment. We ran two 
models, with two different dependent variables, quarterly and annual growth in R&D 
intensity. Table 5 shows the estimated coefficients (full regression results are given in 
Table 26 in the Appendix).  
There is no evidence that there was a deviation from parallel trend for Seagate. We 
found some difference in the changes in the Control and Treatment trends in 2008 for 
WD. For Toshiba however, as our visual analysis has already suggested, the parallel 
trends assumption is violated for virtually all 4 pre-merger years. This finding also 
holds when we look at the joint significance of the annual deviations. 
  
                                          
64 This is fundamentally a DiD estimation for each pre-merger year. 
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Table 5: Testing the parallel trend assumption 
 
Seagate WD Toshiba 
 
Quarterly growth 
in R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
Quarterly growth in 
R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
Quarterly growth in 
R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
te2008 -0.000921 0.00548 0.00218 0.0220*** -0.00817*** -0.0231*** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0110) (0.00187) (0.00537) (0.00107) (0.00161) 
te2009 -0.0000757 0.00350 0.0000420 0.00140 0.00512*** 0.0195*** 
 
(0.00915) (0.00890) (0.00226) (0.00456) (0.00113) (0.00297) 
te2010 0.000693 0.0163 0.00145 0.00748 -0.00316*** -0.00903*** 
 
(0.00652) (0.0101) (0.00178) (0.00634) (0.000760) (0.00153) 
te2011 -0.00729 -0.00709 -0.00703 -0.00441 -0.00437*** -0.0105*** 
 
(0.00803) (0.00694) (0.00436) (0.00740) (0.000945) (0.00220) 
F-test for 
joint sig. 
0.24 1.28 1.60 5.97*** 236.06*** 499.30*** 
(p-value) (0.92) (0.31) (0.21) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 791 742 895 845 1364 1276 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
="* p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01" 
    
 
6.3.4 Robustness checks 
We estimate treatment effects using four different Control groups and find that the 
estimates are robust to changes in the composition of the Control. We offer three 
more robustness checks. 
6.3.4.1 Placebo treatment 
First we tested whether a placebo Treatment group returns significant treatment 
effect. We used the total sample of IT firms and re-run the DiD model assuming in 
each iteration that another firm was the ‘Treatment’. With each iteration we generated 
a new weighted sample (matching the ‘Treatment’ firm) and then estimated the 
treatment effects. The idea is that if our treatment effect for Seagate is a fluke then 
we would find a large number of other firms producing similarly significant treatment 
effects. On the other hand, if the other firms did not receive the same treatment as 
Seagate then there would only be a small proportion of firms with statistically 
significant positive treatment effects.  
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Table 6: Placebo Treatment times 
 
Seagate WD Toshiba 
 
Quarterly growth 
in R&D intensity 
Annual growth 
in R&D intensity 
Quarterly growth 
in R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
Quarterly growth 
in R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
2007 0.00551* 0.00559 0.00136 -0.00227 -0.00122 0.00117 
 
(0.00255) (0.00451) (0.00165) (0.00309) (0.000869) (0.00278) 
 
721 703 926 898 1274 1240 
2008 0.00165 0.0116* -0.00175 -0.00755 0.00215*** -0.00387 
 
(0.00221) (0.00506) (0.00236) (0.00376) (0.000575) (0.00201) 
 
698 680 881 859 1232 1200 
2009 -0.00304 0.00399 -0.00284 -0.0151** -0.00455*** 0.00456* 
 
(0.00345) (0.00508) (0.00196) (0.00445) (0.000756) (0.00182) 
 
656 641 809 794 1155 1124 
2010 -0.00584 0.00612 -0.00343 -0.00908 -0.00314*** -0.00821*** 
 
(0.00445) (0.00714) (0.00248) (0.00600) (0.000529) (0.000979) 
 
605 590 727 715 1077 1046 
2011 -0.0161 -0.0149 -0.0157* -0.0239* -0.00429*** -0.00925*** 
 
(0.00944) (0.0110) (0.00631) (0.0107) (0.000605) (0.00127) 
N 540 533 637 626 978 954 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
    
This resulted in a sample of 1701 ‘Treatment effects’. Less than 15% of these 
produced results similar to Seagate’s (positive and statistically significant treatment 
effect). Given the large number of firms this is a very good piece of evidence for two 
reasons:  
 It shows that at most there are only few confounding effects, i.e. there were 
unlikely to be any other major shocks in Q1-Q2 2012 that would have affected IT 
firms that same way the merger affected Seagate. 
 More importantly, even where estimates for other firms were also significantly 
different from zero, they were evenly spread between negative and positive values. 
Therefore when the pool of IT firms is used as a control, even when there are other 
firms in the sample that reacted to something in 2012, the sign of these reactions 
cancelled each other out in their total effect, therefore our choice of using weighted 
or unweighted IT firms as Control is a good one and should provide unbiased 
results.  
We also tested for placebo Treatment times. This involves checking what happens if 
we assume that Treatment (mergers) happened in a different year before the merger. 
We re-run our regressions for five different pre-merger years and for two different 
dependent variables (quarterly change, annual change in R&D intensity) using the 
weighted IT Control. We used pre-Q3-2012 data as we did not want the effect of the 
actual merger effects confound the placebo effects.  
Table 6 shows the effect of these placebo Treatment times. First of all, there seems to 
be a negative effect in 2011, but here the data includes Q4 2011, when the R&D and 
revenue figures were aggregated for the merging firms in Seagate’s books. We 
explained above that this lead to a dip in recorded R&D intensity, which is an artefact 
of the data rather than a real effect. Nevertheless, our conclusion would be that there 
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is no evidence that would suggest that there were placebo effects for Seagate or 
Western Digital. For Toshiba on the other hand we estimated significant placebo 
effects. This would reiterate our previous stance that our identification strategy did not 
work for Toshiba. 
6.3.4.2 Different matching assumptions 
As explained above, in one of the models we matched IT firms with each of the 
Treatment firms and used a weighted sample of the IT firms that were most similar 
based on observed characteristics. In the matching exercise we matched with the 
Treatment firms the 30 most similar (nearest neighbours) and acquired their weights. 
To see whether our choice of 30 firms affected the results, Table 7 shows the DiD 
estimates for Seagate, under different matching assumptions. The table shows that 
the results were not sensitive to the choice of the number of matched firms. We also 
included a column showing results where only the IT firms with the most similar 
propensity scores feature with equal weight (for example in the case of Seagate this 
includes matching with two other firms). The results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
 
Table 7: Treatment effects for different matching assumptions  
Matching 
assumptions 
Nearest neighbour matching (# of nearest 
neighbours used) 
Matching 
with ties 
 
25 30 35 40 
 
Seagate      
DiD 0.0108* 0.0101** 0.00960** 0.00815** 0.0165*** 
Std.err. (0.00563) (0.00427) (0.00421) (0.00376) (0.0000788) 
N 661 793 873 1032 68 
Western 
Digital      
DiD -0.00519 -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.00642 -0.107 
Std.err. (0.00528) (0.00636) (0.00628) (0.00710) (0.0632) 
n 808 929 1095 1248 116 
Toshiba      
DiD -0.00519 -0.0102 -0.0101 -0.00642 -0.107 
Std.err. (0.00528) (0.00636) (0.00628) (0.00710) (0.0632) 
n 808 929 1095 1248 116 
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7 The impact of the mergers on patent activity 
This chapter provides preliminary results on how patent activity was affected by the 
2011/12 consolidation of the HDD market. 
To measure innovation productivity, patent data is the most frequently adopted 
indicator. However, as shown in the literature there is no unique way to use patent 
data or to measure of patent activity. As such, various measures have been proposed 
and employed. A non-comprehensive list includes: patent counts, patents weighted by 
citations, patent intensity (the ratio between patent count and revenues), and stock of 
patents net of patent depreciation.  
Patent data is different from R&D in many respects, which requires a different 
methodological approach. Take the choice of dependent variable as an example. To 
measure R&D spending, it has been a long standing convention to use firms R&D 
expenditure data (more precisely its ratio to total revenue). On the other hand, to 
gauge patenting activity, there is a multitude of different measures one could use: 
patent count, citations, citation weighted patent count, a composite index, just to 
name a few. Which one of these gives us the most accurate picture of patenting? And 
especially, which one is the best for the purposes of studies like this one?  
In this section we offer a novel, comprehensive way to evaluate the impact of a given 
event on patent activity. Instead of arbitrarily choosing a measure of patent activity, 
we describe a methodological framework that estimates a large number of potentially 
suitable models using all possible expressions of patent activity, and synthesises the 
individual results into a pooled estimate of the effect of the 2012 events. 
7.1 Data and main variables 
Relevant data on patents have been collected and cleaned by an Italian start-up, 
BigFlo, which works in collaboration with the University of Bergamo in Italy. They 
gathered full information on patents related to HDDS, SSDs, and Flash drives. 
Using patent data two problems have to be addressed. First of all, one has to tackle 
how patents are classified and organised, and what their value is, as patents differ 
largely in their technical and economic significance. To address such issues, accurate 
algorithms can be defined to identify and collect relevant patent data. We have done 
some filtering to ensure that only relevant patents are left in our sample. Patent 
classification relies on technical aspects, which allows us to distinguish if a patent 
refers to an innovation for HDD and their complementary applications. Data was 
extracted for each technology, and subsequently grouped by firm. This approach 
enabled an analysis at firm level and thus grants the matching of patent data with firm 
R&D expenditure and other firm characteristics. Despite our best efforts to filter out 
irrelevant patents, our data still contains patents that are not strictly about the 
relevant products (they just make intensive reference to the relevant product). 
However, because our two main firms of interest (Seagate and Western Digital) were 
mainly active in HDD, in the case of treatment firms we could be certain that all 
patents were relevant. 
Of course, such simplification is not always possible, in which case one could draw on 
machine learning techniques to further improve sampling. This would require an 
algorithm to filter out non-relevant patents, and would involve an analyst ‘training’ the 
algorithm by creating a learning set (a set of patents that the analyst identifies as 
relevant). The algorithm would then compare the other patents to the learning set and 
assign it to relevant or irrelevant classes based on their similarity to the documents 
that have already been assigned to the category. As the set of identified ‘relevant’ 
patents grows, the better tuned the algorithm becomes in identifying relevant patents. 
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Methodological remark 5: For evaluating the impact of specific cases on patent 
activity, one has to be able to filter out irrelevant patents. Where the relevant firms 
are only active in the relevant product market, such identification might be possible by 
simply looking at the owner of the patent. More sophisticated machine learning 
techniques are possible in other cases to filter out irrelevant patents. 
Our database refers to patent families, including patent applications taken in multiple 
countries to protect the invention, which is relatively common for inventors or 
applications. The effective date of each patent application refers to the quarter when a 
first application is registered in a country. The date of subsequent applications for the 
same patent are also relevant as they can inform us about changes in patent 
ownership. 
From this dataset we can draw the following variables: 
 Patent count:    The most straightforward measure of patent activity is patent 
count defined as the number of patents assigned over a certain period of time to 
firms, industries, countries, etc. This measure has been considered to be closely 
associated with the input side of the innovative process, as a primarily result of R&D 
expenditures. The use of patent count as a measure of innovation has been 
criticized in the literature for its large variation over time. However, when looking at 
a specific industry (and not aggregate studies) as the one proposed in this feasibility 
study, patent count might be informative to capture the innovative trend of specific 
firms. 
If R&D and patent activity are similar measures of innovation then the main findings 
from the R&D section should be replicated when using patents as measure of 
innovation. However, one has to acknowledge the fact that while R&D can 
potentially instantaneously reflect the decision of a business to innovate, the 
patenting of a new invention might only happen some time after the R&D 
investment. This pattern is confirmed in Table 8, which shows the correlation 
between patent counts and R&D expenditure for all firms in our dataset (where the 
first column refers to the whole sample, second column to Seagate/Samsung only, 
and third column to WD/Hitachi only). The table shows that correlation gets 
stronger as R&D expenditure lags grow, implying that R&D expenditure is more 
likely to require some time to effectuate itself into a patented innovation. However 
this gain over the lags is relatively small in magnitude, and levels out at 2-years. 
This would imply to us that the lagged effect on patent activity come less than 2 
years after a merger. This would be in line with what previous papers have found for 
high-tech products. 
Table 8: Correlation between HDD-related patent count and lagged R&D expenditure 
 All SG/Sa WD/H 
Patent count 1 1 1 
R&Dt 0.3297 0.3985 0.6248 
R&Dt-1 0.3297 0.3727 0.6216 
R&Dt-2 0.3336 0.366 0.6298 
R&Dt-3 0.3387 0.3561 0.6278 
R&Dt-4 0.3504 0.3751 0.6472 
R&Dt-5 0.3567 0.3906 0.6389 
R&Dt-6 0.367 0.4217 0.6468 
R&Dt-7 0.3717 0.4408 0.6437 
R&Dt-8 0.3752 0.4682 0.6024 
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 Patent citations: An alternative but complementary measure suggested by the 
patent literature as an index of patent importance or value is patent citations, 
consisting of the number of times that each patent has been cited in subsequent 
patents (i.e. in reference cited). Scholars use citations to address the wide range of 
inventions covered by a patent (Kutznets, 1962), while the quality of an invention 
can be measured by the magnitude of inventive output associated with it (Griliches, 
1990). The innovation literature assumes that the number of citations received by a 
patent is positively correlated with the quality of the patented invention (among 
others Schmookler, 1962; Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2001; Boolm, Shankerman and 
Van Reeneed, 2014).  
 Citation weighted patent counts: Citations can be used as an index or as a 
deflator of patent counts, by computing the citations weighted patent count 
(weighing each patent by the number of citations it received).65 
 Number of application states: indicates in how many countries the patent 
application has been applied for (EU patents: implies that it is applied in 28 
countries). Patent count stock and citation stock are traditionally considered 
measures of “knowledge stock” (Hall, Jaffe and Tranjtenberg, 2005). To tackle the 
imperfections related to the use of patent counts, Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam 
(1998) make use of the number of countries in which protection for the same 
invention is obtained and patent renewal data, which is the number of years a 
patent is renewed. 
 Name of applicant/assignee: To have the option to group data at the firm level, 
our dataset incorporates full details of all firm names and their subsidiaries, 
including both the Treatment firms and all other firms with HDD-related patents. 
 Number of reassignments: The number of times the patent has changed 
ownership. When it is larger than zero, it means that a patent application has been 
generated by inventors (independent) who sold the innovation to a third party, who 
is now the patent owner. Assignees history and date was also available. 
 Number of inventors: Finally, a relevant source of information is enclosed in the 
characteristics of the inventors.66 In order to identify if that inventors are 
independent or working on order for a firm, we look at the number of 
reassignments, more specifically when the number of reassignments is greater than 
zero, it means that the innovation has been generated by inventors who have 
passed onto the assignee (patent right holder) the ownership of the IP. A further 
way to use the information based on inventors is the definition of research team 
size, which relies on the number of inventors involved in the discovery. 
                                          
65 Thus, in the literature a simple method is to weigh each patent indexed with i by the number 
of citations it received, denoted by Ci , so that the weighted patent count for a given product 
class in a given year t would be: 〖WPC〗_t=∑_(i=1)^(N_t)▒〖(1+C_it ),〗 where N_t is the 
total number of patents granted during year t in a specific product class. More recently, having 
the possibility to distinguish the citation types (for example if it comes from patent attorneys or 
patent examiners), Moser, Ohmstedt, and Rhode (2016), propose the use of citations as a 
measure of patent performance, considering the link between citations and the quality of 
patented inventions. (weighing each patent by the number of citations it received). 
66 To the test the long standing Marshallian hypothesis about the existence of spatial boundaries 
to knowledge diffusion, inventors and their location is often considered to study their role in 
generating knowledge and innovation (Breshi and Lossoni, 2004). Inventors are considered as 
knowledge stocks, hence when they move from one firm to another, they carry knowledge from 
the prior employer to the new one. To measure technological overlaps between firms in a 
specific industry (i.e. semiconductor), inventor dynamics have been used to identify interfirm 
transmission of knowledge (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). These dynamics identify possible 
intra-firm collaboration networks, suggesting the diffusion of the innovation. 
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 Number of claims: Alternative measures of innovation adopted in the literature 
are patent family size (as the number of countries in which the patent is taken out) 
(Putnam, 1996) and the number of claims in the patent application (Tong and 
Frame, 1994). The claims in the patent specification delineate the property rights 
protected by the patent. The principal claims define the essential novel features of 
the invention and subordinate claims describe detailed features of the innovation. 
The patentee has an incentive to claim as much as possible in the application but 
the patent examiner may require that the claims be narrowed before granting. 
 Number of current applicants: indicates how many agents are the owners of the 
patent application. From this information we can deduce possible co-patenting, co-
ownership.  
 Year: year of when the application was submitted as first. 
 HDD/SSD/Flash: a patent refers to a specific product (i.e. HDD) if the key word 
(i.e. for example HDD) appears at least once in the Abstract OR patent description 
OR title OR claims. BUT, to avoid that it is a fake references, other key words are 
excluded, for example NOT SOLID OR SSD OR HYBRID+. An example follows: 
(((HARD DISK? OR HARD DISC? OR HARD DRIVE? OR FIXED DISK? OR FIXED 
DISC? OR HDD))/TI/AB/IW/CLMS AND PRD >= 2008) NOT ((SOLID OR SSD OR 
HYBRID+) 2D (HARD DISK? OR HARD DISC? OR HARD DRIVE? OR FIXED DISK? OR 
FIXED DISC? OR HDD))/TI/AB/IW/CLMS. This type of analysis and text mining is 
based on a “conceptual searching” based on different declension of the same word, 
see Montecchi, Russo and Liu, 2013). Similar search methods were used for 
identifying SSD and Flash drive related patents.  
Below we provide per patent family summary statistics of the main variables that we 
will use in our analysis.  
Table 9: Summary statistics 
Variable N. Mean SE Min Max 
Number of application countries 53107 1.63 1.58 1 41 
Year 53107 2006.94 4.52 1969 2016 
Number of inventors 53107 22.023 38.833 1 321 
Number of current applicants 53107 12.155 20.555 1 171 
Number of reassignments 53107 11.396 26.006 0 229 
Number of citations 53107 24.954 49.166 0 660 
Number of claims 40659 101.093 194.679 1 171 
 
Apart from the above mentioned we have generated further derived variables, as 
follows: 
 Patent intensity: given by the ratio between patent count and sale revenues. 
 Patent stock: given by the sum over time of patents discounted by using a 15 per 
cent depreciation rate (see Noel and Schankerman, 2013). 
 Moving average of patents: We calculate the moving average one year before 
and one year after (using quarterly data) the period of observation.  
The following variables were also available but we did not use them for this pilot 
study. It is not to say that these variables could not be used for estimating how patent 
activity was affected by the 2012 events. For example, one could look at the patents 
cited by a given patent. With more work, it would be possible to extract the number of 
cross-citations between the merging firms, pre- and post-merger. With this data it 
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would be possible to measure if the mergers led to synergies (in the reduction of 
cross-citations). 
 Number of tech domains: indicates in how many domains/classes the patent 
applications is applied. Classes are defined according to the Fraunhofer ISI 
classification, adopted by EPO.  
 Average number of patents cited: identifies the number of patents recalled in 
the applications concerning previous technologies. It is the sum of the citations 
made by applicants and examiner. Those citations occurred in a preliminary phase 
when the examiner assesses the application, and verifies if the document is original 
or not, and to how many and which previous existing technology it refers. 
 Number of literature items cited by examiner: it refers to non-patent citation, 
namely academic articles. 
 Legal Status: alive and granted, alive and pending, dead and granted, or expired. 
7.2 Constructing the dependent variable 
To estimate the impact of the mergers on patenting activity in the HDD market we use 
three different measures of patents: patent counts, citation weighted patents, and a 
factor variable that combines various types of information on patents.  
7.2.1 Patent counts and citations 
The use of patent count as a measure of innovation has been criticised in the literature 
for its large variation over time and across industries. However, when looking at a 
specific industry (and not aggregate studies) as the one proposed in this feasibility 
study, patent count might be informative to capture the innovative trend of specific 
firms. Trajtenberg (1990) and Griliches (1990) show evidence that patent-based 
metrics are better at measuring research productivity than R&D. 
Both patent numbers (number of applications filled) and patent citations (citations 
received by a patent) are widely adopted as control variables to measure innovation 
productivity (see Seru, 2014). Patent citation includes information on previous cited 
patents and cited scientific literature, and it is used as an index of importance or value 
of patents (Tranjtenberg, 1990). Patents cited by subsequent patents contain 
important information upon which subsequent inventions are built. Several studies 
have shown a strong positive relationship between patent citation and patent value. 
Subsequent patents relying on previous technology demonstrates how the original 
innovation cited in the patent is valuable (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). A 
standard approach consists of constructing a measure of patent citations by taking the 
total number of citations a firm receives on all the patents it produces in a specific 
period of time (i.e. quarter) and normalizing it by the total number of patents 
produced during the same period.  
Using patent count raises an identification problem. For example, for the assessed 
time period we cannot be sure that the number of patents have decreased because of 
the mergers which might have reduced competition in the market, or because of their 
legal costs (i.e. application and enforcement) or finally because alternative measures 
to protect innovation have been preferred by the firms (i.e. secrecy, or licencing 
agreements) during the period of our investigation.  
7.2.2 Constructing a patent indicator 
To bring together the richness of patent data into one variable, we construct a patent 
indicator by following an approach similar to the multiple-indicator factor model in 
Shankerman and Lanjouw (2004). In this section we introduce the methodology that 
we use to aggregate different measures of innovation available in the patent data. We 
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make use of a complete set of variables collating information on patent counts, patent 
citations (distinguishing citations from attorneys and from the literature), patent 
inventors (number), patent claims (number), patent applications (number) and 
application countries (number). However, in contrast to their paper we choose to 
utilise factor analysis as the methodology in order to reduce the number of patent-
related correlated variables.67 The justification for using this methodology (instead of 
principal component analysis) is that we have a set of original variables that together 
contribute in explaining innovation, while all those variables on their own would have 
limited contribution and be subject to criticism. 
Given the success of a single factor in explaining the variation in the original data of 
seven variables, we employ an estimate of this single factor (the score) as a 
comprehensive measure of innovation and present the effect of the merger on this 
newly generated variable, along with an analysis on patent count and patent citations 
in the empirical analysis that follows. Details of how we constructed the factor variable 
are given in Section 13.2.1 in the Appendix. 
Methodological remark 6: Patent data is rich and multidimensional. Simple 
measures such as patent count or citation weighted patent count might be used but 
composite indices created through factor analysis can capture more information on 
patents.  
7.3 Finding suitable Control groups 
We selected and analysed in detail three Control groups: (1) HDD patents of firms 
most active in patenting HDD-related innovations (ranked based on number of 
patents); (2) NAND Flash patents (consisting mainly of SSD and/or Flash drive 
patents) of the firms with most Flash-related patents; and (3) top ten storage firms 
(similar to the Control group used in the R&D section). Of course none of these 
Control groups is perfect as there is either risk that they belong to markets that are at 
different point of maturity, or even if they belong to markets that are at the same 
point of maturity they may face different demand and supply shocks. The answer on 
whether these represent a good choice comes from our detailed investigation of the 
data.  
7.3.1 Other firms with HDD patents 
Our first Control group consists of the top 10 firms in terms of number of HDD-related 
patents held in our data. The list of Control firms includes: Canon, Funai, Hon Hai 
Precision Industry, IBM, Inventec, Lenovo, LG Electronics, Panasonic, Ricoh, and Sony. 
The number of patents per year by these companies is given in Table 10. 
To some extent all HDD manufacturers were involved in the treatment (the mergers 
and the related events) and therefore they cannot be part of the Control group. We 
therefore look at other potential solutions. We have a large pool of other businesses 
that own HDD-related patents. These patents are not innovations of the HDD units but 
innovations on something complementary to HDD. For example, Sony has a large 
number of HDD related patents. Many of this are related to game consoles such as 
Playstation or PSP, which use HDD’s for data storage. To offer an example, the US 
patent (US7315447) owned by Sony describes a system for mounting a HDD inside an 
electronic apparatus in such a way that the HDD is isolated from vibration and noise, 
                                          
67 See for example Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003). 
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and heat generated by the HDD is radiated to a cover of the electronic apparatus to 
prevent overheating.68  
It is important to emphasise that this is not to be confused with complementary 
patents. Complementary patents are relatively common in specific technological areas, 
like the semiconductor industry, to protect the innovation proposed in the patent 
applications. Such types of patents are introduced simultaneously with essential 
patents, and the use of the created patent pools allows their independent application 
via licencing contracts. We are not looking at complementary patents but patents on 
complementary products. 
Methodological remark 7: When rivals’ patenting activity cannot be used as control 
one option is to look at patenting activities in complementary product markets as 
Control, although these markets may not be fully independent of the Treatment. 
First of all, when looking at concentrated markets, where all (or almost all firms) are 
affected by the merger, one inevitably has to resort to firms that are not directly 
competing with the analysed firms. For example in our case we need to draw on non-
HDD firms to estimate how the mergers affected patenting in the HDD market. 
Businesses who produce complementary goods might patent innovations that are 
relevant to HDD but these are by definition for a different product.  
The question is whether using these other IT companies that produce goods 
complementary to HDDs, constitutes a good control. For unbiased results we would 
need a Control that behaves like the Treatment group, bar the fact and effect of the 
treatment. If patenting in HDD reflects the new inventions that are disseminated as 
new products, then it is not a far-fetched assumption to think that patents on 
complementary products to HDD follow a similar pattern to patents on HDDs 
themselves. To test if these markets are similar enough to be used as Control, we run 
a number of tests as explained below.  
Table 10: Number of HDD patents for the 10 most patent-intensive firms and for the 
Treatment firms 
Firm 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
CANON 65 48 49 25 27 35 14 27 
FUNAI ELECTRIC 103 12 37 21 7 6 10 11 
HITACHI 270 215 142 105 69 58 66 71 
HON HAI PRECISION INDUSTRY 43 64 158 199 176 111 152 26 
IBM 51 48 34 35 35 17 38 18 
INVENTEC 128 102 104 94 50 70 51 30 
LENOVO 36 54 24 23 24 30 32 30 
LG ELECTRONICS 43 18 14 1 2 1 
 
6 
PANASONIC 38 23 8 7 10 5 
 
1 
RICOH 53 55 51 30 19 13 20 13 
SAMSUNG 144 91 81 46 56 48 48 25 
SEAGATE 9 13 20 13 22 10 30 29 
SONY 98 55 29 16 9 8 5 4 
TOSHIBA 88 70 68 40 27 20 15 9 
WESTERN DIGITAL 2 1 16 20 15 11 33 11 
                                          
68 https://www.google.com/patents/US7315447  
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Another condition of unbiased results if that the Control group is independent (i.e. no 
susceptible to a spill-over effect). There is a viable argument that when HDDs improve 
through innovation, they will trigger complementary goods also to boost their 
innovation. If innovation manifests in new technologies, complementary goods will 
have to innovate to link to these new technologies. For this reason it would seem 
credible that if the mergers increase innovation in HDDs, it would trigger an increase 
in innovation in complementary goods – although this may come with a time lag.  
This is more difficult – if at all possible – to test formally. If there is a spill-over effect, 
the sign of the bias will depend on whether the Treatment and Control groups are 
complements or substitutes in innovation. If it is the former, then the estimates will be 
downward biased because an increase in innovation in the Treatment group is followed 
by an increase in innovation in the Control group. Therefore the real effect is likely to 
be higher than the estimated effect. If they are substitutes, then the bias will be 
upwards, and therefore it will be more difficult to decide how it would affect the 
estimates without knowing the magnitude of the bias. It is clear that in the former 
case, the researcher still gets useful information out of the estimates even if they are 
biased. To formally establish this relationship was far beyond the remits of this 
feasibility study. Our intuition tells us that in this case, for these complementary 
goods, it is unlikely that the firms are strategic substitutes in innovation, as we do not 
find it feasible that increasing innovation in HDD would trigger manufacturers of 
complementary goods to innovate less in their product that uses HDDs.  
7.3.2 NAND Flash patents 
Figure 12 shows the evolution of patenting for four different technological categories, 
HDD, all Flash Memory, SSD, and USB Flash Drives. The latter two categories are sub-
sets of Flash Memory, which also contains other technologies based on Flash Memory, 
for example DRAM. Unsurprisingly it stands out that HDD is a more mature technology 
than SSD or USB Flash Memory. HDD patenting peaked in 2005 then had a small 
decline and has stabilised on a relatively steady path (a reminder that due to the time 
lag in updating the patent office registers, 2015 and 2016 data are not complete). On 
the other hand SSD patenting really picked up in 2008, peaked in 2013, and dropped 
in 2014. Similarly, USB Flash patenting increased until 2013 and dropped in 2014. It 
appears that SSD and USB Flash alone follow an altogether different innovation 
trajectory. On the other hand, the sample of All Flash Memory patents is more likely to 
satisfy parallel trend assumptions. 
One positive aspect of the data is that it allows us to choose as Control the Flash 
Memory related patents of the Treatment firms. Accordingly, we will use two different 
control groups from this dataset: a first one, which is the five Treatment firms’ Flash 
memory activity, and a second one, made of the top 10 Flash memory patent holder 
firms.  
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Figure 12: Number of HDD, Flash Memory, SSD, and USB Flash patents per year 
 
We look at top 10 Flash patent holders. These firms are different from the Treatment 
firms, and as such we expected that they will be less affected by the Treatment. We 
turn to the data to decide whether Flash is sufficiently similar to the Treatment to be 
used as Control (see below). The trickier question, again, is whether these Flash 
patents are independent of the Treatment. Part of the Control group (memory related 
Flash patents) is very likely to be independent, as it is not only a different technology, 
but for different product as well (DRAM). Other parts of the Control (patents related to 
Flash storage) might be affected the same way as it was explained in Section 6.2.2. 
How it was affected depends on whether HDD and Flash storage are strategic 
complements or substitutes in innovation. To formally establish this relationship was 
far beyond the remits of this feasibility study. Our intuition is that they are strategic 
complements (i.e. a rise in innovation in HDD is accompanied by a rise in innovation in 
Flash storage) or even more, their relationship is sequential.69 This means that even if 
there is bias, the bias only affects the magnitude and not the sign of our estimates. 
7.4 Estimating the impact of the mergers on firms’ patenting 
activity 
In the analysis that follows we reduce the original sample size of 53,638 HDD patent 
observations by 531 observations that have no information on the patent applicant, 
obtaining 53,107 patents owned by almost 16,000 firms. Given our interest in the 
merger we confine the time period to four years before the merger and four years 
after the merger. 
7.4.1 Difference-in-differences estimates 
Above we showed that there are many ways one could measure patent activity and 
there are different Control groups we can choose. Previous works tend to arbitrarily 
                                          
69 See for example Bessen and Maskin (2009) 
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choose one or two measures and estimate effects on these. We have no a priori 
knowledge on which of these dependent variables or Control groups would be the best 
choice for this study. For this reason we take an agnostic approach and conduct a 
detailed experiment on all possible dependent variables and Control groups. The idea 
is to synthesise the effects estimated for each measure into one pooled effect 
estimate. 
For each Control group we look at 3 different measures of patents: (I) patent count, 
(II) patent citations, and (III) factor variable. For each of these we offer 5 different 
measures and models to estimate: (1) simple count, (2) stock, (3) moving average, 
(4) patent intensity (divided by revenue), and (5) using a synthetic control group. 
Finally, for each of these measures, one could use levels, logs and growth. This 
altogether gives us 45 models to estimate for each Treatment firm. All of these are 
related to, and derived from patent count, but they reflect transformations that we 
imposed in order to find the ones that satisfy the DD assumptions. 
We eliminate the ones that do not satisfy two assumptions for unbiased DD estimates 
(parallel trends and no serial correlation). Finally, we standardise the remaining 
estimates, and acquire a single estimate that sums up all individual estimated 
effects.70  
Methodological remark 8: There is a multitude of possible measures of patent 
activity, which implies a large number of potential models and Control groups. Our 
recommendation is to look at all possible Controls, filter out the ones where there is a 
violation of the assumptions required for unbiased estimates, and examine the 
robustness of the estimates across the remaining models and Control groups. 
We pool the means and standard errors of all acquired estimates by Treatment firm 
and by Control group. We used weights based on the number of observations in each 
analysis.71 The pooled effects and their 95% confidence interval are reported in Table 
11.72 
These are preliminary results, exposed here to demonstrate how our proposed method 
would work. Nevertheless, they provide useful insight. 
Seagate seems to have increased their HDD patent activity in comparison to all three 
Control groups. Western Digital also increased against all three Control groups. On the 
other hand, Toshiba’s patent activity dropped after the 2012 events when compared to 
all three groups. 
  
                                          
70 Alternatively, one could rely on machine learning techniques to choose a preferred model and 
to cross-validate this choice, somewhat akin to Athey and Imbens (2015). 
71 An alternative approach is to use the inverse variance as weight as it is roughly proportional 
to sample size. 
72 The individual estimates are given in Section 13.2.2 in the Appendix. 
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Table 11: Pooled (weighted) results  
 
Control: Other HDD Control: Top Flash firms Control: Top storage firms 
Seagate 0.406 0.339 0.336 
95% CI [0.344;0.469] [0.222;0.456] [0.292;0.380] 
WD 0.364 0.283 0.304 
95% CI [0.281;0.447] [0.170;0.397] [0.253;0.356] 
Toshiba -0.299 -0.381 -0.394 
95% CI [-0.383;-0.215] [-0.496;-0.266] [-0.446;-0.341] 
How good are these Control groups? One of the main objectives of our exercise to use 
all possible measures of patents was to construct a sample of estimates where the 
similarity assumption for unbiased DiD estimates is not violated. In terms of 
independence, even if one assumes that all Control groups are somewhat affected by 
the 2012 events, it is very unlikely that their response to an increase in innovation in 
HDD would be a drop in innovation. Therefore even if there is a bias, it will affect our 
estimates downward, and so the sign of our estimates for Seagate, and WD should 
still hold (although their magnitude might be biased). 
The above results have to be treated with some caution. It takes time to get from 
research investment to a patented innovation. This lag is likely to vary from product to 
product and we do not know how long it should take for the HDD technology. Our 
reading of the relevant literature tells us that in high tech industries this is less than 
two years, which means that our data should be able to pick up an increase/decrease 
if there was any. But this certainly requires further research. 
7.4.1.1 Methodological lessons of our experiments 
Having estimated a large number of different models with different measures of patent 
activity and different expressions of these measures, we can establish the following 
stylised facts. 
Table 12: Proportion of models where parallel trend assumption was not rejected 
  
Level Log Growth Total 
Patent count 
Level 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.22 
Moving average 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.19 
Stock 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Intensity 0.42 0.08 0.33 0.28 
Patent 
citation 
Level 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.11 
Moving average 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.06 
Stock 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.14 
Intensity 0.42 0.25 0.33 0.33 
Factor 
variable 
Level 0.33 0.08 0.17 0.19 
Moving average 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.19 
Stock 0.33 0.17 0.25 0.25 
Intensity 0.42 0.17 0.25 0.28 
 
Total 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.22 
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- In terms of satisfying the parallel trend assumption (Table 12): 
o Patent count is a better measure than patent citation. 
o Intensity (ratio to total revenue) is the best expression of any given 
measure of patent activity, followed by stock. 
o The level and growth in the given patent measure is better than the log 
of the patent. 
 
Table 13: Proportion of models where no serial correlation assumption was not 
rejected 
  
Level Log Growth Total 
Patent count 
Level 0.67 0.17 0.42 0.42 
Moving average 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.22 
Stock 0.08 0.08 0.75 0.31 
Intensity 0.50 0.42 0.33 0.42 
Patent 
citation 
Level 0.58 0.58 0.17 0.44 
Moving average 0.08 0.08 0.92 0.36 
Stock 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.25 
Intensity 0.50 0.58 0.25 0.44 
Factor 
variable 
Level 0.75 0.67 0.25 0.56 
Moving average 0.00 0.08 1.00 0.36 
Stock 0.08 0.08 0.83 0.33 
Intensity 0.75 0.50 0.33 0.53 
 
Total 0.33 0.27 0.56 0.39 
 
- In terms of satisfying the no-auto-correlation assumption (Table 13): 
o The factor variable and patent count are the best measures. 
o The count and the intensity are the best expressions 
o The growth expression is by far the best. 
Methodological remark 9: Patent count performs much better than patent citation 
in terms of the parallel trend assumption. Of the specific expressions, patent intensity 
(patent/total revenue) is the measure that performs best in terms of the parallel trend 
assumption. Patent stock has also been a reasonably good choice. On the other hand 
simple patent count and patent citation – even when used as moving average – 
almost always violates the parallel trend assumption.  
7.4.2 Assumptions 
No serial correlation 
We tested for serial correlation in all models. We used the same test as explained in 
Section 6.3.3 on page 56. Models and Control groups where serial correlation could 
not be rejected were filtered out. 
Be aware that the test of serial correlation has to be considered only as a warning that 
the dependent variable under investigation may potentially suffer of serial correlation. 
We use the word potential because in the empirical investigation of the merger causal 
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effect we cluster by firms and this structure imposed on the variance-covariance of the 
error may in itself solve (or sufficiently reduce) the issue of serial correlation. 
Independence (no spill-over effects) 
Where the Control group was other firms’ HDD patents, spill-over effects mean that 
the merger not only affected HDD producers’ patent activity, but the HDD patent 
activity of producers of other goods as well. In this Control, firms produce goods that 
are complementary to HDD. There is a viable argument that when HDDs improve 
through innovation, they will trigger complementary goods also to boost their 
innovation. If innovation manifests in new technologies, complementary goods will 
have to innovate to link to these new technologies. For this reason it would seem 
credible that if the mergers increase innovation in HDDs, it would trigger an increase 
in innovation in complementary goods – although this may come with a time lag. This 
would mean that the estimated effect would be biased downwards. As we are not 
particularly concerned about the magnitude of the effect, rather than its sign, this is 
sufficient for us to conclude that a positive effect remains positive even after 
eliminating the bias. 
Another Control group is the Treatment firms’ Flash related patents. Here there might 
be some spill-over effects. Increased R&D spending may contribute to an increase in 
innovation in both HDD and Flash (including SSD). This would result in a downward 
bias. 
Finally, the Control group with the top NAND Flash patenting firms is probably where 
spill-over effects are less likely. These are assumed to be on a separate product 
market (according to the Commission’s market definition). But just like with the other 
two Controls, even if there is bias, it will be biased downwards. 
Similarity (parallel trends) 
To test parallel trends we used a different assumption to the R&D section. For the R&D 
data we used annual dummies to test if the distance between Treatment and Control 
R&D intensity remains constant before the merger. In this case if there are annual 
deviations from parallel trends our test would flag it up. As we mentioned above, that 
test is overly restrictive to what would be required for our simple DiD to provide 
unbiased estimates. Patent data is different, which explains why we relax on this 
restrictive approach. It is very often the case that a firm active in patenting one year, 
files no patent in the following year. This is related to the nature of the discovering 
process, which path is very difficult to predict. This means that the patent data shows 
strong over-time volatility at firm level. This is compared with a Control group of many 
firms, for which the distribution of patents is smoothened out over time. If one looks 
at annual deviation from the parallel trend, we would inevitably pick up the deviations 
caused by the volatility of firm-level patent data. To remedy this, we assume a linear 
pre-merger trend for both the Treatment and the Control groups and test if these 
linear trends are parallel.73 Table 14 shows that we rejected parallel trend in most 
cases, with the exception of Seagate, Toshiba, and WD for some models. 
Methodological remark 10: Firm level patent data is highly volatile over time, which 
makes it difficult to find a suitable Control that satisfies the parallel trend assumption 
needed in difference-in-differences studies. 
                                          
73 We provide a technical explanation of this text in Section 14.2 on p. 166 in the Appendix. 
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7.4.3 Robustness checks 
We deliver results for a large number of different model specifications, and Control 
groups. These are reported in Table 30 and Table 31 in the Appendix. In our follow-up 
work we plan to run more experiments with placebo treatment times and treatment 
units. 
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8 The impact of the mergers on product 
characteristics 
This chapter provides preliminary results on how simple product characteristics were 
affected by the 2011/12 consolidation of the HDD market. 
R&D expenditures along with patent data are the most widely used measures of 
innovation. Product characteristics on the other hand are much less studied in 
innovation works. This is mainly due to the difficulty of accessing this type of data in 
many industries. In this section we offer a tentative analysis of two simple measures 
of product innovation, the release of new products, and the unit cost of these new 
products.  
Here we are only looking at two of the simplest ways of measuring product innovation. 
Ideally, one would also look at technology diffusion but that would require sales data 
for each new technology. Such data is possible to acquire but it was beyond the 
resource boundaries of this feasibility study. Apart from providing some rudimentary 
estimates, we also highlight a few methodological issues, such as constructing the 
right Control group, or finding reliable data. 
In this section we apply the same DiD method that we used in the previous sections. 
Although we did not investigate it in detail, another way to utilise product 
characteristics data would be by quantifying the distance between a technical artefact, 
which includes the innovation, and one which does not have it. For example, one could 
establish a rate of growth in storage capacity (often referred to as Kryder’s law or 
Kryder’s rate), and measure deviations from this rate as a result of various events 
(such as the mergers). Finally, another way of analysing product characteristics would 
be to look for structural breaks in the $/Gb data after the merger.  
8.1 Data and main variables 
Whilst R&D expenditure identifies the breath and intensity of innovation, patents and 
product characteristics capture the direction of the innovation. Technological 
development, or product performance is a more direct measure of innovation that 
captures the performance of various products. Having information on the evolution of 
product characteristics offers an insight into technological diffusion and an altogether 
more accurate measure of innovation. Moreover, it can be immensely informative 
about unobserved factors as well, for example firms’ competences and capabilities 
(Smith, 2005).  
Purchasing product characteristics data is possible but not cheap. As this project was a 
feasibility study we did not have the resources to buy such proprietary data. Instead 
we acquired the data using web scraping methods and assembled a rather noisy 
dataset on HDDs and SSDs sold on Amazon. Clearing this data was time consuming 
and raised some important issues that we will discuss below. Using retail data has a 
disadvantage that we only capture consumer sales of HDDs and ignore the Enterprise 
applications of HDD. On the other hand, innovations in HDD are likely to have uniform 
effect across all applications: enterprise, desktop, mobile and consumer electronics. 
For this reason we expect that our data is representative of the whole industry in 
terms of technological innovations. 
We have information on 1608 HDDs and on 1293 SSDs that were sold on Amazon 
between 2001 and 2016. Table 14 lists the corresponding brands (firms) for both 
technologies. The table shows the number of new products that appeared on Amazon 
between 2008 and 2016. This data was acquired through scraping the Amazon website 
and therefore can be potentially prone to imprecision.  
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One of the first things that stands out is that the SSD market is much less 
concentrated, with a large number of small businesses. In contrast, the HDD market is 
highly concentrated. This is no surprise, seminal contributions to industrial 
organisation, such as Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994), or Klepper and Simons (2000) 
have shown that as industries and technologies mature, markets tend to be more 
concentrated.  
Table 14: Firms in our HDD, SSD dataset 
SSD HDD 
brand Freq. Percent brand Freq. Percent 
ableconn 11 0.85 hitachi 190 11.82 
adata 28 2.17 samsung 47 2.92 
apple 20 1.55 seagate 438 27.24 
arch memory 14 1.08 toshiba 146 9.08 
axiom 51 3.94 wd 787 48.94 
corsair 24 1.86 
   crucial 30 2.32 
   dell 25 1.93 
   edge 11 0.85 
   hp 65 5.03 
   intel 147 11.37 
   kingdian 40 3.09 
   kingspec 33 2.55 
   kingston 43 3.33 
   lenovo 38 2.94 
   micron 19 1.47 
   mushkin 13 1.01 
   mydigitalssd 12 0.93 
   ocz 40 3.09 
   other_ssd 267 20.65 
   owc 61 4.72 
   patriot 11 0.85 
   plextor 22 1.7 
   pny 10 0.77 
   samsung 93 7.19 
   sandisk 40 3.09 
   seagate 13 1.01 
   silicon power 10 0.77 
   super talent 19 1.47 
   systor 11 0.85 
   toshiba 20 1.55 
   transcend 39 3.02 
   visiontek 13 1.01 
   Total 1,293 100 Total 1,608 100 
 
We have access to the following product characteristics data for HDDs and SSDs: 
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 Date first marketed on Amazon: This is the date the product was first sold on 
Amazon. There is some clustering in the way firms market new HDDs and SSDs. For 
example the largest number of products marketed on the same day by the same 
firm was 17 (17 different Intel SSDs appeared first on Amazon on 27 March 2016). 
However, this is an extreme outlier. Nevertheless, more than two thirds of all drives 
in our sample were marketed on unique days. Figure 13 depicts the number of new 
drives marketed, averaged by calendar quarters for all HDD and SSD firms.  
Figure 13: Quarterly average (per firm) number of new drives marketed on Amazon 
 
 Storage capacity: Ideally, it would be useful to have information on areal density. 
However using retail data we have limited access to technological detail and can 
only measure formatted capacity (in our data we express it in gigabytes). One of 
the limitation of looking at capacity, is that alone it does not necessarily give an 
unambiguous picture of innovation because newer products in our dataset do not 
necessarily mean larger capacity (innovation does not necessarily manifests in 
increased capacity). Moreover, the fact that there is a larger capacity storage does 
not mean that demand for smaller capacities disappears. Therefore firms 
continuously market smaller and larger capacity drives. Figure 14 depicts the largest 
capacity marketed in any calendar quarter in our sample. There is a clear upward 
trend for both HDD and SSD. Visually we find no sign implying that storage capacity 
was negatively affected by the 2012 events. 
Figure 14: Largest capacity storage marketed on Amazon in any calendar quarter 
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 Form factor: The form factor refers to the physical size of the drive. Both HDDs 
and SSDs come in the following form factors, 5.25-inch, 3.5-inch, 2.5-inch or 1.8-
inch. In our sample we only have the latter three. The remedy in the WD/HGST 
merger was the divestiture of the 3.5-inch form factor HDD manufacturing to 
Toshiba. WD retained the 2.5-inch manufacturing. 
 Price: We record the prices as they were collected in 2017. This means that for 
example for a product that was marketed in 2010, we record the price as it appears 
on Amazon in 2017. One could of course argue that this might not necessarily be 
the same as the introduction price. We argue that this is not a problem for our data. 
The pace of introducing new HDDs is very fast. When an HDD manufacturer comes 
out with a new product it risks cannibalising into the sales of old products. Despite 
this, HDDs are introduced at a fast rate. On average, the same manufacturer 
introduced a new product every month in SSD, and every 10 days in HDD. If 
manufacturers dropped the prices of their older products at the time of introducing 
new products, they would cannibalise into the sales of their newly introduced 
products. In situations like this, where firms have close substitute products in the 
market, they are less likely to engage in price competition.74 For this reason we 
believe that the price of older products still available on Amazon give a good 
approximation of the price that was charged for the given product at the time of its 
introduction.  
Moreover, even if prices for the same product have dropped since their introduction, 
the technological depreciation of HDDs is so fast that demand for older products 
very rapidly disappears. Therefore the price reduction for each product - if exists - 
must also rapidly reach its maximum. This means that for most products in our 
sample (except for the products marketed in the most recent few months) the 
prices already reflect the final (lowest) retail price.  
Figure 15: Mean recorded price for given quarter 
 
Figure 15 plots the mean price of all HDDs and SSDs marketed in each quarter. 
Although there is a slight increase in the price of both technologies, we have also 
                                          
74 See for example Douglas Pavcnik (2001). 
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seen on Figure 14 that this is accompanied by an increase in capacity (and 
improvements in other product features). For this reason nominal price is unlikely to 
be very useful for the analysis of the impact of the 2012 events. 
Figure 15 shows how the mean (over all new products in each calendar quarter) 
HDD and SSD prices evolved. The big hike after Q2 2011 is probably due to the 
floods in Thailand, which affected a large number of HDD plants, which in turn 
seriously damaged the supply of HDDs, leading to a large price increase. 
From these variables we derive two extra variables that we use as our measures of 
innovation: 
 Number of new products: There are a number of product features that one could 
look at to measure innovation. Probably the most simple, and most widely used one 
is the launch of products having new characteristics. Releasing new products is a 
well-established value creation strategy to capture new consumers and expand 
market shares. Therefore in the innovation process, technical aspects of new 
products can also be considered as an indicator of firms’ value creation aspirations 
(Tranjtenber, 1990).  
 Unit price of product ($/Gb): Another simple way of measuring innovation is 
through the unit cost of storage capacity, i.e. the per unit (say per gigabyte) price 
of storage capacity. 
8.2 Finding suitable Control groups 
Because all HDD producers were involved in the mergers, we could not choose a direct 
rival to use as Control. This left us in a difficult situation as we needed to find a 
product for which technological development follows the same (or sufficiently similar) 
pattern as the Treatment group, except for the effect of the merger. For example, for 
estimating the impact on the number of new products, one would need to use a 
Control product, for which new models are marketed at a similar pace to HDDs.  
Methodological remark 11: When estimating impact on technology development, 
completely different products are unlikely to be a good counterfactual. In general, one 
will have a better chance finding a well-behaved Control in differentiated product 
markets. However, the chance of a spill-over effect might be higher in these markets. 
In the absence of a reliable Control group, one might have to rely on different 
estimation techniques to analyse product characteristics data. 
For this reason it could be a possibility to start with a different estimation method, 
such as establishing structural breaks or divergence from long-term technology 
trends. However, these methods are not as strong in terms of identifying causes and 
effects. Another way to proceed would be to estimate a full structural model, in which 
we could simulate a well behaved Control group.  
We use the same method as for the rest of the report (difference-in-differences) in 
which we take a Control group and make simple comparisons with the Treatment. 
Below, we explore the fact that there is some differentiation in the storage market 
(HDD/SSD) and look at some simple measure where we think a comparison between 
the two technologies might work for our purposes.  
In terms of the similarity of these technologies, SSDs have been converging to HDDs 
both in price and capacity and have exerted increasing competitive pressure on HDDs. 
Even at the time of the merger, the merging parties argued that “SSDs will become 
"mainstream" in the coming years, replacing HDDs in many applications.”75 The 
                                          
75 Para. 231, European Commission, Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung COMP/M.6214, 
Decision October 19, 2011 
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increasing role of SSDs as substitutes of HDDs would put them in a favourable position 
to be used as Control. But SSDs follow a different technological trajectory, it is a less 
mature technology than HDDs, and therefore it is possible that the pace of innovation 
for SSDs is different from HDDs. The question is how much this matters. In mature 
industries product differentiation is not driven by innovation any more. However HDDs 
are different. In the HDD market competition is still driven by differences in 
technology (unlike in typical mature industries where technology tends to be static), 
and therefore there is still intensive technological progress in HDDs (for example in 
areal density).76 Moreover, at this stage we suggest looking at two simple measures, 
number of new products and unit price ($/Gb). For both of these, there is still 
expansion both in HDD and SSD. 
Looking at unit cost, there is more similarity than one might intuitively think. Figure 
16 compares how the unit cost of storage evolved in HDDs and SSDs since 2009. 
Visually, the two lines follow a similar trend, with the exception of 2009, where there 
are only few observations for SSD. We will formally confirm this parallel trend later. 
This would suggest that – at least for this particular characteristic – SSD might not be 
an outlandish choice as Control.  
Figure 16: Unit cost of storage [ln($/Gb)] for HDDs and SSDs 
 
Moreover, product characteristics data is potentially diverse, which can be helpful for 
finding an outcome variable, for which the assumptions of a difference in differences 
study are not violated. This is true even if in general the two products are on a 
different technology cycle. Looking at our cases as example, it is undeniably true that 
HDDs are on a different technology cycle than SSDs. However, some product features 
seem to follow more similar trends than others. For example the number of new 
products, the capacity of drives, or the unit capacity price might offer more 
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meaningful comparisons than features such as size, power consumption, or failure 
rate.  
Methodological remark 12: The diversity of product characteristics data can be 
helpful for finding an outcome variable, for which the assumptions of a difference in 
differences study are not violated, even if the Treatment and Control are on a different 
overall technological cycle. 
So far we have only discussed the extent to which SSDs and HDDs are similar. 
Whether these are independent is an equally challenging question. For example, do we 
see an increase in the number of new SSDs when we have an increasing number of 
new HDDs? If market concentration contributes to more/less innovation in HDD, is it 
met with more/less innovation in SSD? Again, the answer depends on whether the two 
products are strategic complements/substitutes, something that could be tested but 
was beyond the scope of this feasibility study. For the purposes of this discussion we 
would say that we do not know anything about the independence of Treatment and 
Control but our intuition is that even if they are not, the resulting bias will only affect 
the magnitude and not the sign of the estimated effects.77 
8.3 Estimating the impact of the mergers on product characteristics 
8.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
We look at two different features of HDDs and SSDs: the number of new products 
marketed, and the cost of a gigabyte storage.  
8.3.1.1 Number of new products 
Figure 17 shows how the number of newly marketed drives changes for the Treatment 
firms and for the Control group, which includes all SSD firms. As previously with the 
patent data, the data is highly volatile, this time due to the fact that firms often 
market products in clusters, therefore some calendar quarters might have a high 
number of new products appearing on Amazon, and some others, none. However, if 
this volatility is random across the two trends (HDD and SSD) that are otherwise 
parallel, then the DiD estimator should be unbiased. We will test this formally later. 
Methodological remark 13: Data on the number of new products is likely to be the 
most easily available information that could be used to measure how innovation is 
diffused into the market.  
It immediately stands out from Figure 17 that SSD’s only appear in our sample from 
2009, and especially at the beginning the per-firm average number of SSDs was very 
low. Figure 17 reveals an interesting pattern. There is an increase in the number of 
new drives marketed 2 years after the merger. This is important because this could be 
an indication of the length of lag between R&D spending and its effect on production. 
  
                                          
77 See the discussion in Section 7.3.2. 
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Figure 17: Per-firm quarterly average number of new products (log) marketed on 
Amazon by firms involved in the mergers 
 
8.3.1.2 Cost of storage 
Figures 17 and 18 already suggested that there is not much point using the price of 
the product and instead one should look at the price of a unit of capacity. For this 
reason we looked at how the price of a gigabyte of capacity changes over time.  
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Figure 18: Unit cost of storage capacity, Treatment firms against SSD 
 
Figure 18 shows that there has been a continuous decrease in the unit price of SSD 
capacity. HDD on the other hand displays a mixed picture. Unit capacity price has 
shown a consistent drop for Seagate, a slower decrease for WD, and levelling out for 
Toshiba. 
8.3.2 Difference-in-differences estimates 
The estimates are a result of simple DiD models, where we controlled for firm and 
time fixed effects, total revenue, total profit (these two also give us a measure of 
cost). When looking at the impact of a specific (set of) event(s) on product 
characteristics, one would need to know the lag between these events and the change 
in product features. This lag might vary from industry to industry, so we turn to the 
data for more information. We ran several experiments, for 5 different `event dates' 
(Jul 2012, Jan 2013, Jul 2013, Jan 2014, and Jul 2014). The purpose of this was to 
estimate which event dates pick up a significant difference. This could be informative 
of the lag between our events and its effect on new products. Moreover, this also 
provides a test for the parallel trend assumption required for the validity of DiD 
estimates. 
Table 15 shows the estimates for our 5 moving treatment times. In these models we 
controlled for firm and time fixed effects, R&D spending (1-year lag), total revenue (1-
year lag), and profit (1-year lag). One important caveat has to be made here. We 
included R&D expenditure in our regressions but in our system of estimated equations 
R&D (as well as patents and product characteristics) are likely to be endogenous. In a 
follow-up work we plan to deal with this endogeneity. 
In the tables below we are only showing the DD estimate, the effect of R&D spending, 
and an interaction between the treatment and R&D spending (treat x R&D int). The 
interpretation of these coefficients is simple: the interaction coefficient (treat x R&D 
int) shows the effect of R&D spending on the number of new products only for the 
Treatment firms. The coefficient for R&D intensity shows the effect of R&D spending 
on the number of new products for the Control firms. The DD coefficient shows the 
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residual (after controlling for the effect of R&D spending) effect of the 2012 events. 
The full results table is provided in Section 13.3 in the Appendix.  
What seems to stand out is that it is R&D spending that is driving the number of new 
products - but only for the treatment firms. Moreover, once controlling for R&D 
spending, the impact of the 2012 events disappears.  
For Seagate, more R&D spending a year before78 leads to increased number of new 
products (treat x R&D int). Therefore the increase in the number of new HDDs for 
Seagate is associated with the increased R&D activity that we estimated in our earlier 
section. This would be evidence that it was not the 2012 events on their own, but the 
increased R&D spending (which was shown to be a result of the 2012 events in 
Seagate) that increased the number of new products. 
For WD it appears that they have been marketing fewer products despite the 
increased R&D spending. One explanation of the difference between Seagate and WD 
might be explained by the fact that WD was subject to stricter MOFCOM restrictions. 
Finally, the Toshiba results are similar to WD but a caution is repeatedly warranted, 
R&D spending for Toshiba includes many segments beside hard drives, therefore these 
results may not be very informative for our purposes. 
 
Table 15: Effect on log number of new products (control all SSD) 
 
Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Seagate 
     DD -0.328*** -0.102 -0.504*** -0.00834 0.0779 
 
(0.103) (0.179) (0.152) (0.192) (0.219) 
R&D intensity -0.225 -0.151 -2.828 -1.817 -2.728 
(1year lag) (2.284) (2.911) (2.445) (2.308) (2.798) 
treat x R&D int 15.74*** 15.34*** 24.14*** 12.97** 13.42* 
 
(2.039) (4.122) (3.737) (5.318) (6.844) 
Observations 179 176 172 169 165 
WD 
     DD -0.336 0.0675 0.238 -0.0839 -0.379 
 
(0.214) (0.297) (0.314) (0.322) (0.316) 
R&D intensity -0.687 -0.272 -2.007 -2.155 -2.356 
(1year lag) (2.483) (2.949) (2.904) (2.738) (3.570) 
treat x R&D int -27.73*** -33.60*** -35.77*** -28.34*** -20.57** 
 
(5.708) (6.791) (7.406) (7.801) (9.203) 
Observations 171 168 164 161 157 
Toshiba 
     DD -0.0255 -0.167 -0.449** -0.227 -0.101 
 
(0.112) (0.167) (0.168) (0.141) (0.108) 
R&D intensity 0.260 -0.476 -3.056 -2.070 -1.521 
(1year lag) (2.544) (2.744) (2.648) (2.555) (3.251) 
treat x R&D int -25.75*** -27.99*** -49.46*** -25.42*** -23.76*** 
 
(1.861) (3.922) (4.377) (4.039) (2.257) 
Observations 163 160 157 154 150 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
                                          
78 Changing the length of lag does not qualitatevely alter the results. 
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For SSD, we did not find that R&D spending had any effect on the number of new 
products (R&D int). This is in line with intuition. SSD is a less mature technology, 
which is typically characterised by more experimentation at R&D level. In these cases 
it is more likely that more R&D spending is associated with research that do not lead 
to improved/more products. 
The interpretation of the regressions on unit price ($/Gb) follows the same logic as the 
interpretation above. Treat x R&D int shows the effect R&D spending on unit price for 
the Treatment firm, R&D int shows the effect of R&D spending on unit price for the 
Control (SSD) firms, and DD shows the residual effect of the 2012 events. 
Table 16 shows that the increase in R&D spending goes together with falling unit 
prices for Seagate. Seagate seems to be the only firm where the mergers triggered an 
increase in R&D expenditure, and this was followed by a drop in the unit price of 
storage capacity. For WD there does not seem to be any link between R&D spending 
and unit price, and for Toshiba there seems to be a negative relationship (however, as 
mentioned above, Toshiba's R&D spending may be reflecting spending on segments 
other than HDD). 
 
Table 16: Effect on $/Gb (control all SSD firms) 
 
Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Seagate 
     
DD 0.243 0.252 0.240 -0.0261 0.226 
 
(0.366) (0.324) (0.317) (0.383) (0.600) 
R&D intensity 11.66* 13.40** 14.84** 12.21** 11.11* 
(1year lag) (5.519) (5.418) (5.516) (5.377) (6.023) 
treat x R&D int -5.700** -7.174** -8.947** -2.087 -7.724 
 
(2.031) (2.916) (3.936) (7.175) (14.48) 
Observations 151 148 144 141 137 
WD 
     
DD 0.542* 0.0313 -0.0201 0.369 0.284 
 
(0.255) (0.459) (0.337) (0.351) (0.371) 
R&D intensity 14.05** 14.69** 16.35** 13.22** 11.71* 
(1year lag) (5.582) (5.844) (5.900) (5.031) (5.805) 
treat x R&D int 3.335 7.802 3.353 -6.039 -5.874 
 
(4.038) (9.294) (7.708) (5.548) (5.503) 
Observations 143 140 136 133 129 
Toshiba 
     
DD 0.0998 0.212 0.622 0.606* 1.017** 
 
(0.391) (0.349) (0.347) (0.327) (0.377) 
R&D intensity 11.13 13.42** 17.00** 14.33** 12.03* 
(1year lag) (6.258) (5.901) (5.607) (5.096) (5.731) 
treat x R&D int 15.15*** 6.723* 11.42** 
-
24.01*** 
-
32.47*** 
 
(2.129) (2.983) (4.084) (4.379) (5.301) 
Observations 136 133 130 127 123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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What is also striking is that increased R&D intensity is accompanied by increased unit 
prices in SSD. Again, we would warn against claiming causality - for example, for SSD, 
increased demand, driven by a surge in mobile devices, coupled with a shortage in 
NAND flash memory has been driving up prices, irrespective of R&D spending. 
Moreover, the SSD result is consistent with the intuition that less mature technologies 
are more likely to have more experimentation in research, and many of these might 
not lead to improved products. 
8.3.3 Assumptions required for unbiased DiD 
We tested separately whether the Treatment and Control follow a parallel trend before 
the treatment(s). We found that for our 5 ‘hypothetical’ treatment times, the first two 
estimates (the first two columns in Table 15 and Table 16) are likely to be biased 
because pre-treatment trends were not parallel (this is visually confirmed on Figure 17 
and Figure 18). This would allow us to use the other 3 models (reported in the 
remaining 3 columns). However, as shown above, the main story here does not hinge 
on our DD estimate. Rather, it is about the effect of previous R&D spending on product 
numbers and unit prices. This is also important regarding the independence 
assumption required for unbiased DD, because, strictly speaking, in this respect even 
the choice of our Control group is irrelevant here. To illustrate why, take the example 
of Seagate. For our R&D spending estimates in Section 6 we had a better selection of 
Control groups and there we have shown how the 2012 events increased R&D 
spending. Here we show that this increased R&D activity is associated with an 
increased number of new products and lower unit prices. 
We also tested for serial correlation. In general, using logs of the dependent variable 
eliminated serial correlation (at least when using Wooldridge’s (2002) test for serial 
correlation in panel data).  
8.3.4 Robustness checks 
We did do some simple robustness checks within the possibilities given by our data. 
We re-run the above regressions for two different Control groups. The first one only 
included the top 3 largest SSD producers (in terms of number of SSDs marketed). 
These are firms that are more comparable in size to the Treatment firms. The results 
are reported in Table 35 and Table 36. 
As explained earlier, one of the main tasks of our follow-up work is to address the 
issue that R&D spending is potentially endogenous in our estimated models.  
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9 Interpretation of the pilot study 
In the preceding three sections we looked at the impact of a cocktail of events that 
happened at the turn of 2011/12. We do not have the data to offer a precise 
identification of the individual impact of each of these events. Nevertheless, we can 
offer a number of alternative explanations. Follow-up interviews with market 
participants may help in completing and even further clarifying the story.  
One of the main points that stands out is the heterogeneous response of the firms in 
the market (one increase, one no change, and one decrease). Of course the picture is 
muddied by the MOFCOM restrictions, our interpretation is that the storage industry 
remains highly competitive (and therefore innovative) after the mergers. Although the 
HDD market was (going to be) reduced to 3 firms, demand side substitutability 
between HDD and other storage device technologies (SSD, Flash) is likely to be 
increasing.79 If this assumption about the increased competitive pressure is correct, it 
would provide a viable explanation why Seagate increased its R&D intensity post-
merger.  
We offer a number of alternative interpretations for each firm. An important lesson 
from ex-post impact evaluations is that identification of the precise driver of post-
merger changes in innovation can be difficult (as it was in this specific case), but no 
more difficult than in price impact studies.  
Western Digital 
We found no significant impact of the 2012 events on Western Digital’s R&D spending. 
We have to emphasise that this does not mean that WD R&D spending did not change 
after 2012. It means that the change in WD’s R&D intensity growth in comparison to 
our Control group was not significantly different.  
 One possible explanation is that for WD, the acquisition of HGST was part of a 
longer term trend of increasing R&D. This could have been a response to 
intensifying competition from SSD. The 2012 events did not trigger the increase, it 
started earlier than that, therefore we did not find any impact of the 2012 events. 
 Alternatively, it is possible that the MOFCOM conditions were so restrictive that the 
2012 events did not have any effect on the previous status quo. The MOFCOM 
restrictions required WD to maintain separate production, R&D, marketing, and 
sales operations for two entities (WD and HGST). This circumvented any possibility 
of increased efficiency.80 Once sufficient data is available for post-2015 years (i.e. 
after the main MOFCOM restrictions were lifted), one could test whether the fully 
consummated merger improved R&D spending. 
 Other events might have also affected WD’s R&D spending. For example the 
divestiture of the 3.5in operations to Toshiba had to include all 3.5in related IP 
rights. This might have negatively affected how innovation, and indeed R&D 
spending evolved post-2012 for WD. 
Our own interpretation is closest to the first one. Figure 23 shows that WD’s R&D 
expenditure had been on a steady increasing path since Q4 2009. The 2012 did not 
                                          
79 Although we cannot back up this assertion with a new market definition, but it echoes the 
opinions we received throughout our meetings with DG COMP and our reading of industry 
intelligence. 
80 WD and HGST combined, had 80,767 employees, compared to Seagate's 53,602. At the same 
time there was only 8 per cent difference in capacity shipped between the two firms. 
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/12/10/3-things-western-digital-corp-
management-wants-you.aspx  
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further affect this increase. This however does not mean that a combination of other 
things are not confounding this interpretation. 
Regarding patent activity we found an increase for WD against our three Control 
groups. The positive results seems to contradict our R&D findings but there is an 
intuitive explanation to this contradiction. WD did increase its R&D spending but it 
started doing so a couple of year before the merger. Because patent activity reacts to 
R&D spending with a lag, it is possible that the resulting increase in patents only 
started after the merger. Another explanation is that R&D spending is becoming more 
efficient for WD – i.e. the same investment generates an increased number of patents. 
Finally, we found no change in the unit cost of storage capacity for WD. On the other 
hand, we found that increased R&D spending in WD is linked with a lower number of 
new products. This adverse effect might be explained by the fact that WD had to run 
inefficiently with duplicated operations at all levels between 2012 and 2015 as a result 
of MOFCOM’s requirements. 
Seagate 
It appears that Seagate’s innovation activity benefited from the 2012 events. This was 
true for all three stages of innovation: R&D spending, patent activity, the number of 
new products, and the unit cost of storage capacity as well. This is in line with the 
Commission’s assessment in the original decision, which identified Seagate as one of 
the leaders in HDD innovation, and which predicted that the merger would not reduce 
innovation.81 We offer a number of alternative interpretations of these findings:  
 There were innovation synergies between Seagate and Samsung, which were 
corroborated by the merger. The two firms had had cross-licensing agreements 
even before the merger. With the merger, the shared pool of IP was conducive to 
increased innovation. 
 There was increasing competitive pressure from SSD. Although if this explanation is 
true then one needs to emphasise that it triggered a response in WD much (around 
2 years) earlier than in Seagate.  
 Another explanation is that Seagate was less restricted by the MOFCOM remedies, 
and therefore the consummation of the merger advanced further than for WD.  
 Finally, another potential argument would be that MOFCOM required Seagate to 
continue spending at least $800 million per year for three years following the 
merger, and therefore our estimates are simply a sign that Seagate complied with 
MOFCOM. We rule out this interpretation, as Seagate’s R&D expenditure was higher 
than this pre-merger, therefore Seagate had a choice between increasing, not 
changing, and slightly dropping their R&D spending. Our estimates imply that 
Seagate opted for increasing it. 
Perfect identification of the real effect is not possible based on available data. What we 
can conclude is that the 2012 events were the most likely trigger behind Seagate’s 
boost in innovation. 
Toshiba 
We found evidence that Toshiba’s R&D spending growth and patenting activity 
dropped after the mergers. We found some evidence of a drop in the number of new 
products and an increase in the unit cost of storage capacity. However, it was difficult 
to establish an unbiased Control (violation of parallel trend assumption) for Toshiba, 
therefore these estimates can be potentially biased. Moreover, R&D figures include 
Toshiba’s other segments (around 25% of Toshiba’s revenue comes from storage 
                                          
81 E.g. para.353, European Commission, Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung COMP/M.6214, 
Decision October 19, 2011 
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related operations). For this reason it would be far-fetched to go into a detailed 
discussion of the causes of finding a potential drop in R&D intensity growth. However, 
even if our estimates are unbiased, this would not be a surprising result, given that 
there have been industry talks about Toshiba leaving the HDD market, which could 
explain Toshiba’s reduced commitment to innovating in HDD since 2012.82 
 
 
 
                                          
82 See for example: https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomcoughlin/2017/04/04/toshiba-memory-
unit-sale-implications-for-hdd-business/#2cd25cd66b9d  
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10  Conclusion 
In this study we looked at the feasibility of conducting an ex-post evaluation of how 
individual competition enforcement decisions affect innovation. Our headline 
conclusion is that although such exercise is inevitably complex, it is feasible and 
useful, and hopefully this study sets out a sound example for future work.  
We conducted a detailed review of the literature on how competition enforcement 
affects innovation. The literature review set out the approach we took in our pilot case 
study. First of all, to address the multi-faceted nature of innovation we proposed an 
ex-post evaluation method that looks at three stages of innovation: investment (R&D), 
invention (patents), and innovation (product characteristics). This approach informs us 
how each stage reacted to the competition authority’s intervention.  
Throughout the pilot case study we also ran a detailed feasibility check on whether it 
is possible to ex-post estimate how individual competition decisions affected 
innovation. Our conclusion is that in this particular case, the individual impact of each 
merger decisions was impossible to identify and therefore we could only interpret our 
results as the impact of all 2012 events. Nevertheless, in a carefully selected case we 
think that this would be possible to do, at least to the extent that price impact studies 
can identify the impact of interventions.  
Altogether, we believe that ex post studies of this kind are extremely valuable, even if 
the effect of a specific decision cannot be individually identified. This is especially true 
in policy areas where the Commission’s decisions are made ex ante (such as merger 
control), these studies can confirm how dynamic factors, such as innovation evolved 
after the Commission’s decision, and whether the Commission’s predictions on these 
factors had been correct.  
10.1 Methodological variety 
One of the main objectives of this report is to assist in future works of similar type. 
For this reason it is useful to dedicate a separate section to explaining our choice of 
methodology throughout the three main sections of the pilot study. 
The dependent variable 
In the R&D section we looked at one dependent variable, R&D intensity growth. R&D 
intensity is a conventionally accepted and used measure of R&D spending in empirical 
works. We looked at growth figures to eliminate the problems caused by a 
characteristic of the data, i.e. that the merging firms’ relevant financial statement data 
are added up on the acquiring firm’s balance sheet post-merger. In this case there 
was little doubt that R&D intensity growth was the only available and appropriate 
measure of R&D spending. We looked at the log of this measure but it resulted in no 
change in the main results. 
For patents the picture was much less clear. A priori we had much less guidance on 
what would be the best measure of patent activity for this type of analysis. We had 3 
measures: patent count, citation weighted patent count, and a composite index of 
various measures of patents. Moreover, each of these measures could be expressed in 
levels, logs, or in growth. Again, a priori, we had no reason to prefer either one of 
these. For this reason, we proposed estimating a large number of models, one for 
each of these measures and expressions. This served two reasons: (1) to select the 
models where the assumptions required for unbiased estimates were not violated, and 
(2) to examine the robustness of our findings through all unbiased estimates. We 
believe that this approach could be followed in future studies of similar sort. 
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For product characteristics we selected two measures, the number of new products, 
and the unit cost of new products. In the HDD market these are probably the best and 
most readily available measures of technological innovation. However, it does not 
mean that other measures (such as areal density, or power consumption) would not 
be applicable. Moreover, in future studies on different products, other measures of 
technological innovation are also likely to be used. 
The choice of Control group 
Choosing the Control group also justified a different approach under each of the three 
sections of our pilot study. For R&D expenditure, the 4 Control groups were each 
based on: (1) other storage manufacturers, including SSD and other Flash storage, 
and (2) IT firms. A good Control has to be sufficiently similar to the Treatment group, 
and also has to be independent of the treatment event. For (1), we run several tests 
to ensure similarity is given, and we highlighted the possibility that other storage 
manufacturers might not be fully independent. For (2) independence was less of a 
worry as this Control group included firms in different product markets, however, 
similarity may be more of an issue, but much of this could be controlled for in our 
data.  
Patent analysis requires an altogether different approach. Similarity is only likely to be 
present for patents that are in the broader product market (storage). Whereas R&D 
spending data might be comparable across wider sectors, patent data is so strongly 
related to the given product that we dismissed to possibility of using different products 
(for example the IT firms we used in the R&D analysis). Also, R&D spending is likely to 
be dominantly driven by firm characteristics, patenting is much more linked to product 
characteristics, something that we were not able to control for. For this reason, in the 
patent analysis we selected various Control groups that are related to storage 
production (HDD patents of complementary goods, or SSD and Flash patents). We 
believe that this general distinction between R&D and patent data analysis should be 
applicable to future works in other markets. 
For product characteristics, the situation is similar to patent analysis. Comparison to 
altogether different products is less likely to be useful, therefore we explored the 
possibility of using other storage firms as Control. 
10.2 Main methodological lessons 
Throughout the study we offered a number of methodological lessons in the hope that 
they would provide useful guidance for future studies of similar sort. Here we highlight 
three of these, one for each measure of innovation. 
When evaluating how an enforcement decision affected R&D expenditure, only R&D 
spending specific to the relevant product is of interest. R&D expenditure data is 
typically only available at firm level, and without further information it is very difficult 
to identify how R&D spending changed in specific segments of a diversified business. 
Our mergers in the HDD industry are likely to be a rare example where two of the 
main players were only active in the relevant market, therefore R&D expenditure data 
is unlikely to contain any irrelevant information. For most cases however it is likely 
that the relevant businesses are active in many markets and relevant R&D data is not 
available.  
We highlighted in our report that one of the most important lessons we learned from 
using patent data is how noisy it is. The data, which was carefully filtered to only 
contain patents that cite relevant terminology (such as HDD or Flash/SSD), contains 
many patents that are not innovations of the relevant products (HDD or SSD) but 
inventions of something related to the relevant product. We use this feature to create 
a Control group (composed of patents for products complementary to HDD). Our case 
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was also facilitated by the fact that our relevant firms were only active in the relevant 
markets, therefore we made an assumption that all patents by Seagate and WD were 
HDD related. However, as an important lesson for future work of this sort, evaluating 
the impact of individual enforcement actions requires patent data where relevant 
patents are distinguishable from ‘noise’. Various techniques (such as machine 
learning) are available in order to improve the relevance of the patent sample. 
Regarding our analysis of the impact on product characteristics, the most important 
methodological lesson is that the richness of product characteristics data can help find 
a well-behaved Control group. Looking at our cases as example, it is undeniably true 
that HDDs are at a different level of maturity than SSDs. However, HDDs still compete 
on innovation, and we showed that in at least our simple measures of product 
characteristics they can be compared to SSDs. When looking at the data, some 
product features seem to follow more similar trends than others. For example the 
number of new products, or the capacity of drives might offer more meaningful 
comparisons than features such as power consumption, or failure rate. A full-fledged 
evaluation study can make use of this feature of the data. 
We also need to highlight some more general points about evaluating the innovation 
impact of enforcement decision. The first one is about timing of such the studies. The 
Seagate/Samsung and the WD/Hitachi mergers were approved or conditionally 
approved by the Commission in Q4 2011. MOFCOM conditionally approved the 
mergers in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 respectively. This means that we had more than 4 
years of post-merger R&D data, and more than 3 years of patent data (the most 
recent 24 months of patent data is censured as it takes up to 2 years for patent 
applications to appear in records). We also have more than 4 years of post-merger 
product diffusion. If one accounts for the lags between the three stages of innovation 
(R&D-patent-diffusion), then it is safe to conclude that ex-post studies that want to 
look at all three stages should be conducted at least 5-6 years following the merger. 
Such a full-fledged evaluation of innovation is not a trivial task. Data for each of the 
three stages of innovation is different in nature. An evaluation of R&D effects requires 
firm level balance-sheet data. Patent analysis relies on the collection of adequate 
patent data, which involves not only the arduous task of filtering out as much noise as 
possible but also a thorough understanding of the industry. Finally, product diffusion, 
or product characteristics data is often costly and requires engineering knowledge. 
Each stage is a separate ex-post evaluation exercise on its own. We had 7 months to 
conduct a feasibility study on the HDD market, in which we were able to explore many 
issues but did not come to a definitive conclusion on some parts. We would say that a 
full study of how innovation was affected by a competition decision should allow at 
least 12-18 months. 
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As follow-up work we would consider doing do the following. First of all, we could re-
visit our second ‘Treatment’, the lifting of MOFCOM’s restrictions, and re-estimate its 
effect in due time (potentially in 2018). Second, we could do more work on linking the 
effect at each stage of the innovation process. R&D, patents, and product 
characteristics can be considered as manifestations of innovation at different stages. 
In this case, estimates at each level are not independent and we would need to 
address the related endogeneity issues. Finally, we could purchase more data 
(including sales data from IDC) and conduct a full-fledged structural analysis of the 
impact of the 2012 events on HDD technical characteristics and technology diffusion.  
The pilot study highlights another important point. The three firms responded 
differently to the 2012 events. Such heterogeneous response confirms that one cannot 
establish a one-size-fits-all relationship between changes in competition and 
innovation – not even in the same market. Quantitative studies like the one we 
presented are useful but a key lesson is that they are often not enough. To identify 
what is causing the effects estimated in these quantitative studies one would need 
more information, which could be acquired with case specific qualitative studies (for 
example interviews) on each firm. 
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12 Appendix to the literature review 
12.1 Screening for innovative industries 
R&D 
One example where R&D was used to develop a typology for classifying industries was 
developed by Davies and Lyons (1996), building on Sutton’s83 (1991 and 1998) 
seminal works on endogenous sunk costs and product differentiation, they employ a 
1% screen of the industry R&D to sales revenue ratio. This was subsequently followed 
by a number of other authors.  
Table 17: R&D Intensive industries in manufacturing 
3 digit NACE code  
CHEMICALS  
Basic chemicals 
Paint & ink 
Industrial & Agricultural chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals 
Soaps & detergents 
Domestic & office chemicals 
Mam-made fibres 
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING  
Tractors & Agricultural machinery 
Machine tools 
Textile machinery 
Transmission equipment 
Paper, wood machinery 
Other machinery 
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING  
Computers 
Insulated wires & cables 
Electrical Machinery 
Electrical Equipment 
Telecomm& measuring equipment 
Radio & TV 
Domestic Electric Appliances 
Electric lights 
VEHICLES  
Motor vehicles 
Motor vehicle parts 
Railway stock 
Motor cycles & cycles 
Aerospace 
INSTRUMENT ENGINEERING  
Measuring instruments 
Medical Instruments 
Optical Instruments 
Clocks & watches 
Rubber 
Source: Davies and Lyons (1996, Appendix 2, Table A2.1) 
 
Table 17 shows the result of applying this 1% screen. In the main, the industries 
identified accord with our a priori expectations. However, there are two reservations. 
First, these data are more than 20 years old, and ideally should be updated – although 
                                          
83 Sutton, John (1991) Sunk costs and market structure : price competition, advertising, and 
the evolution of concentration MIT Press, Cambridge; (1998) Technology and market structure : 
theory and history MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. ISBN 0-26-219399-X 
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the ranking of industries is in large part time invariant, there may be some exiters and 
some entrants over the last 20 years. Second, they are confined to only the 
manufacturing sector, and especially over recent decades both innovation and 
competition enforcement have become ever more important developed in various 
parts of the service sector. 
Patents 
Table 18 and Table 19 identify the most patent-active sectors and firms, using very 
recently collated data from the European Patent Office. The Commonality with the 
R&D screen in Table 1 is very apparent. The list of firms in Table 19 includes two 
players who feature in our pilot case study.  
Table 18: European patent applications 2006-2015 by field of technology (% of sector) 
Field of 
technology(1)   2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Electrical 
engineering 
Electrical machinery, apparatus, 
energy 0.221 0.231 0.241 0.236 0.224 
  Audio-visual technology 0.113 0.098 0.095 0.088 0.094 
  Telecommunications 0.099 0.098 0.087 0.080 0.086 
  Digital communication 0.210 0.233 0.223 0.237 0.237 
  Basic communication processes 0.028 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.022 
  Computer technology 0.208 0.203 0.217 0.222 0.232 
  IT methods for management 0.035 0.035 0.040 0.047 0.042 
  Semiconductors 0.086 0.077 0.076 0.068 0.063 
 
Total 39382 42117 42150 44040 45434 
Instruments Optics 0.145 0.141 0.137 0.138 0.126 
  Measurement 0.270 0.277 0.279 0.282 0.281 
  Analysis of biological materials 0.058 0.056 0.052 0.049 0.049 
  Control 0.082 0.087 0.087 0.089 0.089 
  Medical technology 0.445 0.439 0.444 0.442 0.454 
 
Total 23874 23945 24261 25405 27464 
Chemistry Organic fine chemistry 0.180 0.169 0.165 0.163 0.162 
  Biotechnology 0.153 0.142 0.140 0.150 0.153 
  Pharmaceuticals 0.158 0.162 0.148 0.140 0.149 
  
Macromolecular chemistry, 
polymers 0.085 0.090 0.095 0.095 0.090 
  Food chemistry 0.042 0.041 0.045 0.043 0.042 
  Basic materials chemistry  0.104 0.109 0.114 0.113 0.123 
  Materials, metallurgy 0.074 0.076 0.079 0.081 0.080 
  Surface technology, coating 0.057 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.059 
  
Micro-structural and nano-
technology 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.004 
  Chemical engineering 0.092 0.092 0.096 0.095 0.090 
 
Environmental technology 0.049 0.053 0.053 0.052 0.049 
 
Total 38445 38916 37569 38454 39572 
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Field of 
technology(1)   2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mechanical 
engineering Handling 0.120 0.120 0.114 0.112 0.115 
  Machine tools 0.107 0.104 0.104 0.099 0.097 
  Engines, pumps, turbines 0.157 0.177 0.165 0.160 0.177 
  Textile and paper machines 0.074 0.068 0.066 0.067 0.064 
  Other special machines 0.134 0.131 0.135 0.140 0.140 
  
Thermal processes and 
apparatus 0.084 0.075 0.075 0.074 0.072 
  Mechanical elements 0.113 0.114 0.116 0.115 0.119 
 
Transport 0.210 0.211 0.224 0.234 0.217 
 
Total 30668 33114 33236 33830 36016 
Other fields Furniture, games 2859 2777 2830 2748 2951 
  Other consumer goods 2985 3070 3094 3220 3347 
  Civil engineering 4296 4309 4491 4667 4886 
(1)  In accordance with the WIPO International Patent Classification technology concordance as 
revised in August 2012. 
Methodology available at: www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_ipc_technology.pdf 
Table 19: Top 25 Firms by European patent applications filed with the EPO in 2013 
Rank   Company 
Total Number of 
Applications 
1.  SAMSUNG 2833 
2.  SIEMENS 1974 
3.  PHILIPS 1839 
4.  LG 1648 
5.  BASF 1577 
6.  ROBERT BOSCH 1574 
7.  MITSUBISHI 1327 
8.  GENERAL ELECTRIC 1257 
9.  QUALCOMM 1204 
10.  ERICSSON 1184 
11.  HUAWEI 1077 
12.  PANASONIC 1055 
13.  TOYOTA MOTOR 894 
14.  HITACHI 874 
15.  SONY 855 
16.  BAYER 850 
17.  ALCATEL LUCENT 806 
18.  EADS 783 
19.  NOKIA 761 
20.  FUJITSU 722 
21.  NEC 699 
22.  CANON 682 
23.  DSM 659 
23.  JOHNSON & JOHNSON 659 
25.  SANOFI 651 
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In summary, while both patents and R&D provide useful screens, on their own, they 
are insufficient. They cannot capture anything about how quickly industries diffuse 
new technologies, and they are not designed to capture the marketing and 
organisational innovations identified above by the OECD. 
12.2 Summary of other papers in the academic literature 
 
Article 
reference 
Research question Method and data 
sources 
Testable hypotheses 
The relationship between competition and innovation 
Aghion et al. 
(2005) 
What is the 
relationship between 
product market 
competition and 
innovation.  
Empirical:  
 Uses a poisson 
model on count data 
(patents) 
 Tests for the effect 
of various policy 
changes 
 measures innovation 
by the number of 
patents and patent 
citations (NBER 
data) 
 measures 
competition by 
Lerner index 
(Datastream) 
 There is an inverted-U 
shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation 
(i.e. in some industries it is 
increasing, in others it is 
decreasing) 
 the equilibrium degree of 
technological neck-and-
neckness among firms 
should decrease with 
competition 
 the higher the average 
degree of neck-and-neckness 
in an industry, the steeper 
the inverted-U relationship 
between competition and 
innovation 
Aghion et al. 
(2009) 
How does firm entry 
affect innovation 
incentives in 
incumbent firms?  
Empirical analysis based 
on the variation of 
incumbent strategy 
measured via labour and 
total factor productivity 
growth and patenting, to 
entry threat (i.e. new 
innovation). 
Micro panel data for the 
UK, to estimate 
productivity growth 
models. Innovation 
estimated by using firm-
level data which are 
matched to patent data 
(from NBER/Case 
Western Patent 
Database). Foreign firm 
entry is used as a proxy 
for the unobservable 
entry threat, and to 
control for the 
endogeneity it is used 
the variation in the UK 
entry conditions, 
following a major policy 
reform in the European 
Union, the Single Market 
Programme, and from a 
Series of other UK 
domestic reforms. 
Incumbent innovation strategy 
and performance is affected by 
its distance from the 
technological frontier. Hence 
there are different alternative 
effects: 
 Incumbent productivity growth 
and patenting is positively 
correlated with lagged 
greenfield foreign firm entry in 
technologically advanced 
industries, but not in laggard 
industries 
 The threat of technologically 
advanced entry spurs 
innovation incentives in 
sectors close to the technology 
frontier, where successful 
innovation allows incumbents 
to survive the threat, but 
discourage innovation in 
laggard sectors, where the 
threat reduces incumbents’ 
expected rents from 
innovating. 
Article Research question Method and data Testable hypotheses 
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reference sources 
Blundell et al. 
(1995) 
Relation between 
competition and 
innovation 
Cross-section data using 
firm level information 
from company accounts, 
industry level variables 
and a count of 
innovations from the 
Science Policy Research 
Unit. 
 
To account for dynamic 
feedback and unobserved 
heterogeneity the 
authors proposed a fixed 
effects estimator that 
generalises the standard 
Poisson and negative 
binomial models. This 
approach would allow for 
dynamic feedback 
through both the firm’s 
stock of knowledge and 
its product market 
power, also when large 
zeros are present. 
 
This estimator is shown 
to control for correlated 
fixed effects and is 
compared with an 
alternative nonlinear 
GMM estimator. 
Most of the empirical 
investigations based on firm size 
and innovation productivity have 
already pointed out that large 
firms tend to invest more in R&D 
with the aim to produce more 
innovation. However,  not all 
studies agree with this output, 
calling for further analysis.  
 Complex relationship between 
competition and innovation: at 
the firm level, dominant 
(large) firms tend to innovate 
more, while at the industry 
level, concentration dampens 
innovation.  
 Innovation is a dynamic and 
nonlinear process, for which 
unobserved heterogeneity 
among firms plays an 
important role. 
 To the extent that growing 
dominance increases 
concentration, the level of 
aggregate innovation will tend 
to fall. 
Correa and 
Ornaghi (2014) 
Making use of U.S. 
patent and productivity 
data, this paper 
presents an empirical 
analysis of the relation 
between competition 
and innovation. 
 
Empirical: 
 Estimates a count-
data model in which 
the number of 
patents is assumed 
to be a nonlinear 
function of our 
measure of 
competition. 
 It uses linear 
regression with 
multiple breaks to 
explore 
nonlinearities in the 
competition and 
innovation 
relationship. 
 R&D intensity and 
productivity growth 
are included. 
 Does competition or market 
power cause innovation? 
 Contrary to the 
Schumpeterian view market 
power does not seem to 
promote future innovation 
and faster technological 
change. 
 An economy with strong 
protection of intellectual 
property rights competition 
substantially increases 
innovation and productivity 
growth. 
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Article 
reference 
Research question Method and data 
sources 
Testable hypotheses 
Davies and 
Geroski (1997) 
Impact of innovation 
on market structure 
dynamics, by 
describing the relative 
magnitudes and 
determinants of 
concentration 
change and turbulence 
in market shares. 
Empirical analysis, which 
uses a stochastic firm 
growth model, estimating 
U.K. data of 1979–1986 
for over 200 leading 
firms, to derive joint 
predictions about the 
stability of market shares 
and the change of 
concentration. 
 How changes in the market 
shares of surviving firms are 
the dominant influence on 
changes in industry 
concentration.  
 However, market 
concentration my hide 
considerable turbulence in 
market shares among firms.  
 Investigation on the role of 
advertising and, to a lesser 
extent, R&D on innovation in 
the dynamics of market shares 
and, therefore, affect both 
concentration and turbulence. 
Geroski (1990) The role of competition 
on innovation 
productivity 
Empirical investigation 
among inter-industry 
using cross-section data. 
Information on rivals is 
used shaping market 
structure more than just 
concentration rations, 
but correcting it for inter-
industry variations in 
technological 
opportunity. 
Fixed effects estimation 
on two 73 MLH (or, three 
digit) industry cross-
section panels covering 
the periods 1970-4 and 
1975-9 
 Along the line of 
Schumpeter, the analysis 
here proposed aims to 
explore the correlation 
between innovativeness and 
monopoly power. 
 Does monopoly maker spur 
innovation? Which are the 
direct and indirect effect on 
post-innovation monopoly? 
Post-innovation return would 
be a good measure of a such 
type of effects. 
 Fairly strong evidence 
against the hypothesis that 
increases in competitive 
rivalry decrease 
innovativeness. 
Griffith et al. 
(2006)  
The effect of 
competition on 
innovation. In 
particular, this work 
aims to analyse and 
measure the impact of 
product market 
reforms on innovation 
activity undertaken in 
the European Union 
and the subsequent 
impact on total factor 
productivity. The main 
focus is on the private 
sector, in particular on 
non-network 
industries. 
 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
competition and 
innovation, the authors 
use country-industry 
level information on 
business sector R&D 
expenditure and data on 
patenting activity by 
individual firms across 
countries.  
 
Data on patents are used 
to look at whether 
product market reforms 
impact on 
incumbents compared to 
new entrants looking at 
their innovative 
activities. 
 How do product market 
reform affect innovation? 
Looking at the economics 
rents, it is possible to 
investigate how innovation 
has been affected. 
 Product market reforms 
generate more competition. 
Hence, increased competition 
may lead to increased R&D 
investment. 
 This analysis shows some 
indication that, within an 
industry, the effect of 
increasing competition on 
innovation is larger in 
countries that are closer to 
the global technological 
frontier. 
 Might an increased 
competition be associated 
with faster productivity 
growth?  
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Article 
reference 
Research question Method and data 
sources 
Testable hypotheses 
Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001)  
Role of IPR on firm 
innovation 
Analysing the patenting 
behaviour of 95 U.S. 
semiconductor firms 
during 1979–1995, this 
paper shows how  
strengthening the US 
patent law in 1990 have 
given rise to a patent 
race among capital 
intensive firms, 
facilitating entry of 
specialized firm. 
 
Both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches 
are used. 
 
This analysis uses a 
patent production 
function first introduced 
by Pakes and Griliches 
(1980) that relates the 
number of successful 
patent applications made 
by a firm in a given year 
to its past history of R&D 
spending, along with 
other firm characteristics 
(i.e. firm size). 
 
The count variable is the 
number of patents 
owned by each firm. To 
deal with many zeros 
and ones, authors 
applies a use Poisson-
based econometric 
models and estimation 
methods.  
 Does R&D spending generate 
more patents, and hence 
innovation? 
 How long does it take to a 
firm to generate innovation 
(i.e. patents)? 
 Which are the firms 
characteristics to be 
considered in the analysis? 
 Is there any difference 
between design and 
manufacturing firms, or the 
difference between 
incumbents and entrants in 
their R&D activity? 
 The analysis here proposed 
wishes to examine whether 
firms most subject to 
"holdup" responded 
strategically to the shift in 
the U.S. legal environment 
by patenting more 
aggressively during the 
period of when a strong 
patent right is applied. 
 Did the changes in patent 
rights facilitate entry by 
design firms? These latter 
type of firm rely crucially on 
patents to appropriate 
returns to innovation. 
Hashmi (2013) It re-examines the 
inverted-U relationship 
between competition 
and innovation, as 
studied by Aghion et al 
(2005).  
It finds a mildly 
negative relationship 
between competition 
(as measured by the 
inverse of markups) 
and innovation (as 
measured by citation-
weighted patents). 
Empirical: 
Due to the use of patent 
data as a measure of the 
innovative activity, this 
paper uses a negative 
binomial (NB) model. 
A linear IV regression of 
technology gap on 
competition is adopted to 
test Aghion et all (2005) 
Theoretical: 
 Partial equilibrium 
model of an 
industry.  
 No restrictions are 
applied to confine 
the maximum 
technology gap 
between the leader 
and the laggard to 
one step. 
Case study on the UK 
 Is there is an inverted-U 
relationship between product 
market competition and 
innovation? 
 As the level of competition 
increases in an industry, 
does the average technology 
gap within the industry 
increase? 
 The inverted-U relationship 
should be steeper in more 
neck-and-neck industries. 
Article 
reference 
Research question Method and data 
sources 
Testable hypotheses 
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Henry and Ponce 
(2011) 
Are there natural 
market forces that 
protect inventors so 
that formal protections 
or other 
incentives are not 
necessary? 
 
 
Theoretical 
 
Dynamic pricing of 
knowledge and 
incentives to imitate 
rather than to innovate. 
 
Studies the problem of 
an inventor who brings 
to the market an 
innovation that 
can be legally copied. 
Imitators may ‘enter’ the 
market by copying the 
innovation at 
a cost or by buying from 
the inventor the 
knowledge necessary to 
reproduce and use 
the invention. The 
possibility of contracting 
dramatically affects the 
need for patent 
protection. 
 It is better to use patent or 
secrecy to protect innovation? 
 This analysis shows that 
imitators wait to enter the 
market and the inventor 
becomes a temporary 
monopolist. 
 The inventor offers contracts 
which allow resale of the 
knowledge by the imitators 
 The profits of the inventor 
typically increase with the 
number of potential imitators. 
Lefouili (2015) Looking at the 
innovative process, as 
a mean to improve 
firm’s efficiency, this 
paper studies how in 
regulated markets the 
incentives to invest in 
cost-reducing 
innovations are 
affected by the 
intensity of yardstick 
competition. 
Theoretical: 
 It present a partial 
equilibrium with 
general demand and 
investment cost 
functions and 
assume that the 
maximum price a 
regulated firm can 
set depends on the 
average marginal 
cost of all. 
No lump-sum transfers 
from the regulator to 
firms are allowed. 
 This paper shows that an 
increase in the intensity of 
yardstick competition leads 
to an increase in firms’ 
incentives to invest in cost-
reducing innovations.  
 Intense yardstick 
competition scheme may not 
be socially optimal. 
Levin et al (1985) Role of market 
concentration on R&D 
and technological 
advance. 
Empirical analysis, which 
makes use of data from 
collected by Levin et al. 
(1984) in a survey of 
 R&D executives in 130 
industries. 
 
The analysis estimates  
equations for both R&D 
and innovative output, 
using a structural model. 
 
 Along the lines of the 
Schumpeterian approach firms 
in concentrated markets can 
more easily appropriate the 
returns from their R&D 
investments. Does market 
concentration reduce 
uncertainty, and hence spur 
firms to invest in risky R&D? 
 Are margin are larger for 
competitive firms than for 
monopolists. 
 In the spirit of the “creative 
destruction” which are the 
main differences between R&D 
spending in youthful 
industries, science based?  
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Competition enforcement and innovation 
Agrawal et al 
(2014) 
The role of antitrust 
policy on both small 
and large innovation 
firms, in the presence 
of large regional labs. 
MSA-level patent data 
during the period 1975–
2000 
 How does the impact of R&D 
labour organization on regional 
innovation affect regional 
R&D? 
 Due to a large variation in 
innovation productivity across 
regions, this paper explores 
which are the main forces 
driving firms productivity (i.e. 
number of local inventors, lab 
concentrations, firms size, 
presence of spin-out to make 
innovation marketable etc.). 
Ezrachi and 
Maggiolino 
(2012) 
How European 
competition law has 
been applied to limit 
the protection 
awarded to IPR 
holders. 
Economic and legal 
investigation of a series 
of case studies. 
 This paper examines the 
possible chilling effect that 
compulsory licensing may have 
on innovation. 
 Does the use of competition 
law gradually eroded the 
protection conferred by IPR? 
 Highlights the gradual lowering 
of the threshold for 
intervention in cases of refusal 
to license and the widening 
scope of Article 102 of the 
TFEU. 
Lopez and Vives 
(2016) 
The role of cross-
ownership agreements 
among firms or 
common ownership by 
investment funds. 
It is a theoretical 
investigation, which 
modes the role of R&D 
process (cost-reducing) 
investments with 
spillovers in a  Cournot 
oligopoly, in which R&D 
cooperation cannot be 
disentangled from 
cooperation in the 
product market. 
 
A general symmetric 
model of cross-
ownership; is allowed for 
a range of corporate 
control and for 
distinguishing between 
stock acquisitions made 
by investors and those 
made by other firms. 
 
 Characterise R&D and output 
behaviour in response to a 
change in the degree of 
cooperation. 
 Derive the threshold values of 
spillover above which some 
cooperation in both dimensions 
is optimal for welfare and 
consumers 
 Examine the optimal degree of 
toughness of the antitrust 
policy. If the objective is to 
maximize total surplus then 
there is scope for cooperation 
in both dimensions when 
spillovers are sufficiently large. 
If the objective is to maximize 
consumer surplus, then the 
scope for cooperation is 
greatly reduced. 
 Entry need not induce a higher 
optimal degree of cooperation 
under the consumer surplus 
standard 
 The socially optimal degree of 
cooperation under the total 
surplus standard increases 
with the number of firms, the 
elasticity of demand and of the 
innovation function, and the 
intensity of spillover effects 
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Testable hypotheses 
Pleatsikas and 
Teece (2001) 
The paper reviews and 
evaluates some of the 
traditional techniques 
used to define markets 
and measure market 
power in dynamic 
(innovative) markets 
in antitrust analysis. 
Review  Examining customer 
reactions to innovation may 
aid in defining the relevant 
market 
 Repeated changes in market 
share is a good sign that 
there is dynamic 
competition. 
 High R&D ratio is a sign of 
dynamic competition. 
Reggiani and 
Valletti (2016) 
How net neutrality 
regulation effectively 
protects innovation. 
This paper develops a 
two-sided model of the 
Internet to analyse 
the possible tensions at 
the“core” versus the 
“edge”. The analysis  
contrasts an equal 
treatment regime (net 
neutrality) as opposed to 
a faster delivery of 
content ensured by 
paying a fee 
(prioritization). 
 Net neutrality regulation 
effectively protects innovation 
done at the edge by small 
content providers. 
 Prioritization increases 
investment and welfare only if 
it stimulates innovation from 
the large content provider. 
Rubinfeld and 
Hoven (2001) 
The authors analysed a 
set of US decisions 
(Visa-Mastercard, 
Halliburton-Dresser, 
Microsoft, Lockheed-
Northup). It is useful 
for our proposes 
because it contains a 
large number of 
landmark US cases. 
Case analysis  High market concentration 
diminishes incumbents’ 
incentives to innovate. 
 Difficult to duplicate know 
how is a significant barrier to 
innovation by new 
competitors. 
 Limiting access could 
suppress innovation. 
 
Abuse of dominance and innovation 
Buehler, et al. 
2014 
Broad investigation of 
the use of competition 
law in the areas of 
antitrust (anti-
competitive 
agreements—including 
cartels—and abuses of 
dominant position), 
merger control, 
and state aids. 
Ex-post evaluation of 
antitrust decisions based 
on recent cases. 
 How the role of Standard 
Essential Patents (SEPs) might 
generate anti-competitive 
effects (i.e. refusal to licence). 
Edelman (2015) The use of tying to 
leverage  and its 
dominance into 
new sectors. 
Case study, based on a 
series of incidents in 
which Google same 
methods to expand its 
market power into 
additional markets. 
 
The analysis is proposed 
reviewing the current 
scenarios under both 
U.S. antitrust law and EU 
competition law. 
Six questions are proposed to 
test the effect if the tying 
practice. 
 Does the defendant have 
market power on the tying 
product? 
 Are the tying and the tied 
product distinct practices? 
 Are the products tied together? 
 Does the tie foreclose 
competitors? 
 Does the tie create consumer 
harm? 
 Are there countervailing 
efficiencies? 
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Goettler and 
Gordon (2011) 
Using a structural 
model the authors 
estimate an 
equilibrium model of 
dynamic oligopoly with 
durable goods (CPU) 
and endogenous 
innovation to examine 
the effect of 
competition on 
innovation in the 
personal computer 
microprocessor 
industry. 
 Case study, based 
on a series of 
incidents in which 
Google same 
methods to expand 
its market power 
into additional 
markets. 
 The analysis is 
proposed reviewing 
the current scenarios 
under both U.S. 
antitrust law and EU 
competition law. 
 a dynamic model of 
a differentiated-
products oligopoly 
for a durable good 
 Measures innovation 
by product quality 
(CPU processing 
speed). 
 The rate of innovation in 
product quality would be 4.2 
percent higher if Intel were a 
monopolist. 
 Total consumer surplus 
would be 4.2 percent lower 
($12 billion per year) in an 
Intel monopoly since the 
surplus gains from higher 
innovation are smaller than 
the losses from the 50 
percent increase in prices. 
 Equilibrium innovation rates 
increase monotonically as 
preferences for quality 
increase and as price 
sensitivity declines, for both 
duopoly and monopoly. 
 The CPU manufacturing 
industry innovation rate 
peaks when AMD is 
foreclosed from half the 
market and consumer 
surplus peaks with 40 
percent foreclosure.  
 There is a dynamic trade-off 
between lower current 
consumer surplus from 
higher prices and higher 
future surplus from more 
innovation. 
 Six questions are proposed 
to test the effect if the tying 
practice. 
 Does the defendant have 
market power on the tying 
product? 
 Are the tying and the tied 
product distinct practices? 
 Are the products tied 
together? 
 Does the tie foreclose 
competitors? 
 Does the tie create consumer 
harm? 
 Are there countervailing 
efficiencies? 
Greenstein, Peitz,  
Valletti (2016) 
Vertical restraint and 
innovation 
Based on a set of studies 
on the net neutrality 
debate, this paper 
proposed a theoretical 
investigation of how 
vertical restraint affect 
innovation rate. 
 Fast lining may encourage or 
discourage innovation and 
content provision. Instruments 
include improvements in 
congestion, effects on 
competition intensity, potential 
foreclosure by internet service 
providers. 
 How broadband internet 
service provided affect the 
market? 
 In particular, rules (i) applied 
to limit right to block traffic; 
(ii) on defining minimal 
transparency requirements for 
internet providers, and finally 
(iii) for limiting discriminatory 
treatment of traffic interfere 
on market competition. 
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Gurkaynak et al. 
(2014) 
Reverse payment 
agreements as a 
conflict between patent 
las and competition 
law. 
Case studies which 
explores the extent to 
which other jurisdictions 
will converge with or 
depart from the US 
approach under Actavis.  
 
It is argued that 
European jurisdictions 
will share the Supreme 
Court’s view that 
antitrust objectives 
should take precedence 
over patent law 
objectives when it comes 
to reverse payment 
settlements. However, 
European jurisdictions 
are likely to rely on a 
more categorical legal 
framework than the US 
rule of reason. 
 
 Intellectual Property Rights, 
and the role of patent are 
traditionally seen as an 
essential tool to promote long-
run dynamic efficiency. They  
protect a patent-holder’s 
incentive to innovate by 
enabling it to recover its 
investments in R&D  through a 
period of exclusivity, letting 
the patent owner to have a 
dominant position on the 
market. The use of a such type 
of settlement, may prolong the 
monopoly power well beyond 
the patent length, creating 
detrimental effect on the 
market. But which are the 
effect on the innovation? Does 
it means, further investment in 
R&D? 
Rey and Tirole 
(2007) 
Horizontal and vertical 
foreclosure 
Overview of studies  Conclusions on social and 
private costs and benefits of 
vertical foreclosure 
 Horizontal foreclosure: 
analyses recent theories of 
anti-competitive bundling 
aimed at reducing competition 
in the adjacent markets or at 
protecting the monopoly 
market 
 Tackles exclusive customer 
contracts and discusses 
potential efficiency defences 
for exclusionary behaviour. 
Rey and Salant 
(2012) 
The impact of 
upstream IP policies on 
downstream industry  
Theoretical 
 
Examines the impact of 
the licensing policies of 
one or more upstream 
owners of essential 
intellectual property on 
the variety offered by a 
downstream industry, as 
well as on consumers 
and social welfare. 
 When an upstream IP 
monopoly increases the 
number of licenses, it 
enhances product variety, 
adding to consumer value, but 
it also intensifies downstream 
competition, and thus 
dissipates profits. As a result, 
the upstream IP monopoly 
may want to provide too many 
or too few licenses relative to 
what maximizes consumer 
surplus or social welfare. 
 With multiple IP owners, 
royalty stacking increases 
aggregate licensing fees and 
thus tends to limit the number 
of licensees, which can also 
reduce downstream prices for 
consumers. 
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Straus (2010) Interplay between 
patent and abuse of 
dominance 
Case studies  Does the Article TFEU 
represent an obstacle to 
innovation?  
 What are the differences 
between European patent law, 
and the US patent law to 
ensure that innovations by 
competitors are not impeded 
either by patent applications 
that have been laid open for 
inspection or by granted 
patents. 
 What it’s the role of 
compulsory licensing 
instruments to ensure the 
necessary balance between the 
interests of the patentee on 
the one hand and the 
competitors on the other, to 
further the interests of the 
general public in innovation. 
Vickers (2010) Analysis of when 
competition law should 
require a firm with 
market power to share 
its property with its 
rivals. 
. 
Theoretical: 
 Partial equilibrium 
model with a 
vertically-integrated 
firm M which is in 
competition to 
supply retail services 
with downstream 
rivals. 
 Comparison between 
the EU and US 
systems based on 
case studies. 
 Should a vertically integrated 
firm let rivals access to its 
own property> (i.e. network 
access). 
 
Mergers and innovation 
Bena and Li 
(2014) 
The paper assesses the 
role of R&D 
expenditure on 
acquirer’s decision to 
take over other firms. 
It further studies how 
prior technological 
overlaps affect 
innovation activity 
post-merger. 
 Empirical analysis is 
based on the 
difference-in-
difference model 
 Control groups using 
random draws and 
propensity score 
matching 
 Acquirer firms usually have 
large patent portfolios but 
low R&D expenditure 
 Acquired R&D intensive firms 
often had a low growth of 
patens before the acquisition 
 Innovation of the merged 
entity is increased if the 
merging firms had a 
sufficient technological 
overlap pre-merger 
 The former effect is smaller 
for firms with a significant 
overlap in the premerger 
product portfolio  
Danzon et al. 
(2007) 
The article studies the 
determinants an 
effects of mergers in 
the U.S. 
pharmaceutical and 
biotech industries.  
 Regression analysis 
with propensity 
scores used to 
mitigate self-
selection bias 
 R&D activity only reduced 
post-merger for small firms, 
but not for large firms 
 Changes in R&D expenditure 
post-merger likely to reflect 
financial distress of smaller 
firms 
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Haucap and 
Stiebale (2013) 
The authors study 
whether EU mergers 
had negative effects on 
R&D activity not just of 
the merged entity, but 
also on its competitors. 
 Testable hypotheses 
derived from an 
oligopoly model with 
heterogeneous firms 
 Empirical results 
based on fixed 
effects, dynamic 
count data, and IV 
models 
 Mergers have a negative 
effect on the innovation 
activity both of the merged 
entity, and its competitors. 
 The above effect is bigger for 
the merged entity than for 
its competitors 
 The result holds for different 
measures of patents and 
R&D spending 
Grabowki and 
Kyle (2008) 
Role of mergers and 
alliances on innovation 
and R&D productivity 
Empirical evidence, 
based on a large 
database of more than 
4500 firms engaging in 
pharmaceutical R&D 
between 1990 and 2007, 
by IMS. 
 A company’s development 
experience is significantly 
related to the likelihood of 
success, especially for the 
large pivotal phase III trials. 
 Evidence that very small firms 
with only a few projects in 
their R&D portfolio can gain 
the most benefits from 
mergers with more 
experienced firms in 
developing new drug 
introductions 
Kern et al. 
(2014) 
This article reviews the 
role of innovation in 
U.S. merger policy and 
how future competition 
affects the assessment 
of market power. 
 Use of regression 
analysis/probit 
models to estimate 
how likely markets 
are to be assessed 
based on arguments 
relating to 
innovation 
 Anticompetitive effects of 
innovation a source of 
concern in 1/3 of all 
challenged mergers 
 DOJ more likely to consider 
innovation’s impact based on 
market definition based on 
existing goods, FTC more 
likely to consider effect of 
merger based on a market 
definition based on products 
after innovation  
Kern (2014) The author discusses 
and compares existing 
approaches to assess 
anticompetitive effects 
of mergers on 
innovation during 
merger review. 
 Review  The different existing 
approaches to assess 
anticompetitive effects of 
mergers on innovation all 
have shortcomings 
 No approach is performing 
best per se and selection 
should depend on the 
characteristics of the 
assessed market 
Park and 
Sonenshine 
(2012) 
Impact of horizontal 
mergers on research 
 and development and 
patenting 
 
This study evaluates 
whether 
anticompetitive effects 
of mergers on 
innovation depend on 
market concentration 
for U.S. mergers. 
Empirical evidence which 
proposes to separate ex-
post merger effects on 
innovation based on a 
U.S. sample, and it 
distinguishes between 
mergers that were 
subject to scrutiny by the 
U.S. antitrust authorities 
because of potential 
anticompetitive effects 
and those without.  
 
Difference-in-difference 
estimators with 
propensity score 
matching is proposed. 
 
 
 They find a negative effect of 
mergers on the merged firms’ 
innovation only for the former, 
but not for the latter. This 
suggests that market 
concentration might play a 
crucial role for any potential 
anticompetitive effects on 
innovation to arise. 
 R&D expenditure and number 
of new patents significantly 
reduces for markets, in which 
concentration was considered 
to be potentially problematic 
 No negative effect of mergers 
on innovation is found for 
mergers, in which 
concentration was no issue 
Article Research question Method and data Testable hypotheses 
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reference sources 
Ornaghi (2009) This study assesses 
the effect of mergers 
in the pharma industry 
on innovation using 
different innovation 
measures.  
 Difference-in-
difference 
regressions 
combined with 
propensity-score-
matching to 
construct the control 
group  
 Merger reduces innovation 
activity by the merging 
entity 
 Technological relatedness of 
acquirer and acquired firm 
have no impact on the 
reduction of innovation  
post-merger 
Shapiro (2010) How can competition 
policy best promote 
innovation? In 
particular, the role of 
mergers on innovation 
policies and firms 
strategies. 
Literature review. Evaluating the impact of mergers 
on innovations, it would be 
interesting to evaluate:  
 How does a merger affect 
future competition between 
the two firms part of the 
merges, that is  abilities, effort 
and incentives to innovate. 
 What are the  merger specific 
efficiencies? In other words, is 
there any enhancing incentive 
or ability of the merged firm to 
engage in further innovation? 
 The questions here underlined 
as Arrow vs Schumpeter 
approaches, looking at 
whether the merger 
significantly reduces 
competition in the market and 
hence or does the enhance 
innovation by increasing 
appropriability?  
Cartels and innovation 
Bourreau et al 
(2016) 
Research joint venture 
and effects on the 
downstream market 
Theoretical analysis 
which proposes an n-firm 
oligopoly model to study 
the effect of the degree 
of cooperation in product 
development  on the size 
of the RJV. 
 
It is assumed that a 
higher degree of 
cooperation in product 
development restricts the 
firms’ ability to 
differentiate their 
products, and hence 
intensifies competition 
among the participating 
firms. 
 R&D cooperation implies joint 
development of product 
components, but also sharing 
the costs associated with the 
post-R&D competition stage. 
In other words, firms which 
cooperate on more product 
components, may compete 
fiercely  on the product 
market, because of a low 
degree of perceived 
differentiation among 
products. 
  The equilibrium size of the 
RJV can vary non-
monotonically with the degree 
of cooperation. If the degree of 
product differentiation is not 
very sensitive to the degree of 
cooperation, then the RJV is 
industry-wide. 
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Duso, Roller and 
Seldeslachts 
(2014) 
Looking at the changes 
in the market share, 
the authors tests 
whether upstream R&D 
cooperation leads to 
downstream collusion. 
 Theorerical 
framework: firms 
compete a la 
Cournot in 
homogeneous 
goods. 
 Empirical analysis: 
data are extracted 
from NCRA-RJV (on 
research joint 
venture), Compustat 
North America (on 
firms 
characteristics), and 
NBER US (patent 
citation data). 
 To define the market 
coverage of a firm 
taking part in a RJV, 
the author construct 
a measure defined 
by the number of 
unique competitors a 
firm meets in all the 
RJVs divide by the 
total number of 
rivals in the 
industry. 
They estimate a market 
share equation as a 
function of the research 
collaborative 
agreements, controlling 
for a series of variable, 
as R&D expenditures, 
industry level 
characteristics, and firm 
specific fixed effect. 
 They test whether upstream 
research joint ventures could 
lead firms to coordinate in 
the downstream market for 
products.  
 By observing changes in the 
market shares of firms’ R&D 
cooperation activities, it 
emerges that some of these 
types of joint ventures are 
adopted mainly for 
innovative purposes. 
 Firms tend to enter non-
vertical joint research efforts 
among rivals with the aim to 
collude subsequently on the 
downstream market. 
Grossman and 
Shapiro (1986) 
Does antitrust policy 
discourage R&D 
cooperation? 
Case studies Identification of the relevant 
research and product market, 
and evaluate the market shares 
of the participants in the 
prospective venture, and to 
delineate the severity of the 
barriers to entry at both levels. 
Irvin and Klenow 
(1996) 
Role of research joint 
venture to promote 
innovation, looking at 
the Sematech case. 
Empirical evidence on 
the role of  joint venture 
on innovation. The 
analysis makes use of 
Compustat data on all 
U.S. semiconductor firms 
to estimate the effects of 
Sematech on 
members’ R&D spending, 
profitability, investment, 
and productivity. 
Different effects are studied: 
 “Commitment” hypothesis: 
Sematech obligates member 
firms to spend more on high-
spillover R&D 
 “Sharing” hypothesis: 
Sematech reduces duplication 
of member R&D spending. 
 Do R&D joint venture promote 
innovation productivity? It 
emerges that Sematech 
induced members to cut their 
overall R&D spending on the 
order of $300 million per year, 
providing support for the 
sharing hypothesis. 
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Jorde and Teece 
(1990) 
The authors explore 
alternative forms of 
deals, which operate 
also in concentrated 
markets, underlining 
how these type of 
agreement can spur 
the innovation pace.  
Review Promotion of different forms of 
cooperative activities among 
rivals in both unconcentrated 
markets, and concentrated 
markets by revising a series of 
rules, among others a more clear 
appropriability regime (i.e. 
definition of the cooperative 
agreement scope), redefining the 
market according to the 
innovation (at the worldwide 
level). 
Levy (2014) Focusing on two 
specific forms of 
technology sharing, 
research joint venture 
and licensing, this 
work studies possible 
collusive behaviour 
between rival firms 
that share 
technological know-
how.  
 
Theoretical  The stability of the collusive 
behaviour depends on the 
type of agreements, and 
magnitude of innovation. 
 The use of horizontal 
licensing agreement as a 
form of sharing technologies 
allows for a stable collusive 
behaviour.  
Licensing often leads to higher 
collusive profits because it 
induces firms to raise their R&D, 
to their joint benefit. 
Kamien et al, 
1992 
R&D cartelization and 
research joint ventures 
Theoretical 
 
Analyses the effects of 
R&D cartelization and 
research joint ventures 
on firms that engage in 
either Cournot or 
Bertrand competition in 
their product market. 
Research efforts, which 
precede production are 
directed to reducing unit 
cost and are subject to 
various degrees of 
spillovers. 
 Creating a competitive 
research joint venture reduces 
the equilibrium level of 
technological improvement and 
increases equilibrium prices 
compared to when firms 
conduct R&D independently. 
 A research joint venture that 
cooperates in its R&D decisions 
yields the highest consumer 
plus producer surplus under 
Cournot competition and, in 
most cases, under Bertrand 
competition. 
Miyagiwa (2000) This paper analysis 
whether cooperation 
(via licencing and RJV) 
in R&D among firms 
producing similar 
products leads to 
product market 
collusion. 
Theoretical:  
 Partial equilibrium 
model, where two a 
priori symmetric 
firms interact over 
an infinite time 
horizon. 
 firms possess the 
common technology 
and produce 
homogeneous 
goods. 
R&D investments are 
uncertain and risky. 
 it is more difficult to 
maintain collusion between 
asymmetric firms than 
between symmetric firms. 
Innovation sharing eliminates the 
inter-firm asymmetry and 
facilitates collusion, and making 
both firms more efficient, sharing 
innovation increases total profit 
in post discovery periods, which 
facilitates collusion in pre-
discovery periods 
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Segal and 
Whinston (2007) 
The authors offer an 
analysis of the effects 
of antitrust policy in 
innovative industries, 
when innovation is 
assumed to be a 
continual process.  
Theoretical applied to 
different specific antitrust 
policies. 
 
 Antitrust policy can have 
detrimental effects on the 
incentive to innovate. 
 Under the assumption of a 
fixed innovation rate a more 
protective antitrust policy, 
that is a policy which favours 
new entrants at the expense 
of incumbents, generates 
two contrasting effects on 
the incentives for innovation.  
 Limiting the current 
incumbents entry-
disadvantaging activities 
may encourage greater R&D 
investment at the initial 
stage, but at the same time 
it curbs innovation efforts of 
the new entrant that hope to 
became the next incumbent. 
When the framework is 
applied to price collusion 
cases, they show that the 
existence of such voluntary 
deals, where both parties 
payoff is greater, leads to 
equilibria with greater 
innovation. 
Song (2011) RJVs benefit firms by 
eliminating duplicative 
research efforts. It is 
beneficial to 
consumers because of 
the lower price, but 
the innovation process 
could slow down its 
pace. 
Empirical: 
Structural dynamic 
oligopoly model 
developed by Ericson and 
Pakes (1995) and Pakes 
and McGuire (1994), to 
estimate the demand 
side parameters and 
research expenditure and 
firm value. 
 Letting firms compete in the 
product market and 
cooperate to improve 
product quality, increase the 
social welfare.  
When research success is a 
stochastic event, and the 
probability of research success is 
a function of the firms’ research 
expenditures, cooperation is 
beneficial to the firms, reducing 
duplicative costs, with positive 
effect on the consumer surplus. 
Sovinky and 
Helland, (2013) 
How research joint 
ventures serve as a 
collusive function 
Empirical evidence which 
examines the possibility 
that firms may form RJVs 
to facilitate collusion by 
exploiting variation in 
RJV formation generated 
by a policy change that 
affects the collusive 
benefits but not the 
research synergies 
associated with a RJV.  
 
Data on RJVs formed 
between 1986 and 2001 
together with firm-level 
information from 
Compustat to estimate a 
RJV participation 
equation. 
 RJV may facilitate collusion 
among members, even if they 
are rivals in the product 
market. R&D cooperative 
agreement may help partial 
cartel to form, also in dynamic 
differentied products 
industries. 
 Since cartels are more likely to 
occur in concentrated 
industries, Competition 
Authority should be more 
careful when RJV are allowed 
in a such type of industries. 
 Does coordination among firms 
part of the RJV play a role? 
Does it change when firms are 
more fragmented? 
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13 Extra material for pilot study 
13.1 Extra material for the R&D section 
Figure 19: IT firms used in the weighted Control group 
Company Name Weight (WD) Weight (SG) Weight (TO) 
ASM International NV (ENXTAM:ASM) 0.033333 
  
ASM Pacific Technology Ltd. (SEHK:522) 0.033333 
  
ASUSTeK Computer, Inc. (TSEC:2357) 0.033333 
 
0.033333 
Acer Incorporated (TSEC:2353) 
  
0.033333 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (NasdaqCM:A 
  
0.033333 
Advanced Semiconductor Engineering Inc. 
 
0.033333 
 
Alcatel-Lucent (ENXTPA:ALU) 0.033333 
  
Alliance Fiber Optic Products Inc. 
  
0.033333 
Alphabet Inc. (NasdaqGS:GOOGL) 0.033333 
  
Amkor Technology, Inc. (NasdaqGS:AMKR) 
  
0.033333 
Apple Inc. (NasdaqGS:AAPL) 0.033333 
  
Applied Materials, Inc. (NasdaqGS:AMAT) 0.033333 
 
0.033333 
Asia Optical Co., Inc. (TSEC:3019) 
 
0.033333 
 
BlackBerry Limited (TSX:BB) 0.033333 
  
Broadcom Corporation 0.033333 
  
CA, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CA) 
 
0.033333 
 
CEVA Inc. (NasdaqGS:CEVA) 
 
0.033333 
 
Cadence Design Systems Inc. (NasdaqGS:CD 
 
0.033333 
 
Canon Inc. (TSE:7751) 
  
0.033333 
Cavium, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CAVM) 0.033333 0.033333 
 
Cisco Systems, Inc. (NasdaqGS:CSCO) 
  
0.033333 
Compal Electronics, Inc. (TSEC:2324) 0.033333 0.033333 0.033333 
Corning Incorporated (NYSE:GLW) 
 
0.033333 
 
Dell EMC 
  
0.033333 
Dell Technologies Inc. (NYSE:DVMT) 0.033333 
  
Delta Electronics Thailand Public Compan 0.033333 
  
Diebold, Incorporated (NYSE:DBD) 0.033333 0.033333 
 
Digital Turbine, Inc. (NasdaqCM:APPS) 0.033333 
  
DragonWave Inc. (TSX:DWI) 
  
0.033333 
Eastman Kodak Co. (NYSE:KODK) 
 
0.033333 
 
Electronic Arts Inc. (NasdaqGS:EA) 
 
0.033333 
 
FIH Mobile Limited (SEHK:2038) 
  
0.033333 
FUJIFILM Holdings Corporation (TSE:4901) 
 
0.033333 
 
Freescale Semiconductor, Ltd. 0.033333 0.033333 
 
Glu Mobile, Inc. (NasdaqGS:GLUU) 0.033333 
  
HTC Corporation (TSEC:2498) 
  
0.033333 
Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. (TS 
  
0.033333 
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IAC/InterActiveCorp (NasdaqGS:IAC) 
 
0.033333 0.033333 
Company Name Weight (WD) Weight (SG) Weight (TO) 
Intel Corporation (NasdaqGS:INTC) 
  
0.033333 
International Business Machines Corporat 
  
0.033333 
Inventec Corp. (TSEC:2356) 
 
0.033333 0.033333 
Jabil Circuit Inc. (NYSE:JBL) 
 
0.033333 
 
LG Display Co., Ltd. (KOSE:A034220) 0.033333 
  
Lenovo Group Limited (SEHK:992) 
 
0.033333 
 
Lexmark International Inc. (NYSE:LXK) 0.033333 
 
0.033333 
Lite-On Technology Corp. (TSEC:2301) 
  
0.033333 
Merry Electronics Co., Ltd. (TSEC:2439) 0.033333 
  
Microsoft Corporation (NasdaqGS:MSFT) 
 
0.033333 
 
Motorola Solutions, Inc. (NYSE:MSI) 0.033333 
  
Multi-Fineline Electronix, Inc. 
 
0.033333 0.033333 
NCR Corporation (NYSE:NCR) 
 
0.033333 
 
NetSuite Inc. (NYSE:N) 
 
0.033333 0.033333 
OMRON Corporation (TSE:6645) 0.033333 
  
Oracle Corporation (NYSE:ORCL) 
 
0.033333 
 
Pegatron Corporation (TSEC:4938) 
  
0.033333 
Pricer AB (OM:PRIC B) 
 
0.033333 
 
QUALCOMM Incorporated (NasdaqGS:QCOM) 0.033333 
  
Qisda Corporation (TSEC:2352) 
 
0.033333 
 
Quanta Computer, Inc. (TSEC:2382) 
 
0.033333 
 
Redknee Solutions Inc. (TSX:RKN) 0.033333 0.033333 0.033333 
SAP SE (DB:SAP) 
 
1 
 
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. (KOSE:A0059 0.033333 
  
Sanmina Corporation (NasdaqGS:SANM) 
 
0.033333 0.033333 
Seagate Technology plc (NasdaqGS:STX) 0.033333 
  
Sigma Designs, Inc. (NasdaqGS:SIGM) 
  
0.033333 
SunGard 
  
0.033333 
SunGard Capital Corp. II 
 
0.033333 
 
TE Connectivity Ltd. (NYSE:TEL) 
 
0.033333 
 
TPV Technology Limited (SEHK:903) 0.033333 
  
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Compa 1 
  
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) ( 0.033333 
  
Texas Instruments Inc. (NasdaqGS:TXN) 
 
0.033333 0.033333 
Toshiba Corporation (TOSBF) 0.033333 
  
Unisys Corporation (NYSE:UIS) 
  
0.033333 
Vtech Holdings Ltd. (SEHK:303) 0.033333 
  
Western Digital Corporation (NasdaqGS:WD 
  
0.033333 
Wistron Corporation (TSEC:3231) 
  
1 
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Table 20: Matching regressions 
 
WD Seagate Toshiba 
Pre-sample R&D spending -14.77 -0.519 -16.63 
 
(40.72) (4.368) (17.57) 
Mean R&D expenditure 0.0113 0.00328 -0.00376 
 
(0.0180) (0.00340) (0.00507) 
Mean total revenue 0.0184 0.000130 0.000694 
 
(0.0269) (0.000314) (0.000588) 
(mean total revenue)^2 -0.00000480 -7.96e-09 
 
 
(0.00000801) (1.47e-08) 
 
Mean revenue growth -0.00483 0.00553 -0.0301 
 
(0.0305) (0.00584) (0.0327) 
Mean total assets -0.000911 -0.000162 -0.000596 
 
(0.00108) (0.000172) (0.000503) 
Mean gross profit 0.00317 0.000442 0.00530 
 
(0.00705) (0.000945) (0.00463) 
Mean number of business 
segments 0.0337 
 
0.213 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.146) 
Constant -15.49 -3.181*** -3.085*** 
 
(21.29) (0.524) (0.788) 
Observations 860 1002 860 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
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Table 21: Pre-merger mean and standard deviation of key variables 
 
WD 
 Weighted 
IT (WD) SG 
Weighted 
IT (SG) Toshiba 
Weighted 
IT (T) 
Storage 
firms IT Firms 
R&D Intensity  0.064 
 
0.085 0.083 0.103 0.054 0.069 0.047 0.084 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) 
R&D growth 0.000 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.01) 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) 
Total Revenue 2006.864 
 
1932.778 2799.136 2796.291 17049.138 7232.541 4602.997 532.975 
 
(480.60) 
 
(2757.88) (307.04) (3129.38) (2219.59) (5691.93) (8299.02) (2370.71) 
Total revenue 
growth 71.136 
 
72.769 23.727 34.929 213.911 204.904 98.118 11.965 
 
(225.25) 
 
(542.32) (285.73) (507.87) (2966.37) (1395.84) (1626.75) (362.14) 
Mean R&D 
before 2007q1 0.064 
 
0.107 0.104 0.111 0.048 0.067 0.051 0.083 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.14) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) 
Total assets 5360.318 
 
6131.120 8790.818 11169.828 3119.067 28717.415 16145.284 2324.626 
 
(2037.89) 
 
(12325.49) (1279.27) (14410.76) (243.77) (23468.94) (29554.21) (9397.80) 
Gross profit 405.091 
 
575.809 601.591 822.058 490.250 2519.887 1136.511 174.466 
 
(144.37) 
 
(1697.88) (193.99) (1477.78) (39.01) (2836.64) (2390.72) (848.61) 
Net income 198.545 
 
252.309 349.136 370.140 20.292 810.499 366.892 58.822 
 
(104.75) 
 
(718.77) (576.74) (644.35) (12.45) (1159.82) (770.74) (309.68) 
Total 
employees 44654.636 
 
32230.099 53445.45 45902.56 7640.409 76869.703 65837.173 10724.08 
 
(15049.76) 
 
(23266.99) (4050.01) (50823.4) (5132.12) (103497.8) (105533.9) (40408.9) 
Total debt 379.591 
 
488.581 2316.273 2443.603 153.333 3155.448 2631.929 367.579 
 
(246.03) 
 
(1062.90) (549.85) (3951.09) (34.20) (3636.66) (6375.14) (1861.68) 
Africa / Middle 
East 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) 
Asia / Pacific 0.000 
 
0.200 0.000 0.150 1.000 0.433 0.710 0.557 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.40) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) 
Europe 0.000 
 
0.050 1.000 0.500 0.000 0.133 0.048 0.091 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.22) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.34) (0.21) (0.29) 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
US and Canada 1.000 
 
0.750 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.433 0.242 0.318 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.43) (0.00) (0.48) (0.00) (0.50) (0.43) (0.47) 
Mergers before 
April 2011 4.000 
 
 2.000  7.000  4.084  
 
(0.00) 
 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (5.06)  
Storage 
relevant 
turnover 1.000 
 
 1.000  0.262  0.647  
 
(0.00) 
 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.40)  
Observations 37 
 
1147 37 1147 37 1110 764 33435 
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Table 22: Pre-merger means of the Treatment and corresponding synthetic control 
 
WD Synthetic(WD) SG Synthetic(SG) TO Synthetic(TO) 
rdexp 147.1429 145.0158 231.9048 237.9602 36.85714 83.19483 
totalrevenue 2162.095 2150.293 2900.381 2850.636 1069.743 1016.572 
grossprofit 469.5238 485.3738 687.7619 742.8744 496.7571 341.5856 
totalassets 6347.286 6328.742 8728.143 9996.717 3173.21 3000.56 
netincome 221.1905 220.6148 439.2381 383.6517 19.34048 60.37796 
totaldebt 532.0476 490.7116 2439.952 2281.339 142.6619 474.7714 
expenses 1903.857 1910.403 2583.048 2622.279 1031.143 922.8327 
prerd 0.058429 0.073868 0.100257 0.101705 0.011598 0.057887 
segments 1 1.41 1 2.803 3 3 
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13.1.1 Full regression tables for estimating R&D impact 
This section presents the full regression tables estimating the impact of the 2012 
events on the merging firms’ R&D expenditure. Table 23 shows the regression 
highlighted in the main text. Regarding the covariates, there is some evidence across 
the models that growth in R&D intensity increases with firm size but only up to a level, 
beyond which it starts to decrease. The other thing might be worth mentioning is that 
R&D intensity growth is lower in firms with high debt, expenses, and costs (cost 
expressed as the difference between total revenue and gross profit). 
Table 23: Full regression results for estimating the effect of mergers on R&D intensity 
growth (annual growth) 
  WD Seagate Toshiba 
control 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
DiD -0.00534 0.00164 -0.0103 0.00569 0.00656*** 0.0101** -0.00980 -0.005*** -0.000650 
 (0.00638) (0.00150) (0.00746) (0.00563) (0.00085) (0.00427) (0.00751) (0.00071) (0.00158) 
Post-merger 0.00768 0.0075*** 0.0140*** 0.00375 0.00739*** -0.0125 0.00457 0.0074*** -0.00187 
 (0.01246) (0.00177) (0.00418) (0.01050) (0.00177) (0.00932) (0.01041) (0.00177) (0.00330) 
Merging firm Fixed effects model 
L5.totalrev 
(billion) 
0.00561 0.00188** 0.0155 0.005** 0.00177** 0.00995* 0.0048** 0.00179** -0.00298** 
(0.00709) (0.00078) (0.01041) (0.0017) (0.00070) (0.00489) (0.00186) (0.00070) (0.00147) 
L5.totalrev^2 
(billion) 
-0.000143 -0.00003** -0.00200 -0.00005** -0.000021* -0.000471* -0.00005* 
-
0.00002** 0.0002*** 
(0.00027) (0.00001) (0.00187) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00024) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00006) 
L5.netincome 
(billion) 
-0.00356 0.00239 -0.0274 -0.0085 0.00239 -0.0163** -0.00783 0.00239 0.00204 
(0.01594) (0.00204) (0.01654) (0.0139) (0.00204) (0.00717) (0.01394) (0.00204) (0.00361) 
L5.totaldebt 
(billion) 
-0.0039** -0.0004*** -0.00236 -0.004** -0.0004*** -0.00178 -0.004** 
-
0.0004*** -0.000385 
(0.00172) (0.00013) (0.00357) (0.0018) (0.00013) (0.00778) (0.00182) (0.00013) (0.00141) 
L5.grossprofit 
(billion) 
-0.0109 0.0149** 0.0516 -0.00714 0.0149** -0.0103 -0.00768 0.0150** 0.0254 
(0.01817) (0.00720) (0.04345) (0.0168) (0.00721) (0.01700) (0.01674) (0.00721) (0.01793) 
L5.expenses -0.00208 -0.011*** 0.000327 0.00143 -0.011*** -0.0423 0.000705 -0.011*** -0.0332* 
 (0.02408) (0.00335) (0.02892) (0.0255) (0.00335) (0.03645) (0.02427) (0.00335) (0.01976) 
year=2006 baseline 
        
          
year=2007 0 0.0074*** 0.000776 0 0.00734*** -0.00565 0 0.0073*** -0.00179 
 (.) (0.00176) (0.00331) (.) (0.00176) (0.00585) (.) (0.00176) (0.00423) 
year=2008 0.000767 0.0096*** 0.00791* -0.0012 0.00948*** 0.00355 -0.00035 0.0095*** -0.00744 
 (0.00328) (0.00192) (0.00442) (0.0033) (0.00191) (0.00695) (0.00330) (0.00191) (0.00466) 
year=2009 0.00429 0.0096*** 0.00849* -0.0027 0.00939*** -0.0124** -0.00206 0.0094*** 0.00602 
 (0.00372) (0.00198) (0.00442) (0.0089) (0.00199) (0.00536) (0.00842) (0.00198) (0.00612) 
year=2010 -0.00356 -0.006*** 0.000181 -0.0036 -0.0056*** -0.0120* -0.00328 -0.006*** -0.00536* 
 (0.00532) (0.00191) (0.00358) (0.0043) (0.00191) (0.00666) (0.00404) (0.00191) (0.00270) 
year=2011 0.00892 0.0111*** 0.0144* 0.00545 0.0110*** -0.00583 0.00598 0.0110*** -0.00322 
 (0.00627) (0.00217) (0.00742) (0.0057) (0.00216) (0.00624) (0.00548) (0.00216) (0.00227) 
year=2012 0.00146 0.0051*** 0.0190*** -0.0001 0.00505*** 0.00176 0.000484 0.0050*** -0.00217 
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  WD Seagate Toshiba 
 (0.01079) (0.00193) (0.00664) (0.0093) (0.00192) (0.00432) (0.00872) (0.00192) (0.00265) 
year=2013 -0.0107 -0.006*** -0.0130** -0.0077 -0.0065*** 0.00329 -0.00799 -0.007*** -0.00259 
 (0.01039) (0.00210) (0.00605) (0.0092) (0.00209) (0.00624) (0.00842) (0.00209) (0.00251) 
year=2014 -0.00819 -0.00235* -0.0069** -0.0063 -0.00233* -0.00315 -0.00659 -0.00234* -0.0055*** 
 (0.00772) (0.00138) (0.00302) (0.0071) (0.00138) (0.00407) (0.00646) (0.00138) (0.00195) 
year=2015 0.00451 0.000312 -0.00490 0.00559** 0.000349 0.0059*** 0.00458* 0.000331 -0.0000226 
 (0.00324) (0.00134) (0.00326) (0.0024) (0.00133) (0.00203) (0.00255) (0.00133) (0.00231) 
quarter=1 baseline 
        
          
quarter=2 0.00107 0.0009*** 0.00384** 0.00056 0.0009*** -0.00101 0.000625 0.0009*** 0.000177 
 (0.00107) (0.00031) (0.00166) (0.0012) (0.00031) (0.00157) (0.00108) (0.00031) (0.00043) 
quarter=3 0.000586 0.0021*** 0.00404** 0.00007 0.00206*** -0.000485 0.000184 0.0020*** -0.000502 
 (0.00116) (0.00038) (0.00196) (0.0012) (0.00038) (0.00250) (0.00108) (0.00038) (0.00033) 
quarter=4 0.000183 0.0017*** 0.00266 -0.0004 0.00169*** -0.00318 -0.000282 0.002*** 0.000750* 
 (0.00157) (0.00045) (0.00167) (0.0013) (0.00045) (0.00279) (0.00123) (0.00045) (0.00044) 
Constant 0.00195 -0.00279 -0.0368 -0.0049 -0.00274 0.0313 -0.00430 -0.00275 0.0332* 
 (0.01927) (0.00225) (0.03447) (0.0198) (0.00225) (0.03584) (0.01945) (0.00225) (0.01753) 
Observations 511 30193 892 600 30287 806 633 30323 1394 
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Table 24: Full regression results for estimating the effect of mergers on R&D intensity 
growth (annual growth, no regressors) 
  WD Seagate Toshiba 
control 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Treatment 
effect 
0.00139 0.00631*** 0.00310 0.00371 0.00753*** 0.0111*** -0.011** -0.006*** -0.0026*** 
 
(0.00523) (0.00059) (0.00296) (0.0048) (0.00059) (0.00370) (0.00401) (0.00067) (0.00066) 
Post-merger 0.00793 0.00848*** 0.0171*** 0.00666 0.00843*** -0.00774 0.00810 0.0085*** -0.00348 
 
(0.00833) (0.00191) (0.00542) (0.0072) (0.00190) (0.00558) (0.00656) (0.00190) (0.00329) 
Merging firm Fixed effects model 
year=2006 Baseline 
        
          
year=2007 0 0.00702*** 0.00281 0 0.00697*** -0.00366 0 0.007*** -0.00142 
 
(.) (0.00197) (0.00338) (.) (0.00197) (0.00482) (.) (0.00197) (0.00420) 
year=2008 0.000642 0.00999*** 0.0101* -0.00096 0.00991*** 0.00468 -0.00013 0.0099*** -0.00720 
 
(0.00357) (0.00221) (0.00527) (0.0035) (0.00220) (0.00776) (0.00339) (0.00220) (0.00491) 
year=2009 0.00317 0.00990*** 0.0145*** -0.00328 0.00972*** -0.00660 -0.00250 0.0097*** 0.00639 
 
(0.00404) (0.00219) (0.00395) (0.0082) (0.00219) (0.00441) (0.00786) (0.00218) (0.00629) 
year=2010 -0.00971 -0.00750*** 0.00211 -0.00845 -0.0075*** -0.0165*** -0.00773 -0.007*** -0.00669** 
 
(0.00717) (0.00218) (0.00576) (0.0061) (0.00218) (0.00571) (0.00585) (0.00217) (0.00258) 
year=2011 0.00959* 0.0117*** 0.0219*** 0.0078* 0.0117*** 0.000129 0.00836* 0.0117*** -0.00333 
 
(0.00490) (0.00237) (0.00571) (0.0042) (0.00236) (0.00478) (0.00403) (0.00236) (0.00213) 
year=2012 0.00111 0.00618*** 0.0179*** -0.00116 0.00612*** 0.00175 -0.00043 0.0061*** -0.000708 
 (0.00881) (0.00208) (0.00592) (0.0077) (0.00208) (0.00494) (0.00709) (0.00208) (0.00216) 
year=2013 -0.0117 -0.00669*** -0.0121** -0.00936 -0.0067*** 0.00243 -0.00923 -0.007*** 0.000276 
 
(0.00864) (0.00185) (0.00485) (0.0076) (0.00184) (0.00522) (0.00701) (0.00184) (0.00151) 
year=2014 -0.00871 -0.00338** 
-
0.00737**
* 
-0.00760 -0.00338** -0.00144 -0.00752 -0.0034** -0.00419** 
 
(0.00702) (0.00135) (0.00260) (0.0062) (0.00134) (0.00300) (0.00564) (0.00134) (0.00179) 
year=2015 0.00536 -0.000461 -0.00467 0.0052* -0.00044 0.0082*** 0.00445 -0.000458 0.000855 
 
(0.00307) (0.00133) (0.00335) (0.0026) (0.00133) (0.00248) (0.00262) (0.00133) (0.00179) 
quarter=1 baseline 
        
          
quarter=2 0.000652 0.000551** 0.00315** 0.00051 0.000548** -0.00136 0.000537 0.00055** 0.0000177 
 
(0.00071) (0.00027) (0.00147) (0.0006) (0.00027) (0.00121) (0.00059) (0.00027) (0.00029) 
quarter=3 0.000306 0.00205*** 0.00346 0.00019 0.00204*** -0.000945 0.000231 0.0020*** -0.000530 
 
(0.00110) (0.00038) (0.00204) (0.0009) (0.00038) (0.00100) (0.00090) (0.00038) (0.00040) 
quarter=4 0.000452 0.00170*** 0.00281* 0.00051 0.00170*** -0.00160 0.000557 0.0017*** 0.000340 
 (0.00198) (0.00041) (0.00154) (0.0017) (0.00041) (0.00098) (0.00164) (0.00040) (0.00036) 
Constant 0.000156 -0.00730*** -0.012*** 0.00032 -0.0072*** 0.00497 -0.00012 -0.007*** 0.00539* 
 (0.00292) (0.00172) (0.00366) (0.0026) (0.00172) (0.00372) (0.00249) (0.00171) (0.00271) 
Observations 528 34096 928 624 34197 879 658 34234 1450 
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Table 25: Full regression results for estimating the effect of mergers on R&D intensity 
growth (quarterly growth) 
  WD Seagate Toshiba 
control 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
Other 
storage 
firms 
IT firms 
Weighted 
IT firms 
DiD -0.00231 0.000604 -0.00269 0.0047*** 0.00217*** 0.000748 -0.004*** -0.0012*** -0.0000235 
 
(0.00285) (0.00051) (0.00261) (0.00125) (0.00026) (0.00229) (0.00109) (0.00025) (0.00067) 
Post-merger 0.000713 -0.000701 0.00424* -0.000527 -0.000721 0.00622 0.000255 -0.000714 -0.00317** 
 
(0.00163) (0.00073) (0.00247) (0.00173) (0.00073) (0.00563) (0.00166) (0.00073) (0.00152) 
Merging firm Fixed effects model 
L5.totalrevenue 
(billion) 
0.00630** 0.000440 0.00127 0.0032*** 0.000469 0.00577*** 0.0032*** 0.000475 -0.00165*** 
(0.00252) (0.00031) (0.00399) (0.00069) (0.00030) (0.00184) (0.00068) (0.00029) (0.00044) 
L5.totalassets 
(billion) 
0.0223*** -0.000893 -0.00250 0.0219*** -0.000894 -0.00315 0.0218*** -0.000894 -0.00383 
(0.00331) (0.00111) (0.00719) (0.00368) (0.00111) (0.00820) (0.00366) (0.00111) (0.00369) 
L5.netincome 
(billion) 
-0.000218* -0.00000539 0.000143 
-
0.00004*** 
-0.00000479 -0.0003*** 
-
0.00004**
* 
-0.000005 0.00008*** 
(0.00010) (0.00001) (0.00071) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00009) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00002) 
L5.totaldebt 
(billion) 
-0.0031*** -0.0003*** -0.00234 -0.0033*** -0.00028*** -0.00735* -0.003*** -0.0003*** -0.00183** 
(0.00076) (0.00007) (0.00151) (0.00082) (0.00007) (0.00410) (0.00081) (0.00007) (0.00087) 
L5.grossprofit 
(billion) 
-0.0301** 0.00371** 0.0277 -0.0269** 0.00372** 0.0273 -0.0268** 0.00372** 0.00883 
(0.01086) (0.00178) (0.01699) (0.01139) (0.00178) (0.02368) (0.01134) (0.00178) (0.00833) 
year=2006 baseline 
        
          
year=2007 0 -0.000325 0.00290 0 -0.000331 0.00384 0 -0.000326 -0.00148 
 
(.) (0.00069) (0.00223) (.) (0.00069) (0.00285) (.) (0.00069) (0.00241) 
year=2008 0.00129 0.00204*** 0.00519*** 0.00142 0.00203*** 0.00441 0.00148 0.002*** -0.00196** 
 
(0.00175) (0.00075) (0.00145) (0.00155) (0.00075) (0.00295) (0.00148) (0.00075) (0.00084) 
year=2009 -0.00157 -0.00216*** 0.00255 -0.00337 -0.00219*** -0.000483 -0.00327 -0.0022*** 0.00000825 
 
(0.00208) (0.00082) (0.00189) (0.00262) (0.00082) (0.00645) (0.00248) (0.00082) (0.00280) 
year=2010 0.00198 -0.00191*** 0.00318* 0.00158 -0.00191*** 0.000877 0.00153 -0.0019*** -0.00172 
 
(0.00145) (0.00069) (0.00155) (0.00130) (0.00068) (0.00321) (0.00124) (0.00068) (0.00121) 
year=2011 0.000973 0.00381*** 0.00816** 0.000124 0.00377*** 0.00367 0.0000635 0.0038*** -0.00296*** 
 
(0.00251) (0.00072) (0.00326) (0.00235) (0.00072) (0.00335) (0.00222) (0.00072) (0.00079) 
year=2013 -0.00185 -0.000615 -0.00282 -0.000852 -0.000605 -0.00584* -0.00118 -0.000603 0.00125 
 
(0.00205) (0.00073) (0.00230) (0.00190) (0.00072) (0.00293) (0.00185) (0.00072) (0.00160) 
year=2014 -0.00102 0.000849 -0.00111 -0.000150 0.000848 -0.00571** -0.000484 0.000848 -0.000216 
 
(0.00181) (0.00061) (0.00259) (0.00172) (0.00061) (0.00273) (0.00169) (0.00061) (0.00169) 
year=2015 -0.000388 0.00108 -0.000615 0.000103 0.00108 -0.00368 -0.000150 0.00108 0.00195 
 
(0.00147) (0.00073) (0.00196) (0.00140) (0.00073) (0.00228) (0.00139) (0.00072) (0.00172) 
quarter=1 baseline 
        
          
quarter=2 -0.00839** -0.00547*** -0.00400** -0.00655** -0.00544*** 0.000442 
-
0.00639** 
-0.005*** -0.000956 
 
(0.00319) (0.00117) (0.00163) (0.00293) (0.00117) (0.00657) (0.00278) (0.00116) (0.00189) 
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  WD Seagate Toshiba 
quarter=3 
-
0.00912*** 
-0.00677*** 
-
0.00772*** 
-0.00755** -0.00675*** -0.00737** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.00259* 
 
(0.00312) (0.00076) (0.00202) (0.00282) (0.00076) (0.00313) (0.00267) (0.00076) (0.00134) 
quarter=4 -0.00915** -0.00116 -0.00265 -0.00670* -0.00113 -0.00418** -0.0067** -0.00114 -0.000410 
 (0.00367) (0.00106) (0.00204) (0.00338) (0.00105) (0.00172) (0.00320) (0.00105) (0.00133) 
Constant 0.00787** 0.00259** -0.00760 0.00597** 0.00255** -0.0145 0.00584** 0.00255** 0.00314* 
 (0.00360) (0.00105) (0.00559) (0.00272) (0.00104) (0.01045) (0.00267) (0.00104) (0.00183) 
Observations 546 32376 945 638 32477 860 673 32515 1499 
 
Table 26: Testing parallel trend - full regression results 
 
Seagate WD Toshiba 
 
Quarterly growth in 
R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
Quarterly growth in 
R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
Quarterly growth in 
R&D intensity 
Annual growth in 
R&D intensity 
year==  
2008.0000 
0.00716 0.00706 0.00200 -0.00242 0.00215** 0.00217* 
 
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00152) (0.00445) (0.000824) (0.00119) 
year==  
2009.0000 
-0.00484 -0.00854 -0.000121 0.00618 0.000631 0.00358 
 
(0.00760) (0.00758) (0.00185) (0.00390) (0.000952) (0.00273) 
year==  
2010.0000 
-0.0153** -0.0143** 0.000298 -0.00494 0.00115* 0.000643 
 
(0.00741) (0.00661) (0.00131) (0.00484) (0.000611) (0.00115) 
year==  
2011.0000 
0.00747 0.00543 0.00808* 0.0127 0.000498 0.00302 
 
(0.00722) (0.00672) (0.00442) (0.00780) (0.00109) (0.00210) 
te2008 -0.000921 0.00548 0.00218 0.0220*** -0.00817*** -0.0231*** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0110) (0.00187) (0.00537) (0.00107) (0.00161) 
te2009 -0.0000757 0.00350 0.0000420 0.00140 0.00512*** 0.0195*** 
 
(0.00915) (0.00890) (0.00226) (0.00456) (0.00113) (0.00297) 
te2010 0.000693 0.0163 0.00145 0.00748 -0.00316*** -0.00903*** 
 
(0.00652) (0.0101) (0.00178) (0.00634) (0.000760) (0.00153) 
te2011 -0.00729 -0.00709 -0.00703 -0.00441 -0.00437*** -0.0105*** 
 
(0.00803) (0.00694) (0.00436) (0.00740) (0.000945) (0.00220) 
L2.totalrev
enueb 
0.00830 
 
0.000108 
 
-0.00346*** 
 
 
(0.00559) 
 
(0.00361) 
 
(0.000871) 
 
L5.totalrev
enueb  
0.0119** 
 
0.0170 
 
-0.00735*** 
  
(0.00569) 
 
(0.0108) 
 
(0.00254) 
L2.rev2 -0.000363 
 
0.0000993 
 
0.000148*** 
 
 
(0.000228) 
 
(0.000616) 
 
(0.0000317) 
 
L5.rev2 
 
-0.000580** 
 
-0.00263 
 
0.000325*** 
  
(0.000278) 
 
(0.00213) 
 
(0.0000932) 
L2.totalass
etsb 
0.00236 
 
0.00144 
 
-0.00148** 
 
 
(0.00239) 
 
(0.00111) 
 
(0.000643) 
 
L5.totalass
etsb  
-0.00147 
 
0.00283 
 
-0.00485*** 
  
(0.00380) 
 
(0.00231) 
 
(0.00145) 
L2.netinco
meb 
0.0133 
 
-0.00396 
 
-0.00548 
 
 
(0.00908) 
 
(0.00788) 
 
(0.00487) 
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Seagate WD Toshiba 
L5.netinco
meb  
-0.0216*** 
 
-0.0302*** 
 
-0.00312 
  
(0.00627) 
 
(0.00622) 
 
(0.00305) 
L2.totaldeb
tb 
-0.00406 
 
-0.00437* 
 
-0.0000573 
 
 
(0.00683) 
 
(0.00218) 
 
(0.00116) 
 
L5.totaldeb
tb  
-0.00257 
 
-0.00497 
 
0.00328 
  
(0.0105) 
 
(0.00558) 
 
(0.00241) 
L2.grosspro
fitb 
0.0126 
 
0.0275 
 
0.0182** 
 
 
(0.0308) 
 
(0.0164) 
 
(0.00879) 
 
L5.grosspro
fitb  
0.0305 
 
0.0912** 
 
0.0488* 
  
(0.0297) 
 
(0.0332) 
 
(0.0251) 
calendar 
quarter=1       
       
calendar 
quarter=2 
-0.00314*** -0.00210 -0.00430** 0.00267 -0.00107 0.000995 
 
(0.000670) (0.00167) (0.00171) (0.00190) (0.00187) (0.000622) 
calendar 
quarter=3 
-0.0000706 -0.000383 -0.00827*** 0.00336 -0.00248* -0.000246 
 
(0.00112) (0.00225) (0.00211) (0.00224) (0.00130) (0.000435) 
calendar 
quarter=4 
0.000484 -0.00305 -0.00382* 0.00201 0.000252 0.000111 
 
(0.00144) (0.00243) (0.00187) (0.00170) (0.00145) (0.000612) 
Constant -0.0261 -0.0235 -0.00565 -0.0507*** 0.00436** 0.00989** 
 
(0.0211) (0.0205) (0.00423) (0.0135) (0.00189) (0.00460) 
Observatio
ns 
717 695 868 791 1327 1202 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
="* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01" 
    
13.1.2 Selecting the right non storage Control 
In this short additional section we present which IT firms sample performs best as 
Control. Figure 20 plots quarterly R&D intensity for Seagate against four different 
Controls as discussed in Section 6.2.3. It appears that the sample of all IT firms 
provides the closest to parallel trend. For this reason, in the analysis above we use an 
unweighted and a weighted sample of this Control. 
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Figure 20: Comparing various IT firm samples as Control against Seagate 
 
Figure 21: Comparing various IT firm samples as Control against WD 
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Figure 22: Comparing various IT firm samples as Control against Toshiba 
 
 
13.1.3 R&D intensity plots 
In the main text we use R&D intensity growth as dependent variable. For 
completeness, below we show plots looking at R&D intensity. 
Figure 23: Mean R&D intensity for WD and Control groups 
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Figure 24: Mean R&D intensity for Seagate and Control groups 
 
 
Figure 25: Mean R&D intensity for Toshiba and Control groups 
 
 
13.2 Extra material for the patent section 
13.2.1 Generating the factor variable 
Factor analysis and similarly principal component analysis are methods that can be 
used to reduce the dimension of multivariate data. The basic idea is to reduce the 
original number of multivariate variables to a lower number of factors or components, 
while preserving the maximum information (variation) of the original data. The main 
difference between factor analysis and principal component analysis is that principal 
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component analysis assumes that there are few common factors that drive the 
variation in the data, whereas factor analysis does not need such an assumption.84 
In factor analysis, factors are defined according to patent counts and patent citation 
characteristics. A starting point for factor analysis is a study of the correlation between 
the variables of interest. We correlate patent count, patent citations, patent literature 
cited by the examiner, number of inventors, number of patent claims, number of 
applicants and number of countries in which a patent is registered in Table 4. The 
correlation displayed in Table 27 has been done for the time period 2007-2014 and for 
the sample of other storage firms (other than the Treatment firms, as used in the R&D 
part). The table highlights limited pairwise correlation between the number of 
countries a patent is registered in and other variables; a modest correlation between 
patent count and patent literature; and high correlation between patent counts and 
the remaining variables: number of inventors, number of patent claims and number of 
applicants.  
Table 27: Correlation between measures of innovation 
 
N. Pat. Pat. Cit. Pat. Lit N. Inv. Pat. Claims N. Appl. 
N. 
Country. 
Number of Patents 1.00 
      
Patent Citations 0.90 1.00 
     
Patent Literature 0.61 0.65 1.00 
    
Number of Inventors 0.97 0.90 0.62 1.00 
   
Patent Claims 0.98 0.90 0.60 0.97 1.00 
  
Number of Applicants 0.99 0.89 0.60 0.96 0.98 1.00 
 
Number of Countries 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 1.00 
 
An important message that can be drawn from Table 27 is the presence of an overall 
high correlation between the variables, characteristic which fulfils one of the main 
requirements for a successful factor analysis (where success is measured in the ability 
to reduce the number of original variables into a few factors): the higher the 
correlation reported across the variables is, the better would be the definition of the 
factor(s). 
We document the estimates of the factors in Table 28. The factors are ordered 
according to the corresponding eigenvalue.  
Table 28: Selected Factors 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 5.164 5.053 0.985 0.985 
Factor2 0.111 0.062 0.021 1.007 
Factor3 0.048 0.047 0.009 1.016 
Factor4 0.002 0.008 0.000 1.016 
Factor5 -0.007 0.004 -0.001 1.015 
Factor6 -0.011 0.056 -0.002 1.013 
Factor7 -0.067 . -0.013 1.000 
Obs. 420 420 420 420 
p-val Chi2(12) 0 0 0 0 
                                          
84 In the Appendix we discuss this methodology and briefly compare it to its close substitute - 
the principal component analysis. 
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As can be seen in Table 28 the first factor’s eigenvalue is 5.164. The eigenvalue of the 
second factor is well below one. An eigenvalue of one is commonly chosen in the 
literature as the cut-off point to determine the number of factors that explain a 
sufficient proportion of the variation in the original data (Kaiser criterion). For this 
reason, a single factor is enough to capture most of the correlation in the original 
seven variables. The success of a single factor is also emphasized in the column 
“Proportion”, which indicates that the first factor explains on its own 98.5% of the 
variation in the data. The success of a single factor is also demonstrated in Table 29, 
where we provide the estimates of the factor-loading matrix, which shows that most 
of the original variables load in the first factor, and thus that first factor can be chosen 
as portmanteau of the seven original variables. 
Table 29: Factor loading matrix 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness 
Patent count 0.993 -0.104 0.010 0.003 
Patent citations 0.918 0.176 -0.010 0.126 
Patent literature 0.636 0.203 0.094 0.546 
N. inventors 0.979 0.002 -0.043 0.041 
Patent claims 0.985 -0.045 -0.078 0.023 
N. applicants 0.987 -0.131 0.028 0.008 
N. countries 0.176 -0.091 0.175 0.930 
 
 
13.2.2 Full regression results for the patent analysis 
Table 30: DiD estimates for different patent measures for Seagate 
   Patent count Patent citations 
   
Control: 
HDD patents 
of top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the 
top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Control: 
HDD 
patents of 
top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents of 
the top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Count Level Coeff 7.897*** 5.400* 6.876*** 12.108** 6.839 10.300** 
  
Std.err 0.995 2.770 1.310 4.214 4.624 4.082 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.121 0.132 0.024 0.246 0.035 0.009 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Log Coeff 1.070*** 0.715* 0.817*** 1.055*** 0.428 0.591*** 
  
Std.err 0.129 0.329 0.112 0.171 0.330 0.177 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.039 0.009 0.000 0.066 0.722 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Growth Coeff 0.005* -0.015* 0.003* -0.060 -0.036 -0.016 
  
Std.err 0.057 0.030 0.030 0.056 0.032 0.034 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.128 0.018 0.071 0.000 0.002 0.000 
    Obs 307 309 700 307 309 700 
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   Patent count Patent citations 
   
Control: 
HDD patents 
of top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the 
top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Control: 
HDD 
patents of 
top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents of 
the top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Stock Level Coeff 7.510*** 6.114* 7.295*** 11.760*** 8.003 11.768** 
  
Std.err 1.175 3.132 1.432 3.320 5.084 4.264 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 297 303 659 297 303 659 
 
Log Coeff 1.021*** 0.778** 0.897*** 1.075*** 0.470 0.735*** 
  
Std.err 0.148 0.339 0.110 0.112 0.322 0.145 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 297 303 659 297 303 659 
 
Growth Coeff -0.005* -0.005* 0.001* -0.070 -0.078** -0.066*** 
  
Std.err 0.034 0.020 0.016 0.043 0.024 0.021 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.517 0.003 0.017 0.022 0.765 0.172 
    Obs 287 293 634 287 293 634 
Moving 
average 
Level Coeff 
129.386** 
148.940
* 
123.411**
* 
313.680**
* 
362.383**
* 
328.610**
* 
  
Std.err 51.057 66.847 32.513 74.603 111.444 84.061 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 690 317 319 690 
 
Log Coeff 
1.530*** 
1.396**
* 1.331*** 1.667*** 1.636*** 1.408*** 
  
Std.err 0.328 0.295 0.184 0.281 0.208 0.179 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 690 317 319 690 
 
Growth Coeff 0.001* -0.037 -0.002 0.010 -0.050 0.008 
  
Std.err 0.010 0.026 0.011 0.012 0.028 0.014 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.629 0.050 0.170 0.111 0.962 0.098 
    Obs 307 309 666 307 309 666 
Intensity 
(count/reven
ue) 
Level Coeff 
0.004* 0.004** 0.003*** 0.007 0.024 0.004 
  
Std.err 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.017 0.003 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.029 0.000 0.250 0.007 0.026 0.127 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Log Coeff 0.004* 0.004** 0.003*** 0.007 0.022 0.004 
  
Std.err 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.015 0.003 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.025 0.000 0.248 0.007 0.033 0.144 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Growth Coeff -0.010 -0.000* 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
  
Std.err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.460 0.000 
    Obs 307 309 700 307 309 700 
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Table 31: DiD estimates for different patent measures for WD 
   Patent count 
 
Patent citation 
 
      
Control: 
HDD patents 
of top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Control: 
HDD 
patents of 
top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Count Level Coeff 7.877*** 5.380* 6.859*** 13.155** 7.886 11.397*** 
  
Std.err 0.994 2.770 1.310 4.214 4.624 4.074 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.106 0.099 0.024 0.271 0.069 0.009 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Log Coeff 
1.368*** 1.014** 1.130*** 1.377*** 0.750** 0.930*** 
  
Std.err 
0.129 0.329 0.104 0.171 0.330 0.173 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.039 0.008 0.000 0.109 0.949 0.000 
 
  Obs 
317.0 319.0 728.0 317 319 728 
 
Growth Coeff 
-0.264*** 
-
0.283*** -0.277*** -0.426*** 
-
0.400*** -0.397*** 
  
Std.err 
0.057 0.030 0.027 0.056 0.032 0.029 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.163 0.026 0.069 0.000 0.001 0.000 
    Obs 
307 309 700 307 309 700 
Moving 
average 
Level Coeff 
7.843*** 6.450* 7.645*** 13.487*** 9.730* 13.586*** 
  
Std.err 
1.175 3.132 1.426 3.320 5.085 4.247 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 
297 303 659 297 303 659 
 
Log Coeff 
1.280*** 1.039** 1.169*** 1.185*** 0.580 0.850*** 
  
Std.err 
0.148 0.339 0.102 0.112 0.322 0.143 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 
297 303 659 297 303 659 
 
Growth Coeff 
-0.046 -0.046** -0.043** -0.089* 
-
0.097*** -0.087*** 
  
Std.err 
0.034 0.020 0.016 0.043 0.024 0.020 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.588 0.001 0.024 0.724 0.318 0.179 
    Obs 
287 293 634 287 293 634 
Stock Level Coeff 
136.896** 156.44** 131.29*** 298.77*** 347.44** 312.91*** 
  
Std.err 
51.059 66.847 32.434 74.608 111.444 84.249 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 690 317 319 690 
 
Log Coeff 
1.912*** 1.779*** 1.732*** 1.464*** 1.431*** 1.193*** 
  
Std.err 0.328 0.295 0.175 0.281 0.208 0.184 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 690 317 319 690 
 
Growth Coeff 0.029** -0.009 0.028** 0.045*** -0.015 0.044*** 
  
Std.err 0.010 0.026 0.010 0.012 0.028 0.013 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.934 0.012 0.167 0.496 0.649 0.095 
    Obs 307 309 666 307 309 666 
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   Patent count 
 
Patent citation 
 
      
Control: 
HDD patents 
of top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Control: 
HDD 
patents of 
top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Intensity 
(count/reven
ue) 
Level Coeff 
0.0037* 0.004 0.003** 0.007 0.024 0.004 
  
Std.err 
0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.017 0.003 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.026 0.000 0.247 0.002 0.026 0.123 
 
  Obs 
317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Log Coeff 
0.003* 0.004 0.002** 0.007 0.022 0.004 
  
Std.err 
0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.015 0.003 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.023 0.000 0.245 0.002 0.033 0.139 
 
  Obs 
317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Growth Coeff 
-0.001*** 
-
0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003** -0.002*** 
  
Std.err 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.432 0.000 
    Obs 
307 309 700 307.000 309.000 700.000 
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Table 32: DiD estimates for different patent measures for Toshiba 
   Patent count 
 
Patent citation 
 
      
Control: 
HDD patents 
of top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the 
top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Control: 
HDD 
patents of 
top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the 
top Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Count Level Coeff -4.968*** -7.479* -6.628*** -5.235 -10.53** -7.925* 
  
Std.err 0.998 2.770 1.315 4.207 4.622 4.099 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.115 0.104 0.024 0.505 0.307 0.009 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Log Coeff -0.435*** -0.79** -0.763*** -0.495** -1.12*** -1.035*** 
  
Std.err 0.129 0.329 0.113 0.170 0.330 0.173 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.047 0.014 0.000 0.147 0.895 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Growth Coeff 0.047 0.027 0.047 -0.011 0.013 0.036 
  
Std.err 0.057 0.030 0.030 0.056 0.032 0.034 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.150 0.026 0.064 0.000 0.001 0.000 
    Obs 307 309 700 307 309 700 
Stock Level Coeff -5.356*** -6.624* -6.352*** -5.689 -9.089 -6.650 
  
Std.err 1.345 3.428 1.592 3.257 5.570 4.678 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 299.000 305.000 659.000 299 305 659 
 
Log Coeff -0.472** -0.724* -0.700*** -0.321** -0.944** -0.768*** 
  
Std.err 0.165 0.357 0.123 0.112 0.339 0.154 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 299 305 659 299 305 659 
 
Growth Coeff -0.039 -0.041* -0.034* 0.008 -0.005 0.017 
  
Std.err 0.035 0.020 0.017 0.044 0.025 0.021 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.569 0.008 0.019 0.053 0.806 0.168 
    Obs 289 295 634 289 295 634 
Moving 
average 
Level Coeff 
-91.987 -72.556 
-
109.144**
* 
-
274.691**
* 
-
226.385* 
-
289.593** 
  
Std.err 51.104 66.840 32.729 74.698 111.442 84.757 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 690 317 319 690 
 
Log Coeff -0.044 -0.179 -0.323 -0.143 -0.176 -0.494** 
  
Std.err 0.329 0.295 0.196 0.282 0.208 0.192 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Obs 317 319 690 317 319 690 
 
Growth Coeff -0.008 -0.046 -0.011 -0.006 -0.066** -0.009 
  
Std.err 0.010 0.026 0.011 0.012 0.028 0.014 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.594 0.046 0.170 0.134 0.827 0.098 
    Obs 307 309 666 307 309 666 
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   Patent count 
 
Patent citation 
 
      
Control: 
HDD patents 
of top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the 
top 
Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Control: 
HDD 
patents of 
top HDD 
patent 
holders 
(lagged 0, 
1, 2 years) 
Control: 
Flash 
patents 
of the 
top Flash 
patent 
holders 
Control: 
same 
storage 
firms as in 
R&D part 
Intensity 
(count/reven
ue) 
Level Coeff 
-0.007*** -0.007 -0.009*** -0.011* 0.006 -0.015*** 
  
Std.err 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.017 0.003 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.024 0.000 0.250 0.037 0.023 0.127 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Log Coeff -0.007*** -0.007 -0.009 -0.011* 0.004 -0.015*** 
  
Std.err 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.015 0.003 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.021 0.000 0.248 0.039 0.030 0.144 
 
  Obs 317 319 728 317 319 728 
 
Growth Coeff 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.001 0.000 0.001*** 
  
Std.err 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
  
Parallel 
trend 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.336 0.000 
    Obs 307 309 700 307.00 309.00 700.00 
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13.3 Extra material for the product characteristics section 
 
Table 33: Effect on log number of new products (full regression) 
 
Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Seagate 
     
DD -0.328*** -0.102 -0.504*** -0.00834 0.0779 
 
(0.103) (0.179) (0.152) (0.192) (0.219) 
R&D intensity -0.225 -0.151 -2.828 -1.817 -2.728 
(1year lag) (2.284) (2.911) (2.445) (2.308) (2.798) 
treat x R&D int 15.74*** 15.34*** 24.14*** 12.97** 13.42* 
 
(2.039) (4.122) (3.737) (5.318) (6.844) 
Total revenue  0.0357 0.0400 0.0494* 0.0594* 0.0668* 
(billion USD) (0.0291) (0.0282) (0.0266) (0.0275) (0.0335) 
Total profit -0.0910 -0.103 -0.128* -0.160** -0.182* 
(billion USD) (0.0721) (0.0681) (0.0663) (0.0690) (0.0864) 
Time quarters 0.0357*** 0.0364** 0.0308** 0.0322** 0.0235 
 
(0.00965) (0.0137) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0222) 
Constant -7.192*** -7.301** -6.163** -6.300** -4.450 
  (1.889) (2.755) (2.629) (2.650) (4.498) 
Observations 179 176 172 169 165 
WD 
     
DD -0.336 0.0675 0.238 -0.0839 -0.379 
 
(0.214) (0.297) (0.314) (0.322) (0.316) 
R&D intensity -0.687 -0.272 -2.007 -2.155 -2.356 
(1year lag) (2.483) (2.949) (2.904) (2.738) (3.570) 
treat x R&D int -27.73*** -33.60*** -35.77*** -28.34*** -20.57** 
 
(5.708) (6.791) (7.406) (7.801) (9.203) 
Total revenue  0.0242 0.0262 0.0383 0.0537 0.0581 
(billion USD) (0.0313) (0.0315) (0.0390) (0.0392) (0.0530) 
Total profit -0.0545 -0.0626 -0.105 -0.141 -0.153 
(billion USD) (0.0776) (0.0784) (0.105) (0.104) (0.143) 
Time quarters 0.0391*** 0.0382** 0.0243 0.0353* 0.0213 
 
(0.0112) (0.0162) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0272) 
Constant -6.802** -6.551* -3.568 -6.014* -3.242 
  (2.161) (3.184) (3.547) (3.284) (5.473) 
Observations 171 168 164 161 157 
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Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Toshiba 
     
DD -0.0255 -0.167 -0.449** -0.227 -0.101 
 
(0.112) (0.167) (0.168) (0.141) (0.108) 
R&D intensity 0.260 -0.476 -3.056 -2.070 -1.521 
(1year lag) (2.544) (2.744) (2.648) (2.555) (3.251) 
treat x R&D int -25.75*** -27.99*** -49.46*** -25.42*** -23.76*** 
 
(1.861) (3.922) (4.377) (4.039) (2.257) 
Total revenue  0.00768 0.0210 0.0444 0.0450 0.0402 
(billion USD) (0.0331) (0.0345) (0.0417) (0.0410) (0.0546) 
Total profit -0.0159 -0.0519 -0.122 -0.122 -0.111 
(billion USD) (0.0798) (0.0837) (0.111) (0.108) (0.148) 
Time quarters 0.0342** 0.0403** 0.0335** 0.0354** 0.0165 
 
(0.0113) (0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0242) 
Constant -6.564** -7.721** -6.033* -6.663** -2.745 
  (2.240) (2.729) (2.874) (2.890) (4.976) 
Observations 163 160 157 154 150 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 34: Effect on unit capacity – ln($/Gb) (full regression) 
 
Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Seagate 
     
DD 0.243 0.252 0.240 -0.0261 0.226 
 
(0.366) (0.324) (0.317) (0.383) (0.600) 
R&D intensity 11.66* 13.40** 14.84** 12.21** 11.11* 
(1year lag) (5.519) (5.418) (5.516) (5.377) (6.023) 
treat x R&D int -5.700** -7.174** -8.947** -2.087 -7.724 
 
(2.031) (2.916) (3.936) (7.175) (14.48) 
Total revenue  0.00474 -0.0126 -0.0315 -0.0318 -0.0240 
(billion USD) (0.0747) (0.0757) (0.0809) (0.0788) (0.0873) 
Total profit 0.0196 0.0700 0.132 0.147 0.119 
(billion USD) (0.141) (0.147) (0.181) (0.174) (0.201) 
Time quarters 
-
0.0609** 
-
0.0613** -0.0598* -0.0464 -0.0363 
 
(0.0215) (0.0244) (0.0318) (0.0313) (0.0302) 
Constant 11.52** 11.37** 10.92 8.093 6.139 
  (4.297) (4.895) (6.510) (6.289) (6.004) 
Observations 151 148 144 141 137 
WD 
     
DD 0.542* 0.0313 -0.0201 0.369 0.284 
 
(0.255) (0.459) (0.337) (0.351) (0.371) 
R&D intensity 14.05** 14.69** 16.35** 13.22** 11.71* 
(1year lag) (5.582) (5.844) (5.900) (5.031) (5.805) 
treat x R&D int 3.335 7.802 3.353 -6.039 -5.874 
 
(4.038) (9.294) (7.708) (5.548) (5.503) 
Total revenue  -0.0274 -0.0523 -0.105 -0.0932 -0.0903 
(billion USD) (0.0802) (0.0822) (0.0934) (0.0876) (0.0945) 
Total profit 0.0726 0.160 0.339 0.312 0.307 
(billion USD) (0.202) (0.203) (0.249) (0.237) (0.253) 
Time quarters 
-
0.0722** 
-
0.0683** -0.0693* -0.0509* -0.0343 
 
(0.0238) (0.0285) (0.0353) (0.0261) (0.0237) 
Constant 13.62** 12.58** 12.65 9.147 5.781 
  (4.673) (5.596) (7.072) (5.170) (4.767) 
Observations 143 140 136 133 129 
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Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Toshiba 
     
DD 0.0998 0.212 0.622 0.606* 1.017** 
 
(0.391) (0.349) (0.347) (0.327) (0.377) 
R&D intensity 11.13 13.42** 17.00** 14.33** 12.03* 
(1year lag) (6.258) (5.901) (5.607) (5.096) (5.731) 
treat x R&D int 15.15*** 6.723* 11.42** 
-
24.01*** 
-
32.47*** 
 
(2.129) (2.983) (4.084) (4.379) (5.301) 
Total revenue  0.00220 -0.0315 -0.108 -0.101 -0.0895 
(billion USD) (0.0767) (0.0812) (0.0967) (0.0934) (0.0971) 
Total profit -0.00258 0.102 0.343 0.334 0.307 
(billion USD) (0.193) (0.202) (0.259) (0.252) (0.259) 
Time quarters -0.0562* -0.0586* 
-
0.0752** -0.0602* -0.0375 
 
(0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0321) (0.0268) (0.0227) 
Constant 10.86* 11.12* 14.13* 11.40* 6.766 
  (5.352) (5.775) (6.532) (5.370) (4.631) 
Observations 136 133 130 127 123 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Final report 
145 
Table 35: Effect on log number of new products (Control: top 3 SSD firms) 
 
Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Seagate      
DD -1.467** -1.405 -3.320*** -2.208* -1.110 
 
(0.421) (0.983) (0.401) (0.746) (0.696) 
R&D int 8.552** 6.576 -3.078 -1.291 2.697 
(1 year lag) (1.757) (5.316) (4.228) (1.519) (2.151) 
Treat x R&D 
int 17.60** 18.02* 32.27*** 25.03** 17.56* 
 
(3.212) (6.885) (3.514) (7.561) (6.920) 
Constant 0.225 0.394 1.296** 1.089*** 0.796** 
 
(0.131) (0.397) (0.367) (0.136) (0.183) 
Observations 93 90 86 84 81 
WD 
     
DD 1.191 -1.433 -0.281 -0.963 -0.601 
 
(0.924) (1.138) (0.694) (0.568) (0.553) 
R&D int 7.133** -5.859 -12.77 -6.505 -2.140 
(1 year lag) (2.225) (10.70) (6.052) (4.992) (4.745) 
Treat x R&D 
int -24.31* 2.031 -9.610 -2.543 -2.671 
 
(8.331) (11.19) (6.052) (4.992) (4.745) 
Constant 0.971*** 2.000 2.576** 2.089** 1.753** 
 
(0.130) (0.917) (0.547) (0.476) (0.481) 
Observations 84 81 77 75 72 
Toshiba 
     
DD 0.738 1.107 -0.149 0.567** 1.862*** 
 
(0.574) (0.765) (0.209) (0.142) (0.221) 
R&D int 3.337 2.709 -8.093** -1.362 2.759 
(1 year lag) (6.464) (7.017) (2.285) (1.601) (2.311) 
Treat x R&D 
int -20.02* -28.81** -14.74*** -19.62*** -38.06*** 
 
(6.464) (7.017) (2.285) (1.601) (2.311) 
Constant 0.403 0.496 1.327*** 0.889*** 0.677** 
 
(0.438) (0.466) (0.174) (0.128) (0.183) 
Observations 78 75 72 70 67 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 36: Effect on log unit cost (Control: top 3 SSD firms) 
 
Q1 2012 Q3 2012 Q1 2013 Q3 2013 Q1 2014 
Seagate 
     
DD 0.568 2.412 3.325* 3.040 2.460 
 
(0.364) (1.459) (1.070) (1.299) (1.160) 
R&D int -0.778 10.67 17.25* 13.81 6.752 
(1 year lag) (1.884) (8.484) (7.239) (10.65) (7.509) 
Treat x R&D 
int -11.85*** -25.48* -33.49** -33.04** -28.21* 
 
(1.877) (9.956) (6.920) (8.965) (9.255) 
Constant -0.758*** -1.966* -2.689** -2.461* -1.969** 
 
(0.120) (0.652) (0.533) (0.833) (0.597) 
Observations 91 88 84 82 79 
WD 
     DD 1.617** 3.105* 2.899* 3.087* 1.643 
 
(0.394) (1.301) (1.096) (1.285) (0.923) 
R&D int -0.182 9.935 14.86 8.384 3.451 
(1 year lag) (2.590) (8.962) (7.071) (7.965) (5.069) 
Treat x R&D 
int -11.63** -25.01* -24.78** -26.30** -15.33* 
 
(2.590) (8.962) (7.071) (7.965) (5.069) 
Constant -0.963** -1.886* -2.416** -1.947** -1.543** 
 
(0.167) (0.628) (0.499) (0.590) (0.378) 
Observations 82 79 75 73 70 
Toshiba 
     DD 1.640* 2.373 2.896* 3.256* 3.697** 
 
(0.524) (1.038) (1.006) (1.150) (0.816) 
R&D int 2.702 10.53 17.51 10.95 4.849 
(1 year lag) (5.749) (8.760) (8.721) (9.617) (6.480) 
Treat x R&D 
int -42.40*** -50.21** -50.05** -63.43*** -71.15*** 
 
(5.749) (8.760) (8.721) (9.617) (6.480) 
Constant -0.580 -1.372* -2.125** -1.757* -1.449** 
 
(0.387) (0.544) (0.573) (0.646) (0.444) 
Observations 77 74 71 69 66 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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14 Technical Appendix 
14.1 General methodology 
In what follows we outline the methodology, difference-in-differences, which is widely 
used in causal inference literature and for estimating policy impact. Suppose that for a 
single product firm 𝑗 from the population we observe an outcome variable 𝑌𝑗 and a 
binary treatment variable 𝐷𝑗, which can take values 0 or 1. The outcome variable in 
this study will be a measure of innovation (R&D spending, patents, product 
performance) and the treatment variable, a dummy variable that takes value one for 
any product involved in (or affected by) the two mergers. Consider two potential 
outcomes for company 𝑗, denoted respectively as: 
𝑌𝑗 = {
𝑌𝑗
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑗 = 1
𝑌𝑗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑗 = 0
}, (1) 
where superscripts are used to denote the status of firm 𝑗 under the Treatment (1) 
versus under the Control (0). We are interested in the treatment effect, which is 
computed as the difference between the treatment (the merger) and its absence. 
Assume that the merger affects the outcome variable. For firm 𝑗 the effect of the 
merger is captured by Δ𝑌𝑗 = 𝑌𝑗
1 − 𝑌𝑗
0. However the identification and the measurement 
of this effect is logically impossible because we do not observe the same firm 𝑗 
contemporaneously both merging and not merging – i.e. each observation 𝑗 is the 
realisation of only one of the two outcomes, depending on whether the treatment 
happens 𝐷𝑗 = 1, or not, 𝐷𝑗 = 0. Consequently, we cannot perfectly infer the effect of the 
merger because we do not have the ideal counterfactual evidence, i.e. what would 
have happened with the same firm 𝑗 had it not been involved in the mergers.  
The solution is that instead of focusing on just the individual (firm) we focus on the 
average causal effect on a sample of firms and study difference between the 
treatment (𝐷𝑗 = 1) and the control (𝐷𝑗 = 0). The average treatment effect (ATE) is 
expressed in equation form as: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0)
= [𝐸(𝑌𝑗
1|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑗
0|𝐷𝑗 = 1)] + [𝐸(𝑌𝑗
0|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑗
0|𝐷𝑗 = 0)]. 
(2) 
Where the first term in square brackets on the right hand side of the equation is the 
average treatment effect of the treated (ATT) and the second term in square brackets 
is the possible selection bias.  
Assuming a constant treatment effect and maintaining the assumption of single 
product firms, the level of innovation for single-product firm 𝑗 can be formulated, 
disregarding, for simplicity, additional controls, as the linear regression equation: 
𝑌𝑗 = 𝛽0⏟
𝐸(𝑌𝑗
0)
+ 𝛽1⏟
𝑌𝑗
1−𝑌𝑗
0
𝐷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗⏟
𝑌𝑗
0−𝐸(𝑌𝑗
0)
 
(3) 
 
From which we can get the individual conditional expectations for the treatment and 
control groups respectively: 
𝐸(𝑌𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 +  𝐸(𝜀𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0) = 𝛽0 +  𝐸(𝜀𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0) 
(4) 
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The evaluation of the treatment effect 𝛽1 (key parameter, called in this case difference 
parameter) in Eq.(3) is given in full by the difference between conditional moments in 
(4):  
𝐸(𝑌𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0) = 𝛽1 + 𝐸(𝜀𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 1) − 𝐸(𝜀𝑗|𝐷𝑗 = 0)⏟                  
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠
 
(5) 
 
Eq.(5) shows that the simple difference between the treatment and the control would 
lead to a biased estimate if the error term is correlated with the incidence of the 
treatment (the merger).  
The selection bias can be eliminated or weakened by adding a time difference. By 
allowing a period before the merger, t = 0, and a period after the merger, t = 1, a DiD 
can be identified as the over time difference in expectations between treatment (1) 
and control (0): 
DiD = 𝐸(𝑌𝑗1
1 − 𝑌𝑗0
1 |𝐷𝑗1 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑗1
0 − 𝑌𝑗0
0|𝐷𝑗1 = 0) (6) 
The corresponding regression equation to produce a DiD estimator, omitting other 
controls for notational simplification, and recalling 𝑡 = {0,1}, is:  
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (7) 
and the difference-in-differences estimator: DiD = 𝛽1. The DiD estimator is an unbiased 
estimator, under regularity conditions. However the research design relies on some 
key assumptions, without which DiD estimates are going to be biased. The most 
important of those stems from the choice of the Control (counterfactual). For this 
reason in the main text we provide detailed discussion on the choice of the Control, 
and results of tests on how each Control satisfies the assumptions required for 
unbiased DiD. 
14.1.1 An example – the model estimated for the R&D section 
We observe R&D expenditure for each calendar quarter t, starting with Q1 2007 and 
finishing with Q2 2016. Out of 𝑇 = 40 total time periods, there are 𝑇0-1 time periods 
measured prior to the mergers that take place in period 𝑇0, implying that 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇0 −
1, 𝑇0, 𝑇0 + 1,… , 𝑇}. 
There are 𝐽0 firms in the Control group in the sample and 𝐽1 in the Treatment group. 
Therefore indexing each firm by 𝑗, we have 𝑗 ∈ {1, … 𝐽0, … , 𝐽0 + 𝐽1}. 
Denote by 𝑥𝑗𝑡 a (𝐾 × 1) vector of time-dependent firm characteristics: total assets, 
gross profit, income, total revenue, total debt, total employees, total operating 
expenses, profitability (the ratio of net income to total assets), growth in revenue, 
growth in R&D (percentage change in R&D expenditures between two consecutive 
periods).  
Denote by 𝜇𝑗 firm fixed effects, and by 𝜇𝑡 unobserved time period characteristics. 
We use the following model to estimate the effect of the mergers on R&D intensity 
growth in the more general time setting, t={ 1,… , 𝑇0 − 1, 𝑇0, 𝑇0 + 1,… , 𝑇}: 
𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡−4 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑗𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑗 + 𝜑𝑥𝑗𝑡−5 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 (8) 
Where 𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 is R&D intensity for firm 𝑗 in the calendar quarter t. In the main model we 
estimate impact on the annual absolute growth in R&D intensity, hence the left-hand 
side expression. In the headlined model we did not allow for contemporaneous effect 
of firm characteristics, which explains the subscript in 𝑥𝑗𝑡−5. Our main results were not 
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sensitive to This choice did not affect our main results. 𝐷𝑗 indicates whether firm j was 
involved in one of the two mergers, 𝐼𝑡 denotes whether period t was pre, or post-
merger notification (Q2 2011), 𝜀𝑗𝑡 are idiosyncratic shocks with mean zero.  
In this design 𝐷𝑗 = 0 if j = {control firms}, and 𝐷𝑗 = 1 if j = {Seagate, Western_Digital, 
Toshiba}. It is important to point out that the Treatment group only contains the two 
acquiring firms, i.e. we are excluding Samsung and Hitachi. This might be an 
unconventional move for studies estimating the price impact of mergers, because 
there the focus is on an output variable (price) that is relevant with respect to all 
merging firms. In the present case we are studying how R&D intensity (which is firm, 
rather than market specific) changed for Seagate and Western Digital. In this respect 
we are uninterested in Samsung and Hitachi, who no longer have operations in the 
relevant products.  
In this model 𝛽1 is the treatment effect: 
𝛽1 = 𝐸(𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡−4|𝐷𝑗 = 1, 𝑡 = 𝑇0 + 1) −  𝐸(𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡−4|𝐷𝑗 = 0, 𝑡 = 𝑇0 + 1) (9) 
Below we give further details of each case proposal addressing specific issues of 
counterfactual selection, the measurement of innovation, potential biases, and data 
availability. 
14.2 Testing for parallel trends 
We applied two methods for testing for parallel trends. In the first one (used in the 
R&D Sections) for each time period (calendar year) 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇0, we denote the binary 
indicator 𝐼𝑡. To test for parallel trends before the merger, we estimate: 
𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡 − 𝑟𝑑𝑗𝑡−4 = 𝛼 +∑ (1 − 𝐼𝑡)(𝛽𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡𝐷𝑗)
𝑇0
𝑡=1
+ 𝜑𝑥𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
 
(10) 
Where 𝛾𝑡 is the DiD estimator for each year. If 𝛾𝑡 ≠ 0 in any year before the merger, it 
would be evidence, that R&D intensity growth changes at a different pace (i.e. there is 
no parallel trend) for the Treatment and the Control. 
The second test is more restrictive and studies the existence of a parallel (linear) 
trend before the merger. We employ this method in the patent and the product 
characteristics section. Because we are estimating a simple DiD model that compares 
pre and post change over Treatment and Control, parallel in linear pre-2012 linear 
trends should be sufficient for our purpose. The equation of interest can be written as 
(𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡 denotes the number of patents for firm j at time t): 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑗𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑗+𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑗𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑧𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
The treatment and control groups have a parallel (linear) trend if the coefficient 𝛽5 is 
not statistically different from zero. 
14.3 Factor analysis and principal component analysis  
Factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA) are methods that exploit 
the correlation among observed variables to reduce the original number of 
multivariate variables to a lower number of unobserved variables called factors or 
components. This reduction in the number of variables occurs while preserving the 
maximum information (variation) of the original data. Both methods abstain from 
presenting statistical model distinction between dependent and independent variables. 
The main difference between FA and PCA lies on the fact that principal component 
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analysis assumes that there are few common factors that drive the variation in the 
data, whereas factor analysis does not need such type of restrictive assumption.  
This section will explain the factor, as this is the method that we have employed in the 
main text to reduce the number of patent variables to a smaller number of common 
factor, which in our case was only one single factor.  
If variables can be grouped in a way that they have high correlation between them 
and limited correlation with variables in other groups, then each group can be 
represented by a factor. This procedure eliminates the problem of multicollinearity, 
which can be problematic in regression analysis, allowing one to identify underlying 
patterns in data, which could largely explain the observed variables (variance and 
covariance). The number of groups of correlated variables gives the number of factors 
that can be used to explain the original variables. The factor analysis is an attempt to 
approximate the covariance matrix of the original variables. 
Methodology 
Let denote with 𝒙 = [𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑞] an observed random vector made of 𝑞 elements. 
Assuming 𝑇 to be the data dimension, we can express with 𝑿 the data matrix, whose 
dimension is 𝑇 × 𝑞. This allows us to identify the first principal component vector, 
denoted by 𝒇1, by multiplying the data matrix with a loading factor vector of size 𝑞 × 1, 
𝒂1, yielding 𝒇1 = 𝑿𝒂1. The inner product of the principal component vector, 𝒇1
′ 𝒇1 =
∑𝑡=1
𝑇 𝑓1𝑡
2 = 𝒂1
′𝑿′𝑿𝒂1, is the function that need be maximised. When data are standardised, 
by subtracting the mean and dividing by the corresponding variance-covariance 
matrix, the inner product of the data matrix, 𝑿′𝑿, is the correlation matrix of the data 
(otherwise it would be the variance-covariance matrix). According to the unit of 𝒂1, we 
need to choose a normalisation that determines a scale, and it is a common practice 
to use 𝒂1
′𝒂1 = 1 as normalization, leading to a constrained maximization, which can be 
expressed by the Lagrangian function, 
𝐿 = 𝒂1
′𝑿′𝑿𝒂1 − 𝜆1(𝒂1
′𝒂1 − 1), 
whose first order condition with respect to the loading factor is: 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝒂1
: 𝑿′𝑿𝒂1 − 𝜆1𝒂1 = 𝟎. 
We can identify the parameter 𝜆1 as the largest eigenvalue, and 𝒂1 as the equivalent 
eigenvector. Thus, when data are standardised, 𝜆1 suggests the proportion of variation 
in 𝑿 explained by the first principal component. We can obtain all the other principal 
components in a similar fashion, and they will be uncorrelated (orthogonal). Then, 
following this approach we will obtain 𝑚 < 𝑝 new variables, which are linear 
combinations of the original 𝑿, that is 𝑭 =  𝑿𝑨, where 𝑭 identifies the 𝑇 ×𝑚 matrix 
factors. To select how many factors to use, we consider eigenvalues from a principal 
components analysis. The factor equivalent to the r largest eigenvalues will be 
employed. Two interpretations are possible, either the eigenvalues suggest the 
equivalent number of variables which the factor represents, or the eigenvalues identify 
the amount of variance in the data described by the factor. To choose those 
eigenvalues, different approaches are taken. A good rule of thumb is that the number 
of eigenvalues must be greater than 1. 
The factor analysis is made of a linear dependence of correlations between variables, 
summarizing correlation structure. More specifically, the factor model postulate that 𝑿 
is linearly dependent upon a few unobservable random variables, 𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑚, called 
common factors. Then, we can represent a standardized factor model as 
𝑥1 − 𝜇1 = 𝑙11𝑓1 + 𝑙12𝑓2 +…+ 𝑙1𝑚𝑓𝑚 + 𝜀1 
𝑥2 − 𝜇2 = 𝑙21𝑓1 + 𝑙22𝑓2 +…+ 𝑙2𝑚𝑓𝑚 + 𝜀2 
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    ⁞ 
𝑥𝑝 − 𝜇𝑝 = 𝑙𝑝1𝑓1 + 𝑙𝑝2𝑓2 +…+ 𝑙𝑝𝑚𝑓𝑚 + 𝜀𝑝 
 
where 𝑙𝑝𝑚is the loading factor of the p
th observed variable, for the mth factor. In matrix 
form we can write as the above system of linear simultaneous equations for each 
observation 𝑡 (omitted in the notation below) as 
 
𝒙 − 𝝁 = 𝑳𝒇 + 𝜺, 
 
where 𝑳𝒇 identifies the common part, and 𝜺 the error is defined as the unique part. 
The common and unique parts are estimated iteratively to predict B (correlation 
matrix between variables), since they are unobservable. This latter characteristic 
differentiates the factor model from the multivariate regression model in which the 
independent variables can be observed. As factor models deal with many 
unobservable quantities, which makes difficult a direct check, specific assumptions of 
the random vectors 𝒇 and 𝜺, are introduced. More specifically, random vectors 𝒇 and 𝜺 
are assumed to have the following mean and covariances: 
𝐸(𝒇) = 𝟎 and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒇) = 𝐸[𝒇𝒇′] = 𝑰 
𝐸(𝜺) = 𝟎 and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝒇) = 𝐸[𝜺 𝜺 ′] =В, and 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜺𝒇) = 𝐸[𝜺𝒇′] = 𝟎, 
where B is a diagonal matrix of possible heteroskedastic variances. For the loading 
factor matrix L, columns represent the derived factors, whereas rows represent input 
variables. The loading factor defines the degree to which each of the variables 
“correlates” with each of the factors, and it ranges from -1 to 1. An inspection of the 
loading factor reveals the extent to which each of the variables contributes to the 
meaning of each of the factors, which means high loadings provide meaning and 
interpretation of factors (i.e. regression coefficients). 
As factor models are linear in the common factors, the portion of the variance of the ith 
variable (with 0 < 𝑖 < 𝑝), explained by m common factors, is called the ith communality. 
The part of the variance of 𝑥𝑖 explained by a specific factor is called uniqueness, or 
specific variance. Thus the variance of 𝑥𝑖 is the sum of squares of the loading factors 
of the ith variable on the m common factors and the specific variance 
𝜎𝑖𝑖
2 = 𝑙𝑖1
2 + 𝑙𝑖2
2 +⋯+ 𝑙𝑖𝑚
2 + 𝜁𝑖 . 
 
For standardised data, the sum of communality and uniqueness is equal to one, and 
then we can obtain uniqueness by subtracting communality from 1. If data are 
informative, communality is high, whereas if data are not very informative it is 
uniqueness to be high. Intuitively, we can deduce that variables with high 
communality share more in common with the rest of the variables. 
In the past, factors have been estimated by using parametric likelihood specification 
(for example Kalman filter). In the more recent time, nonparametric averaging 
methods are applied, as the principal component analysis, which will be used to order 
the factors by their importance. The principal component analysis helps deciding: (i) 
the type of factor analysis,  (ii) number of factors is equivalent to number of variables, 
and (iii) each factor is a weighted combination of the input variables. 
Feasibility study on the microeconomic impact of enforcement of competition policies on innovation 
 
152 
Abstract 
While there is an extensive literature on the relationship between market competition and 
innovation at the aggregate level, there are far fewer case-specific accounts of this relationship, 
particularly on the effects of specific competition policy interventions on innovation. The 
objective of this study was to offer a detailed literature review, develop a methodological 
framework for ex post evaluating such impacts, collect data, and provide preliminary results on 
how innovation was affected by the 2012 consolidation of the HDD market (involving the 
Seagate/Samsung and Western Digital/HGST mergers). Following a Schumpeterian trichotomy, 
we evaluate the impact of this consolidation on three layers of innovation: research spending, 
patent activity, and the characteristics of newly marketed products. Our results show a 
heterogeneous response, with one of the acquiring firms, Seagate, displaying increased 
innovation on all three levels. This is consistent with an interpretation that, notwithstanding the 
increased concentration, the HDD market remains contestable, mainly from other storage 
technologies (as predicted by the European Commission in 2011). We found no impact on 
Western Digital’s R&D spending, or product characteristics, but an increase in their patent 
activity. The study provides detailed explanations for these results, together with important 
methodological contributions on how to use R&D, patent and product characteristics data to ex-
post evaluate the impact of competition policy on innovation. 
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